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The objective of this study was to examine whether representations of nonhuman animals could affect 
prejudice toward immigrants. Previous research has indicated that belief in a large divide between 
humans and other animals may underlie dehumanization and prejudice, whereas a belief in the 
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Specifically, the effect of the animals are like humans editorial on prejudice toward immigrants was 
examined, as well as the potentially mediating roles of humanization (traits and emotions), empathy, 
and recategorization. Values were also analyzed, to determine if and how one’s moral universe relates 
to these variables. Further, the social representations held about the groups Finn, Immigrant, Animal, 
and Human were examined, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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content, and all traits and half of the emotions were significantly attributed to either Finns or 
immigrants, corresponding to stereotypic social representations of each group.  
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Finally, word associations for Finn, Immigrant, Animal, and Human were examined in total and by 
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Animal groups were discussed, and the valences given to all groups were analyzed and found to differ 
significantly across groups. Additionally, a significant effect of the experimental condition on the 
Immigrant group was found.  
 
The mixed results are discussed in light of methodological concerns and cultural implications. Overall, 
results indicate that representations of nonhuman animals may affect prejudice toward immigrants, and 
that targeting these representations could be a promising prejudice reduction method. Further research 
accounting for the issues raised by this study should be conducted. 
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1 Introduction 
Prejudice is a central area in social psychology because it is a massive social problem 
for which solutions need to be found. Intergroup enmity is increasing throughout much 
of the world; it is even becoming socially and politically acceptable to openly endorse 
prejudice toward certain outgroups, which has not been the case for several decades. 
Right wing, anti-immigrant political parties are on the rise throughout Europe, and 
similar rhetoric is beginning to crop up in immigrant-based societies, such as the United 
States and even Canada. This is a serious domestic issue in many countries, as well as a 
concern for international relations. Prejudice must be addressed for its own sake, as well 
as so that global solutions can be found and implemented to combat our shared 
problems such as climate change, worldwide resource depletion, and overpopulation.  
Prejudice toward various human groups has been studied extensively in social 
psychology and other disciplines. However, even with the planet-wide problems facing 
our world today, one aspect that has not been scrutinized thoroughly is biases toward 
nonhuman (NH) animals1 and/or the rest of the natural world, or whether there is a 
relationship between biases against NH animals and prejudice toward other humans. In 
this study, I wanted to find a way to examine these different – but I believe intimately 
related – topics.2 My original inquiry could be summed up as such: if you include 
nonhuman animals and/or the natural world within your sphere of moral inclusion, are 
you then more likely to include other outgroups in your moral universe?3 
A recent approach has postulated that the roots of prejudice, and specifically 
dehumanization, grow out of cultural beliefs in a wide divide between humans and other 
                                               
1 I use the term nonhuman (NH) animals, as is the custom among many researchers in this subject (e.g., 
Kwan, Gosling, & John, 2008), to highlight the scientific reality that humans are also animals. The very 
fact that we do not consider ourselves to be, and that we socially recognize the term “animal” to mean all 
other creatures, is just one example of the exaggerated animal-human divide being examined. 
2 In the interest of full disclosure, although my research almost exclusively discusses how representations 
of NH animals affect human issues, I am equally concerned with how they affect NH animals and the rest 
of the natural world. In this way, I see minimizing the animal-human divide as beneficial to both humans 
and other animals, and to life across the planet more generally. 
3 Moral universe, or moral ingroup, consists of “(categories of) persons to whom (s)he thinks (s)he has 
duties and/or who (s)he thinks are equal to her or him” (Helkama, 2009, p. 139, brackets in original). 
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animals. Viewing humans as a distinct and exceptional group, separate from and 
superior to the rest of the natural world, allows one to exclude all NH animals from 
moral consideration. It also provides a referent category into which other, disliked 
human groups can be put. This thesis is an investigation of this topic; specifically, it is a 
replication of Costello and Hodson’s (2010) experiment, with several variations. I 
attempt to induce the perception of humans and other animals as part of a continuum, 
rather than being strictly divided, to see if this lessens the degree to which participants 
feel prejudiced towards immigrants. This intervention is intended to increase 
humanization (traits and emotions), empathy, and recategorization, each of which is also 
theorized to decrease prejudice. Beyond the replication, I also explore the social 
representations that are held of Finns, immigrants, animals, and humans; how they 
related to each other and how they relate to prejudice. 
Following the introduction in section 1, the extensive and varied theoretical 
underpinnings of this research is discussed in section 2. Section 2.1 addresses prejudice, 
and is comprised of a brief overview of some of the mainstream theories (2.1.1), the 
intersection of various prejudices (2.1.2), and prejudice’s relationship with 
dehumanization (2.1.3). Section 2.2 focuses on dehumanization and, inversely, 
humanization, including the socially represented nature of dehumanization (2.2.1), 
studies on those emotions and traits that are considered to be either uniquely human or 
not uniquely human (2.2.2), and (de)humanization’s links to recategorization and 
empathy (2.2.3). Recategorization makes up the subject of section 2.3, namely the 
application of recategorization (2.3.1), and recategorization’s relationship with both 
empathy and one’s moral universe (2.3.2). Section 2.4 is an exploration of empathy, 
addressing dispositional empathy and other traits (2.4.1), inducing empathy (2.4.2), and 
empathy’s relationship to one’s moral universe (2.4.3). This leads into section 2.5 and 
an examination of moral universe, both specifically via Schwartz’s perspective (2.5.1), 
and in terms of the animal-human divide and hierarchy (2.5.2). Section 2.6 surveys a 
few issues pertinent to NH animals more generally within science, culture, and history. 
These include a brief historical analysis of the roots and propagation of the animal-
human divide (2.6.1), a look at the links between attitudes toward humans and other 
animals, both historically and empirically (2.6.2), NH animals in science, notably 
anthropomorphism and its counterpart, anthropodenial (2.6.3), as well as the effect of 
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culture (2.6.4). Finally, section 2.7 outlines Costello and Hodson’s (2010) study, both 
what they found in their first exploration of the subject (2.7.1), as well as the results of 
their attempt to experimentally induce continuity between humans and other animals 
(2.7.2), after which I will briefly introduce this study (2.7.3). 
Once the background has been addressed, the research questions are delineated in 
section 3. They are divided into those questions relating to the replication of Costello 
and Hodson’s (2010) study (3.1), as well as those unique to this study, which address 
the social representations of the groups in question (3.2), regarding traits and emotions 
in the questionnaires (3.2.1) as well as the qualitative word association questions 
(3.2.2). Next is methodology in section 4. This includes participants (4.1), instruments 
(4.2), and the analytical strategy (4.3), split into strategies used for the quantitative data 
(4.3.1), and those used for the qualitative data (4.3.2). This is followed by the results in 
section 5, once more broken into the replication results (5.1), and the social 
representation results (5.2), by emotions and traits (5.2.1) and word associations (5.2.2). 
The discussion is presented in section 6, comprised of general discussion (6.1), 
methodological issues (6.2), the study’s strengths and contributions to the field (6.3), 
suggestions for future research (6.4), and final thoughts (6.5). A number of appendices 
are also included, after the references.  
2 Theoretical Background 
There is a wide breadth of research that applies to this study that must be addressed. 
This includes contributions from multiple sub-disciplines of social psychology, as well 
as from outside of the field. However, one theoretical framework frames most of the 
study, which must be explicated, and that is social representations theory (SRT). SRT is 
at the crossroad between individuals and society, as well as between the cognitive and 
social (Sakki & Pirttilä-Backman, 2009), making it a natural framework through which 
to examine this topic. Though no absolute definition of SRT exists, Sakki (2010) has 
articulated it in this way: “Social representations have two primary functions, they 
enable people to master their material and social worlds and they enable people to 
communicate. Social representations are shared knowledge by a community” (p. 39). A 
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forthright examination of this shared knowledge, particularly about the animal-human 
divide, underpins this thesis. 
The key variables are prejudice, dehumanization, recategorization, empathy, and moral 
universe, so each will be attended to in turn. Further, the topic of NH animals and their 
relationship to prejudice must be socially anchored and explicated, which necessitates 
some level of scrutiny about how they are framed and enacted within society more 
broadly. Finally, before going into the details of this study, Costello and Hodson’s novel 
approach and findings must be examined in brief. To begin, prejudice will be addressed. 
2.1 Prejudice 
Prejudice has been discussed and defined in numerous ways over the years by both 
researchers and laypeople, sometimes in contrasting and even contradictory ways. For 
example, there has been a historical debate in social psychology about whether all 
thought is inherently prejudiced, versus whether prejudiced thought is fundamentally 
different from non-prejudiced thought (Billig, 1985). There have been controversies 
about whether prejudice is always necessarily bad, whether it is simply an attitude (and 
what is meant by attitude), and how closely behaviour is related to said attitude 
(Duckitt, 1992). Some researchers question if prejudice really needs to include 
derogation of outgroups, or if it can simply mean “preferential positivity toward 
ingroups” (Brewer, 1999, p. 430). These dialogues have abounded ever since Gordon 
W. Allport’s (1979/1954) famous treatise on the subject, which made prejudice – and its 
nature – a focal point in social psychology. According to Allport (1979/1954): “Ethnic 
prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt 
or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual 
because he [sic] is a member of that group” (p. 9). This definition alone contains 
numerous debates within it. 
Some researchers distinguish between a traditional form of overt, blatant prejudice and 
a more recent type of covert, subtle prejudice (e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). 
Others examine the various moderators of prejudice (see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002). Some concentrate exclusively on certain elements of prejudice; for example, 
there have been numerous critiques of models that focus on cognition and miss other 
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important factors, such as Tajfel’s social cognitive approach to prejudice (Billig, 2002). 
What is obvious is that prejudice is a central focus in social psychology. As noted by 
Brewer (1997): “Understanding prejudice and intergroup conflict invokes virtually 
every area of social psychological inquiry—including the study of person perception, 
social attitudes, aggression, self-esteem, social comparison, equity, cooperation and 
competition, conformity and compliance, and group identification. Further, the study of 
prejudice crosses all our levels of analysis, from intraindividual to interpersonal to 
intergroup processes” (p. 198). It seems that almost every area of social psychology can 
be applied, in one way or another, to the understanding of prejudice. 
Paluck and Green (2009) recently conducted an overarching review of hundreds of 
published and unpublished studies on prejudice reduction and have designated a simple 
yet comprehensive definition based upon those regularly used by prejudice researchers, 
namely that prejudice is “a negative bias toward a social category of people, with 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral components” (p. 340). This is the working 
definition that will be kept in mind throughout the following discussion, paired with this 
crucial addition from Moscovici (2010): “What we call a prejudice is neither an 
expression nor a definition of a given reality, but of the goal or aim of a group or a 
society” (p. 3). Some pertinent theories about prejudice will now be examined, as well 
as the intersectional nature of prejudice, and how it is linked to dehumanization. 
2.1.1 Social psychological theories of prejudice 
There are almost as many theories about prejudice as there are definitions of it. These 
theories understandably differ depending on what definition is used, but also depending 
on the ontology and epistemology of the theorists. One notable distinction is contingent 
upon where on the continuum from realism to constructionism the theorist falls; that is, 
whether they believe in a knowable reality hidden in a person’s mind, based on such 
things as their personality, upbringing, and cognitive abilities, or whether they believe 
that all reality is socially constructed and dependent upon context. Still others see these 
two elements as concurrent rather than contradictory. (Madill, Jordan, & Shirley, 2000.) 
Prejudice has been researched in all main sub-fields of social psychology; social 
cognition (e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994), social identity theory (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2002; Tajfel, 1970), social 
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representations (e.g., Joffe & Staerklé, 2007; Moscovici & Perez, 1997), and discursive 
psychology (e.g., Billig, 1985; Augoustinos, Tuffin, & Rapley, 1999); some even bridge 
several sub-fields (e.g, Potter & Wetherell, 1998; Verkuyten, 2005). Prejudice has been 
studied within each sub-discipline from different angles (see e.g., Augoustinous, 
Walker, & Donaghue, 2006). As noted, prejudice is incredibly complex; thus, theories 
about it generally focus on a certain type or factor, while acknowledging (explicitly or 
implicitly) that other elements are involved (Duckitt, 1992).  
One of the earliest social cognitive theories of prejudice, the authoritarian personality, 
suggests that people are predisposed to prejudice when their personality is characterized 
by rigidity of thought, deference and anxiety toward authorities, conformity to 
conventions, and scapegoating weaker members of society. Its early methodology was 
somewhat flawed, which for a time lessened the enthusiasm for this theory and its 
explanatory power. (Brown, 1995.) However, authoritarianism along with a later 
incarnation, termed social dominance orientation (which indicates the desire for ones 
ingroup to maintain dominance or superiority over outgroups), have had a recent 
resurgence as explanatory factors for prejudice and have been shown quite conclusively 
to predict prejudice (McFarland, 2010; as well as Costello & Hodson, 2010). An 
inversely related personality characteristic is empathy, which will be discussed in detail 
in section 2.4. Allport’s (1979/1954) well-known quote: "Defeated intellectually, 
prejudice lingers emotionally" (p. 328), is well founded and has stood the test of time. 
Emotions play a central role in prejudice, and ought to be addressed for interventions to 
be effective (see Sinisterra, Finell, & Geschke, 2009, for an overview of recent research 
on prejudice and emotions). 
Another early and leading theory, intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1979/1954), 
stipulates that individuals may be afraid of the unknown, and may assume that those 
unlike them are much more different than they may actually be, which produces fear, 
anxiety, and feelings of threat (Stephan & Finlay, 1999), though this varies from person 
to person. Contact theory affirms that interaction between groups improves intergroup 
relations, which has been widely proven to be true, although only under specific 
conditions (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, for a review). If contact with an outgroup 
member is generalized to the entire outgroup, this will occur for both positive and 
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negative experiences, so contact also has the potential to exacerbate intergroup tensions 
(Brown, 1995). Among the many refinements suggested to boost positive contact (see 
e.g., Hewstone et al., 2002), an additional extension to the theory has been delineated, 
namely extended contact theory. This theory suggests that even knowing that an ingroup 
member has a close relationship with an outgroup member can act as a positive model, 
leading to better intergroup relations (Liebkind & McAlister, 1999). This minimizes the 
chances of negative experiences while retaining the positive aspects of contact theory. 
Other early causal theories include tension between models of prejudice that assume an 
inherent instinct for aggression that precludes rational thought, and models with a 
rational cognitive approach that emphasizes the changeable nature of prejudice and 
revolts against the idea that humans are hardwired for outgroup aggression. There is a 
fear that presumption of such an instinct at best merely accepts prejudice as inevitable 
and at worst can justify or condone it. (Billig, 2002.) The more cognitively oriented 
theories of prejudice can slip into similar problems if they over-rely on categorization as 
an explanatory tool for prejudiced thinking. This can lead to the same inevitability 
problem in that all human thinking requires categorization, therefore potentially all 
thinking predisposes humans to prejudgement, a supposition that has been heavily 
criticized (Billig, 1985). Both prejudiced and non-prejudiced thought requires and 
makes use of both categorization and particularization. 
Another critique of this issue has come from social representations theory. Moscovici 
and Perez (1997) suggest that it is rather more likely that categorizations are used 
intentionally to magnify even slight distinctions (e.g., “the well-known narcissism of 
minor differences,” p. 29) in order to make the outgroup more different from oneself 
than they actually are, to make them completely other. This perspective of 
categorization sees it as a rather more effortful pursuit, whereby differences are 
overblown and similarities dismissed, for the very purpose of separating oneself from 
the other.4 To take gypsies as an example, “It really seems too far-fetched to imagine 
                                               
4This argument is of course not limited to SRT. For example, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) note that, for 
the past three decades, there has been increasing acknowledgment throughout social psychology that 
people only act like cognitive misers in “momentary conditions” (p. 395) and that generally, people 
process information in a more detailed and nuanced way, corresponding to their aims in a given situation.  
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that people discriminate against the Gypsies as a result of erroneous generalizations or 
for the sake of conserving mental energy. The history of oppression shows, on the 
contrary, that a great deal of mental energy, physical violence, strategic skill… and a 
whole cultural tradition had to be mobilized on its behalf” (Moscovici & Perez, 1997, p. 
35). They further postulate that the discriminatory power of prejudice may well be more 
about repudiating likeness than about emphasizing dissimilarities per se: that it may be a 
deliberate effort to exclude (Moscovici & Perez, 1997).  
Theorists with a constructivist viewpoint also emphasize the socially constructed nature 
of prejudice, and how that prejudice arises directly out of discourse (Billig, 1985). 
Considerable evidence has been found to indicate the “situational specificity of 
prejudice” both in smaller and more regional groups as well as more broadly at the 
societal level; theories focusing solely on individual thoughts or feelings simply cannot 
fully explain the homogeny of prejudice across a population in certain times and places 
(Brown, 1995). Prejudices are not merely isolated thoughts within individuals’ heads (or 
isolated feelings within their hearts) but are rather a part of social life and shared 
ideologies. That is, “if ideologies are said to encompass emotions, this does not mean 
that emotions should be seen as free-floating psychological impulses, lying behind 
ideologies or social categories. They exist within socially shared explanations, 
blamings, accountings, and so on” (Billig, 2002, p. 184).  
Broadly, causal theories of prejudice fall into one of three different general categories: 
cognitive, psychodynamic, or sociocultural. Each of their popularity has waxed and 
waned over the years for a variety of reasons, and some resonate more for different 
theorists than for others. Nonetheless, all of them can account for or explain certain 
aspects of prejudice, and they are perhaps best viewed as a collection of concurrent 
causes, rather than mutually exclusive possibilities. (Duckitt, 1992.) 
2.1.2 Intersectionality of prejudices 
These theories of prejudice are each pieces of the puzzle, but one thing that is not often 
made explicit in social psychology and many other fields are the complexities between 
the different prejudices experienced by certain individuals, as well as the relationships 
between various prejudices (Gaines, & Reed, 1995). For example, an African-American 
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woman does not experience sexism and racism in two separate, distinct ways, but rather 
these two oppressions intersect and provide a particular quality to the prejudice directed 
towards her. This has been termed intersectionality research by Crenshaw (1991), and it 
examines the ways in which oppressions based upon nationality, sex, class, ethnicity, 
sexuality, etc. interrelate and produce unique forms of oppression that are greater than 
the sum of their parts, and cannot be wholly understood by looking at them separately.5  
Intersectionality is a complex concept, originally formulated as a feminist sociological 
methodology, but which has been further broadened since its inception (Knudsen, 
2006). This includes a comprehensive understanding of how various forms of prejudice 
intersect in a more abstract way, in that prejudice is prejudice is prejudice, regardless of 
who or what it is directed toward. This is where it applies to Costello and Hodson’s 
(2010) and the present study of the topic, in seeing the correspondences between biases 
against NH animals and prejudice toward human outgroups. Parallels between the 
oppression of women and NH animals have been explored in detail (Adams, 1990), and 
multiple human rights movements (e.g., suffrage, civil rights, and Ghandi’s nonviolent 
campaign) have likewise been directly or indirectly involved with the welfare of NH 
animal (Patterson, 2002; Singer, 1990). This will be explored further in section 2.6.2. 
2.1.3 Prejudice and dehumanization 
Costello and Hodson (2010) have proposed the theory that prejudice is inescapably 
based upon dehumanization, that it is central to its very core. Their work was guided by 
the premise that “dehumanization depends on a perceived divide between humans and 
non-human animals” (p. 10), suggesting that narrowing the animal-human divide can 
“undermine the ability to dehumanize” by “removing the legitimacy of outgroup 
dehumanization” (p. 5). This is an extension of recent work in social psychology, 
primarily by Haslam and colleagues (2005, 2006, 2007), which looks at dehumanization 
in a different way than it has traditionally been considered. Historically, dehumanization 
was assumed to be an extreme version of prejudice, a version on the most cruel and 
vicious end of the continuum (Haslam, Loughnan, Reynolds, & Wilson, 2007). This is 
                                               
5 See Doise, Deschamps , & Meyers (1978) for a somewhat conceptually similar discussion of 
intracategory similarities and differences with regards to social identity theory. 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     16 
   
still a popularly understood meaning of the word in public discourse. However, in social 
psychology, many researchers have determined that it can also “take on subtle and 
everyday forms” (Haslam et al., 2007, p. 409).6 Dehumanization is therefore not a form 
of prejudice, but rather an underlying and inextricable part of prejudice.  
Dehumanization and its inverse, humanization, will now be examined in more detail, 
including its socially represented nature, uniquely and non-uniquely human traits and 
emotions, and its links to recategorization and empathy.  
2.2 (De)humanization  
By definition, NH animals are excluded by the word dehumanization; in fact, it is 
defined in terms of treating a person like a NH animal, which is implied to mean like a 
lesser creature with limited (or no) thoughts or feelings, whose pain and life matter less 
than others’. Synonyms for dehumanize include animalize and bestialize (Merriam-
Webster, 2011). This is directly related to prejudice; even Allport (1979/1954) noted the 
“inferiority and ‘animal-like’ mentality” (p. 11) with which Ancient Greeks and 
American plantation owners viewed slaves as proof of their prejudice. For some highly 
prejudiced people, many individuals and groups outside of their own community can be 
dehumanized without it causing them moral qualms. Others have a much broader realm 
of moral inclusion, whereby no sentient creature should be dehumanized. All of this is 
rooted in social and cultural experience, through interactions with different social 
representations on these subjects. 
2.2.1 Dehumanization as socially represented 
Dehumanization as an idea and a practice does not come out of nowhere; it is something 
taught and learned, discussed and negotiated. How dehumanization is represented – 
along with how humans and NH animals are represented – is something that is socially 
created and shared, which suggests that social representations theory may be of use in 
scrutinizing the process. Howarth (2006) notes that social representations (SRs) can be 
                                               
6 This form of dehumanization has been recently called infra-humanization by some researchers (e.g., 
Haslam et. al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2000;Tileag?, 2007). I use the term dehumanization throughout, for 
the sake of continuity and clarity, with the understanding that the form of dehumanization that I am 
referring to is equivalent to infra-humanization. 
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“drawn on both to naturalize and legitimize exclusion and othering as well as to critique 
and challenge such stereotypes and marginalizing practices” (p. 79). This applies both to 
SRs about NH animals as a markedly distinct other, excluded from moral consideration, 
as well as for the process of engaging in dehumanization to legitimate “othering” by 
removing outgroup humans from the human category and placing them in the animal 
category. Alternative SRs critiquing such distinctions and viewing life as a continuum 
rather than a divide are likewise accounted for in SRT. 
Three concepts necessary to fully understanding social representations theory are 
anchoring, objectification, and naturalization. Anchoring means to classify and name 
something (Moscovici, 1984), attaching a novel or unfamiliar object to a familiar and 
ordinary category in order to make sense of it (Sakki, 2010). A relevant example in this 
case could be the London bombings in 2005, where a new and fear-provoking 
phenomenon (Islamic terrorism), may well have been anchored to the more familiar, if 
still disquieting, category of IRA (Irish Republican Army) terrorism. Objectification is 
“where something abstract is transformed into something almost physical and concrete” 
(Sakki & Pirttilä-Backman, 2009, p. 151), which involves in some way converting an 
intangible notion into a more tangible image (Moscovici, 1984). Naturalization can be 
thought of as the final phase of the objectification process, in which the abstract concept 
becomes fully real, and is a normalized part of the social reality that begins to “live a 
life of its own” (Sakki & Pirttilä-Backman, 2009, p. 151). Joffe and Staerklé (2007) note 
that the “connection or affinity between the nature of animals and humans is an example 
of the objectification process in social representations: social groups are figuratively 
construed as wild, dangerous or disgusting animals” (p. 400). When one uses a term 
such a rat or snake to refer to another human, these objects represent something, which 
is socially shared and understood among members of a community. 
Tileag?’s (2007) exploration of dehumanization (operationalized as an extreme form of 
prejudice) includes a number of potential definitions, all of which involve it being a 
social process, requiring examination of the social psychology of the group and 
relations between groups, as well as the recognition that social-cognitive approaches 
alone cannot account for extreme prejudice, as noted. This does not mean that there is 
not a cognitive element to dehumanization. In fact, Moscovici (2010) elucidates that it 
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involves the “logical” process of freeing ourselves from the burden of morally including 
a group as human, and indicates that “racism is a rationalization of the differences 
between men [sic] rather than a hostility towards the foreigner or the group, or a form of 
discrimination against a group different from one’s own” (p. 12). This point is critical, 
and illustrates the underpinnings of our perceived divide with NH animals: it is not 
(necessarily) denoted by any hostility toward NH animals, but is instead an attempt to 
rationalize our difference from them.  
As noted, dehumanization involves legitimizing inhuman acts against other humans 
who have been removed from moral inclusion (Holtz & Wagner, 2009). This can be 
done in many ways; less than human does not always equate NH animals (e.g., referents 
may also be machines or monsters), but removing an outgroup from the human category 
and placing it in the animal category is perhaps the most common. This can be seen in 
instances of vilifying cultural groups by referring to them as NH animals, such as 
calling Romanies rats (Tileag?, 2007) or Jews locusts (Holtz & Wagner, 2009). It is also 
a short-hand form of discourse used for despised or dangerous groups, such as naming 
Muslim terrorists vipers or vermin to be hunted, trapped, snared, netted, or corralled 
(Steuter & Wills, 2010). It is important to note how often they are compared to NH 
animals classified as varmints, which inescapably involves the implication of 
extermination (Tileag?, 2007). As Joffe and Staerklé (2007) state, symbolising disliked 
outgroups in terms of NH animals is “a key aspect of stereotype content” (p. 400.) 
Therefore, there is a certain logic to the idea that if one were to remove the distinct 
reference category of animal, and merge it in a continuum with human, it would be 
more difficult to dehumanize in that manner. Animalistic words used socially to give 
immediate connotations that one is excluding a group from moral consideration would 
no longer have the same weight or power. If one were to genuinely believe (and more 
importantly, sincerely feel) that NH animals are very similar to humans; that apes, for 
example, are genetically almost identical to us, and thus deserve moral consideration, 
then it would not seem as likely that one might refer to a disliked outgroup member as 
an ape (e.g., Capozza, Boccato, Andrighetto, & Falvo, 2009; Holtz & Wagner, 2009). If 
one did, the connotations would presumably be at least somewhat different. Of course, 
sub-categorization is always possible, and there is undoubtedly a difference between 
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people’s perspectives regarding apes and chickens, for example. Researchers have 
established that humans generally hold very different ideas about NH animals, 
contingent upon if they are seen as food animals and on their perceived similarity to 
humans (see e.g., Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; Rajecki, Rasmussen, & 
Craft, 1993). Regardless, seeing life as a continuum rather than two discrete groups for 
whom different rules apply should affect the ability to dehumanize in this manner. 
Perceptions about NH animals’ inferiority, their objectification and reduction to two-
dimensional representations that caricature a species – which can also be used to pass 
that characterization off upon other humans – is imbued in popular culture, into 
literature and film and everyday speech. As with many stereotypes, they can be thought 
of as a heuristic tool, but one with many complications: “This kind of objectification is 
dangerous, not only because it is outmoded from a scientific and social perspective, but 
more fundamentally because it is reductionist. It circumscribes animals’ existence in 
relation to the human gaze, appraising them only in terms of their usefulness or threat 
(to us)” (Malamud, 2010, p, 7, brackets in original). It is problematic both for the sake 
of NH animals themselves, and for those humans characterized in that fashion. Anyone 
reduced to a stereotype is, after all, inexorably reduced.  
Before moving on, it is necessary to clarify what exactly a stereotype is. Dovidio et al. 
(2004) explain that, “a stereotype represents a constellation of beliefs about the 
members of a particular social category” (p. 247). They articulate the long-term debate 
about whether stereotypes are merely functional and assist us to comprehend our social 
world (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), or whether they are necessarily 
overgeneralizations that are based upon faulty cognitive processes (Allport, 1979/1954). 
Dovidio et al. (2004) note that contemporary social psychological and popular usage of 
the term generally assumes the latter meaning. However, this is not so when talking 
about stereotypes as social representations. Augoustinos, Walker, and Donaghue (2006) 
assert that, “Stereotypes are social representations: they are objectified cognitive and 
affective structures about social groups within society which are extensively shared and 
which emerge and proliferate within the particular social and political milieu of a given 
historical moment. Stereotypes do not simply exist in people’s heads. They are socially 
and discursively constructed in the course of everyday communication, and, once 
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objectified, assume an independent and sometimes prescriptive reality” (p. 258). In this 
way, stereotypes can simply be seen as a social category with shared meaning. They are 
generalizations, but they are not intrinsically faulty. 
2.2.2 Uniquely and non-uniquely human traits and emotions 
In order to study dehumanization empirically, it must be operationalized; testable 
variables must be determined in order to examine the level of humanization directed 
toward various groups. This has been accomplished by research on personality traits and 
emotions, and the distinctions between those that are popularly considered unique to the 
human species, versus those that are thought to be common across multiple species’. 
Obviously, these studies depend on socially shared representations of what it means to 
be human, and as such, vary from culture to culture. However, some general patterns 
across the Western world have been established. 
Leyens et al. (2000) first tested whether secondary emotions were more commonly 
attributed to ingroups than to outgroups. Secondary emotions are another term for 
uniquely human emotions, and include sentiments such as serenity, compassion, hope, 
guilt, remorse, and shame. These are contrasted with primary or non-uniquely human 
emotions such as excitement, attraction, pleasure, anger, pain, and fear. “Compared to 
primary emotions, secondary emotions were rated more human, more internally caused, 
more invisible, more cognitive, more moral, less intense, longer in time, and appearing 
later in age” (p. 187).7 Leyens and colleagues (2000) found that people do more readily 
attribute uniquely human (secondary) emotions to their ingroup than to an outgroup; this 
was true regardless of the valence. Follow-up studies by Leyens et al. (2001), Paladino 
et al. (2002), and Demoulin et al. (2004) have concurred, giving robust evidence for this 
type of “emotional prejudice” (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005, p. 937). 
Research has also been done on the interspecies generalizability of uniquely and non-
uniquely personality traits, often with a version of the Big Five personality dimensions. 
The Big Five are the continuums of extroversion (from sociable to shy), agreeability 
(from affable to quarrelsome), conscientiousness (from responsible to careless), 
                                               
7 Agreement with these categorizations varies by individual, but these distinctions have been generally 
accepted across studies (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2000; Paladino et al., 2002). 
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emotional stability (from calm to neurotic), and openness to new experiences (from 
open-minded to conventional) (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). Gosling and John 
(1999) conducted a review of 19 studies measuring the personality factors found in 
various species’ of NH animals, and found that openness and particularly 
conscientiousness were considered more specific to humans, whereas extroversion, 
neuroticism, and agreeableness were more generalizable across species’.  
In the same vein as the studies on the humanness of emotions, Haslam et al. (2005) 
sought to discover whether uniquely human traits and human nature traits were more 
likely to be applied to oneself and one’s ingroup than to outgroups. Haslam and 
colleagues found this to be so across multiple studies (Haslam et al., 2005, 2007) and 
across cultures (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008). Hodson & 
Costello (2007) also conducted an earlier study on prejudice, dehumanization, and 
disgust that measured uniquely human big five traits (conscientiousness and openness) 
as compared to non-uniquely human traits (extroversion, neuroticism, and 
agreeableness). They too found that immigrants were attributed less uniquely human 
traits, particularly by more prejudiced individuals. 
2.2.3 (De)humanization’s relationship with recategorization and empathy 
Recategorization can be defined most simply as encouraging individuals to “think of 
people from different groups as part of one superordinate group” (Paluck & Green, 
2009, p. 346). Obviously, recategorization is intimately related to prejudice (and by 
extension, dehumanization), as it was originally conceived as a method to combat it 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). Numerous studies have found recategorization to be an 
effective mediator of prejudice against different outgroups; for example, in Paluck and 
Green’s (2009) review, they list it as one of the prejudice reduction methods that has 
been repeatedly shown to be effective across a variety of situations. Since many studies 
conflate dehumanization with prejudice (as an extreme form of it), it would stand to 
reason that dehumanization has an equally strong relationship with recategorization. 
Haslam (2006; and with colleagues, 2007) asserts that there is a distinct link between 
empathy and humanization, while Batson and Ahmad (2009) indicate that empathy is 
the converse process of dehumanization. Bandura (2002) explains that simply 
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perceiving another person as human stimulates empathy, which makes it very difficult 
to dehumanize them, as “it is difficult to mistreat humanised people without risking 
personal distress and self-condemnation” (p. 109). He asserts that, if one is going to be 
cruel to another human, the only way to avoid this self-condemnation is to divest them 
of their humanness, which thus allows one to strip oneself of the requirement to feel 
empathy towards them. Empirically, dehumanization has also been shown to be 
negatively correlated with both empathy and recategorization (Costello & Hodson, 
2010). Recategorization will now be examined in more detail, both in its applications 
and further on its relationship to empathy and moral universe. 
2.3 Recategorization 
The roots of recategorization can be traced back over the decades, to Sherif, Harvey, 
White, Hood, & Sherif’s (1954/1961) famous Robbers Cave experiment, which 
examined the limitations of contact for reducing prejudice. Young male campers were 
put into two random groups, between which competition devolved into overt hostility, 
subsequent to which contact simply worsened the situation. However, once 
superordinate goals were introduced (which implies a certain level of recategorization 
into a common ingroup) the tension between the groups systematically dissolved. One 
of the conclusions was that real-world zero-sum style conflicts result in intergroup 
conflict. (Sherif et al., 1954/1961.) However, Tajfel’s (1970) well-known study 
determined that merely being divided into (random) groups where no competition for 
resources exists can trigger discrimination; meaning that any categorization of people 
into separate groups (with or without conflict) can be a recipe for prejudice. 
Multiple methods to address this have been articulated that involve a categorization 
change of some kind, either de-categorizing (emphasizing individual identities as 
opposed to group identities) or re-categorizating in a number of ways (Gaertner, 
Dovidio, & Saguy, 2007; Hewstone, et al., 2002; Paluck & Green, 2009). As previously 
noted, I am looking at recategorization at its most basic, where people are encouraged to 
think about themselves and others as members of a superordinate group (Paluck & 
Green, 2009). This is grounded in Gaertner and Dovidio’s (2000) Common Ingroup 
Identity model, which is based upon the idea of changing us vs. them to a common 
group of we (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).  
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2.3.1 The application of recategorization 
Although merely categorizing people into random groups is enough to foster intergroup 
bias, in the real world, groups are not generally random – there are many social and 
historical facets to them that exacerbate biases. As initially theorized by Gaertner, 
Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio, (1989), when the import of these group boundaries are 
lessened, intergroup bias should be subsequently reduced. The process of 
recategorization is meant to replace the separate ingroup-outgroup categorizations “with 
a single, inclusive superordinate boundary,” (p. 239) which decreases the salience of 
ingroup-outgroup boundaries, focuses the individual on the shared group, and 
consequently diminishes intergroup bias. With recategorization into a superordinate 
group, “bias should be reduced primarily because the social distance with former out-
group members has decreased and the social distance with former in-group members 
has remained relatively close” (p. 240). (Gaertner et al., 1989.) 
In a way, recategorization is like switching the lens through which a person or group is 
viewed. It is like the difference between a telephoto and a wide-angle lens on a camera: 
you can either zoom in and focus on the boundaries and the differences, or you can pan 
out and see the bigger picture. Recategorization is a wide-angle way of seeing others; it 
is like looking at the forest rather than individual trees. When this switch in perspective 
succeeds, the loyalty and positive regard that are normally reserved for one’s ingroup 
are broadened to include the larger category as a whole (Brewer, 1997; Dovidio et al. 
2004). Gaertner and Dovidio (2005) note that this Common Ingroup Identity model of 
recategorization was established in particular to combat aversive racism, where well-
intentioned people who do not think of themselves as prejudiced nonetheless show bias 
toward outgroup members. It was a way to “bring the behavior of aversive racists into 
closer alignment with a professed nonprejudiced self-image” (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2005, p. 627), indicating that there is also an implicit element to recategorization. 
2.3.2 Recategorization’s relationship with empathy and moral universe    
As noted, Bandura (2002) explicates a conceptual relationship between empathy and 
recategorization, as he reasons that it is difficult to think of someone as human and not 
feel empathy toward them. Stephan and Finlay (1999) have posited several theoretical 
possibilities for why empathy may mediate prejudice, one of which is that it may 
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increase the salience of shared humanity. Therefore, logically, recategorizing someone 
from an outgroup into the human category should incite empathy. Recategorization 
likewise has a theoretical link to a person’s moral universe. This reprint of Allport’s 
(1979/1954) concentric 
circles of ingroups 
shows, in essence, a 
moral universe. 
Recategorizing a person 
into a superordinate 
group inevitably 
involves the widening of 
one’s moral universe, 
whether it is a small 
jump from one’s family 
to one’s neighbourhood, or a larger jump, say from one’s state to all of humankind, or 
beyond. As noted by Helkama (2009), “The ingroup – outgroup boundary seems to be 
the quickest-changing component of morality. Values and norms do change, but much 
more slowly. It is easier to change the range of their application, i.e. the boundaries of 
the moral ingroup” (p. 145).This also relates to empathy, as universalism (the Schwartz 
value associated with the moral universe) most highly correlates with empathy 
(Helkama, 2004). Empathy will now be addressed, namely dispositional empathy and its 
links to other traits, stimulating empathy, and empathy’s connection to moral universe. 
2.4 Empathy 
An element that weaves in and out of numerous prejudice reduction methods is empathy 
and perspective taking. Paluck and Green (2009) articulate the importance and 
effectiveness of numerous studies that target people’s emotions, most notably empathy, 
and Dovidio et al. (2004) note that increasing empathy toward outgroup members is one 
of the most promising potential mediators of prejudice.  
Several main types of empathy have been explicated; cognitive empathy and emotional 
empathy, with emotional empathy being further divided into reactive and parallel 
Figure 1. Allport’s (1979/1954) Circles of Moral Inclusion
Figure 1. Reprinted from Allport (1979/1954, p. 43), with 
the caption “Fig. 2. Hypothetical lessening of ingroup 
potency as membership becomes more inclusive.” 
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empathy. Cognitive empathy is another term for perspective-taking, where an individual 
understands (or tries to understand) the world from another’s point of view. Reactive 
empathy is an emotional reaction in response to another person’s emotional experience, 
for example, responding to someone’s distress with sympathy (though sympathy can be 
defined in many ways, see e.g., Sklar, 2008). Parallel empathy is an emotional reaction 
similar to what the other person is experiencing, for instance, it could mean 
experiencing indignation along with another person’s anger in response to 
discrimination. (Stephan & Finlay, 1999.) There is some suggestion that cognitive 
empathy or perspective-taking may actually be a precursor to emotional empathy (e.g., 
Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003), but a causal direction is by no means clear.  
2.4.1 Dispositional empathy and other traits related to prejudice 
In trying to determine why some individuals are more predisposed to prejudice than 
others, regardless of being in similar social contexts, several personality traits have been 
examined. Perhaps most consistently, the authoritarian personality has been identified as 
a good predictor of individual prejudice, despite early methodological concerns. Right-
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation’s recent revival has led some 
researchers to wonder if there are any other personality factors that have significant 
relationships with prejudice. More specifically, some have questioned why females have 
been shown to be consistently less prone to prejudice than males, even after controlling 
for authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. (McFarland, 2010.) 
McFarland (2010) theorized that empathy (specifically empathic concern and 
perspective taking) should be antithetical to prejudice, which could explain gender 
differences in prejudice, as females have consistently shown higher levels of empathy 
than males (e.g., Myyry & Helkama, 2001; Silfver-Kuhalampi, 2008). McFarland 
examined several personality factors beyond authoritarianism, social dominance, and 
empathy that could relate to prejudice, including narcissism, nurturance, principled 
moral reasoning, and the Big Five personality traits. Only empathy and principled moral 
reasoning were significantly negatively related to prejudice. It is important to note that 
prejudice and empathy are inversely correlated, but further research is needed to 
determine if people’s innate, dispositional empathy cause them to be less prejudiced or 
if prejudiced individuals actively suppresses their empathy, or both. (McFarland, 2010.) 
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2.4.2 Inducing empathy 
It has been shown repeatedly that when participants are directed to take the perspective 
of outgroup members or to try to feel what they feel, their prejudice is reduced (Stephan 
& Finlay, 1999). A clear causal relationship has been established, which suggests that 
inducing empathy may be an effective underlying component of many prejudice 
reduction techniques (Paluck & Green, 2009). Although often considered a hereditary 
personality trait, recent research has determined that both empathy and sympathy can be 
induced, encouraged, and taught (see e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Sklar, 2008). 
Numerous studies have shown that it is possible to increase empathy via various 
training methods. Understandably, this varies by person, as individuals with high 
dispositional empathy are easier to reach than others. However, specific, clear 
instructions on thinking and feeling empathically can produce a change in most 
individuals. Encouraging cognitive empathy can be particularly effective at providing 
useful information about the outgroup and changing negative stereotypes. Emotional 
empathy can have more varied results. Reactive empathy can encourage both a negative 
and positive response; it can either produce compassion-related emotions that encourage 
prosocial behaviour or it can produce personal distress, including feelings of anxiety 
and threat, which are not conducive to improving intergroup relations. Even compassion 
and concern for the outgroup can be problematic, potentially causing condescension if 
these feelings are not mediated by respect. Parallel empathy can likewise be positive, or 
negative, or both. Highlighting the suffering of people who are discriminated against 
can inspire reactive compassion but also produce parallel feelings of uncertainty, fear, 
or anger toward one’s own ingroup, which can be confusing and troubling for 
individuals. More positively, parallel empathy that elicits feelings of injustice on behalf 
of the outgroup can inspire social change. (Stephan & Finlay, 1999.)  
Batson and colleagues (1997) suggest five reasons, both pragmatic and theoretical, for 
why and how empathy may directly affect prejudice. First, people’s response to movies, 
books, and plays illustrate that it is reasonably easy and common to induce empathy 
(one example they note is the movie Free Willie inspiring a reported 40,000 calls to join 
a whale-saving campaign during its first week in theatres). Second, it can be low-risk to 
implement (and low-cost); empathy can be induced in the comfort and safety of 
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people’s homes without going to the effort and difficulty of creating an effective contact 
scenario. Third, by using extended contact in this way, it can be controlled to more 
readily ensure a positive experience. Fourth, empathy can have a direct effect on 
attitudes by addressing the feelings and evaluative aspects of attitudes rather than 
relying on information and cognition. Finally, empathy has been shown to increase 
altruistic motivation. The researchers acknowledge that several factors may negatively 
affect this process, namely generalizability, questions of victim responsibility, and as 
previously mentioned, the potential for empathic responses to stigmatized persons to be 
anxiety-provoking. (Batson et al., 1997.) More recently, Batson and Ahmad (2009) 
reiterated the conviction that empathy can play an important role in prejudice reduction, 
but recommend that more research on specific types of empathy be conducted in order 
to best realize and employ the promise that empathy may hold in intergroup relations. 
2.4.3 Empathy and moral universe 
Empathy markedly influences people’s understanding and treatment of others. 
Increasing empathy can have wide-ranging effects, particularly because it has been 
found that fostering empathy in one area can also increase it in other areas. An 
interesting example of this was explicated by Sklar (2008), who notes that even 
inducing empathy for fictional characters can stimulate real-life empathy. Much like 
prejudice, empathy is empathy is empathy. An increase in empathy is unlikely to be 
limited to one area, but rather spills over into multiple situations. This makes it logical 
that, as previously noted, empathy is more highly correlated with Schwartz’s (1992) 
value of universalism (concern for all humans and nature) than with benevolence 
(concern for ingroup members), even though it has been predicted to be conceptually 
closer to benevolence (Helkama, 2004; Myyry & Helkama, 2001). In fact, the 
characteristic sinusoid curve associated with Schwartz’s (1992) values is found with 
empathy, wherein empathy has the highest positive correlation with universalism and 
the strongest negative correlation with power, while the correlations in between rise and 
drop methodically around the circle (Myyry & Helkama, 2001). 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     28 
   
This directly relates to one’s moral universe, which is conceptually and empirically 
related to universalism (Schwartz, 2007), particularly since empathy is a moral emotion 
that has been shown to motivate moral behaviour (Silfver-Kuhalampi, 2008). Schwartz 
(2007) notes that, in an inclusive moral universe, universalism values relate to all 
members of society, whereas when moral inclusiveness is low, universalism is conflated 
with benevolence, both of 
which then relate solely to 
one’s own ingroup. This links 
back to Bandura (2002), who 
calls for society to actively 
pursue compassion and 
empathy, so as to avoid moral 
disengagement – in other 
words, in order to promote 
greater moral inclusion. De 
Waal (2009) registers the 
same appeal, with a direct 
reference to NH animals. He 
posits a conceptually similar 
vision of a moral universe as 
shown by Allport’s 
(1979/1954) figure in section 2.3.2 (Figure 1), with some modifications, most notably 
the inclusion of other life forms at the broadest level, as illustrated by the reprint in 
Figure 2 (de Waal, 2006).8    
It is into the subject of one’s moral universe that I will now delve, both from Schwartz’s 
point of view, and from a broader social psychological perspective. 
                                               
8 De Waal (2006) likewise displays the same pessimism as Allport (1979/1954) regarding the difficulty 
and unlikelihood of people widening their moral universe to the outermost circle. I am more optimistic. 
Figure 2. De Waal’s (2009) Floating Pyramid of 
Human Morality 
Figure 2. Reprinted from de Waal (2009, loc. 2245), with the 
caption “Fig. 9. The expanding circle of human morality is 
actually a floating pyramid viewed from above. Loyalty and 
duty to immediate family, clan, or species serve as 
counterforce to moral inclusion. Altruism is spread thinner the 
further away we get from the center. The pyramid’s buoyancy 
(i.e., available resources) determines how much of it will 
emerge from the water. The moral inclusion of outer circles is 
therefore constrained by commitment to inner ones.” 
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2.5 Moral Universe 
The concept of moral universe has been addressed in numerous ways by different 
researchers, both directly and often implicitly. What is fundamental to them all is the 
idea that one’s moral universe delineates to whom we apply moral rules to; in other 
words, who we are morally obligated to. This varies dramatically between cultures, 
groups, and individuals, based on an assortment of different reasons.  
2.5.1 Schwartz’s moral universe 
Schwartz’s (in press) contributions to the topic have been isolated because his revised 
value survey is being used in this study to operationalize participants’ moral universes. 
Therefore, the particular way in which he understands the concept, and universalism 
more specifically, is directly relevant. Universalism is a complex construct on the self-
transcendence side of the value spectrum. Helkama (2012) affirms that universalism 
(along with benevolence and conformity) has been found to be a primary moral value. 
Schwartz (1992) defines universalism as “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and 
protection for the welfare of all people and for nature” (p. 12, emphasis his). However, 
there are indications that universalism does not necessarily apply to “all people and for 
nature” for everyone who holds it as a value.  
It is a person’s moral inclusiveness, specifically, which determines the extent to which 
universalism genuinely applies to all. Schwartz (2007) identifies moral inclusiveness as 
an individual’s perception of “the breadth of the community to which people apply 
moral values and rules of fairness” (p. 711). Schwartz (2007) acknowledges that there is 
considerable variation in moral inclusiveness between people, within and among 
different cultures, partly dependent on how highly each culture socializes its citizens in 
moral inclusiveness. Broadly, wealthier countries (including Finland) tend to apply 
universalism to outgroups, whereas poorer countries cannot necessarily afford that 
luxury (Helkama, 2009). Schwartz distinguishes between those who truly hold 
universalism values and those who hold universalism values that are indistinguishable 
from benevolence values, in order to determine moral inclusiveness. His premise is that 
“the meaning of any construct finds expression in the pattern of its semantic or 
functional associations with other constructs” (p. 714). By that reasoning, to put it 
simply, he assumes that as long as a person’s universalism values are more highly 
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correlated with each other and less highly correlated with benevolence values, they are 
discrete, and the moral inclusiveness of universalism is expected to be high – or at least, 
not simply applying to one’s circle of close others. (Schwartz, 2007.)  
However, as seen in Figures 1 and 2, there is a vast realm of potential moral universes 
beyond one’s circle of close others, and to consolidate all of these possibilities into one 
group and suggest they are all similarly morally inclusive seems unduly crude.9 
Schwartz et al. (in press) has recently refined the value model, splitting universalism 
into three groups, concern (equality and protection for others), nature (conservation of 
the environment), and tolerance (accepting those who are different). This will allow a 
person’s moral universe to be more readily teased apart, particularly whether it includes 
the natural world within it or not (see Figure 5 in section 4.2 for the new model). 
2.5.2 The animal-human hierarchy 
The moral universe has also been touched upon by other social psychologists. Brandt 
and Reyna (2011) posit a social cognitive chain of being (SCCB), which is an extension 
of previous work done by Haidt (see e.g., Haidt & Algoe, 2004). The SCCB in essence 
suggests that, although we do not necessarily articulate it in this way (particularly within 
science), we still use a modified form of Aristotle’s scala naturae (chain of being), 
which represented all things, living and otherwise, as part of a hierarchical progression 
of existence. Aristotle’s chain focused upon human and NH animals, plants, and 
minerals, but it was soon taken up as a moral hierarchy, which included demons, angels, 
devil(s), and god(s). The specifics of the hierarchy are relative culturally, temporally, 
and idiosyncratically, but it being a progression from the most evil at the bottom to the 
most good at the top enduringly persists (see Figure 3). (Brandt & Reyna, 2011.) 
Brandt and Reyna (2011) argue that, although perhaps not explicitly acknowledged, it is 
still used nonetheless as a cognitive tool for ordering our moral universe. “Social targets 
that are considered less moral (on the bottom half of the SCCB) would be perceived as 
                                               
9 In Schwartz (2007) the indicated disparities in moral inclusion using country differences (such as 
attitudes toward immigrants) is based only on European data, which renders some of his broader claims 
unconvincing. This is particularly so since the more problematic of the purportedly high universalism 
countries were eliminated (Schwartz, 2007). (For example, South Korea; see Lim, 2010, for some of 
South Korea’s problems with immigrants, among other issues.)  
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more animal-like and, in extreme cases, even akin to demons and devils. Conversely, 
social targets that are considered especially moral (on the top half of the SCCB) would 
be perceived as more saintlike and, in some extreme cases, even akin to God… Thus, 
we are proposing that the perception of humanity, animality, and divinity have a 
bidirectional and mutually reinforcing relationship with the moral hierarchy of the 
SCCB” (Brandt & Reyna, 2011, p. 430). They go on to say that, clearly, the perception 
of people as more or less human influences how they are 
treated. They also note that these positions are not fixed, 
and are subject to changes in status and development over 
time. It is also at least somewhat culturally dependent; 
that is, the sense of a moral hierarchy is consistent across 
most cultures, but who populates the levels varies, both 
by culture and by person. To use the example of 
immigrants, depending on the scope of one’s moral 
universe, they may be included in any category from 
saints to demons, although they would typically fall 
somewhere between humans (in general) and nonhuman 
animals (Brandt & Reyna, 2011.)  
The animal-human divide and how people relate to it can 
be explained by the pairing of this broad concept of 
SCCB with Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner’s 
(2000) theory of the sacred-value protection model. They 
have posited that, beyond solely the intuitive scientist 
(assessing causality) and intuitive economist (appraising 
utility) functionalist frameworks discussed by social 
psychologists, there is quite likely a third dimension, that 
of intuitive moralist-theologian (protecting sacred 
values). They find that intuitive economists are unwilling 
to compare trade-offs when the subject is taboo or considered morally corrosive (e.g., 
attaching a monetary value to one’s children), in the same way that intuitive scientists 
will not use base rates that conflict with moral ideologies (e.g., those that portray 
women as inferior in a gender-egalitarian culture). This also applies to “heretical 
Figure 3. The social cognitive 
chain of being, showing the 
hierarchical progression of 
existence (extrapolated from 
Brandt & Reyna, 2011). 
Figure 3. Social Cognitive 
Chain of Being (Brandt & 
Reyna, 2011) 
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counterfactuals,” which are what-if statements that provide an alternate possibility for 
something that is viewed as sacred by a particular group (e.g.,  reflecting on how Jesus’ 
life would have been different had Joseph left Mary when she got pregnant). The 
responses to any of these trespasses is moral outrage against the offenders and against 
those who do not punish the offenders, and/or moral cleansing of oneself, for having 
been peripherally party to such a transgression. This is both a theoretical precept, and 
based upon five experiments. (Tetlock et al., 2000.)  
In that vein, animal-human continuity would also be seen as a heretical counterfactual to 
the Judeo-Christian premise that humans (or at least men) were created in the image of 
God, and NH animals are lesser beings that were created for human use. Moral outrage 
is often directed at those who do not conform to social norms emphasizing the animal-
human divide or hierarchy, such as researchers being derided for espousing notions of 
animal-human continuity (see e.g., de Waal, 2006, 2009) to animal rights activists or 
vegetarians being belittled and scorned (see e.g., Einwohner, 2002). Moral cleansing 
can involve, at its most basic, an activity that volubly reaffirms one’s commitment to the 
“right” side, so in this case, it could be something as straightforward as immediately 
going out and eating a huge steak, or buying a new leather jacket. Both scientific (e.g., 
evidence of animal-human similarity) and utilitarian (e.g., eliminating human starvation 
if we all switched to a plant-based diet) conceptions can be dismissed in order to protect 
the sacred values of human exceptionalism and our dominion over the natural world. 
Moscovici (2010) makes a similar point: “The real prejudice focuses on the human/not 
human, culture/nature and domesticated/wild dichotomy. When we free ourselves from 
a moral authority that applies only to humans, we feel that we are justified in freely 
using naked, violent force against others” (p.10). 
These factors constrain a person’s moral universe and make it difficult to broaden it to 
include NH animals. However, Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, and Hodson (in press) 
recently examined whether that very broadening, or extension of moral concern for 
animals could have “‘spillover’ effects for the expansion of moral concern more 
generally” (p. 2). They found that linking NH animals to humans did in fact lead to an 
extension of moral concern more generally. It increased people’s concern for NH 
animals’ welfare, a concern that also extended to ostracized human groups.  
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Our moral universe is determined largely by our society, and the basic principles and 
tenets of that society. This includes, rather significantly in Western cultures, the tenets 
of science. Thus, the role of NH animals in science, as well as in culture, is crucial and 
needs to be examined at least in brief, to clarify some of the issues involved in 
conducting research involving them. First, the birth and progression of the animal-
human divide will be examined, followed by the intersection of attitudes toward NH 
animals and humans, both historically and empirically. Next, NH animals in science and 
finally, the effect that culture has on our social representations, will be discussed.  
2.6 Nonhuman Animals in Culture, Science, and History 
Of course, considering NH animals in “culture, science, and history” is massive and 
largely well beyond the scope of this study. However, there are several areas within the 
natural and social sciences that clarify how and where this study fits into the broader 
framework of research relating to humans and other animals, which will be addressed 
both theoretically and empirically. Equally necessary is an exploration of the historical 
and cultural milieu that produced these representations of NH animals in science and 
more generally in society, to trace the roots of the animal-human divide, and more 
clearly grasp the implications of culture, both past and present. This brief investigation 
of the broader societal implications of the animal-human divide is an attempt to anchor 
this study more concretely, to make our implicit understandings of NH animals explicit, 
and to explicate the underlying theory in this research. 
Socially creating meaning is a cultural act, but often an implicit one. Culture is the 
water the fish swims in: it is hard to see what it is comprised of until one is outside of it, 
and suddenly experience its lack. Emphasizing a marked divide between humans and 
NH animals is something that permeates Western, individualistic understandings of 
reality which can be difficult to see beyond; it is an entrenched, socially accepted 
“truth.” It is more or less a biblical idea that still holds sway today, in everyday speech 
and thought, and we generally do not stop to analyze what this perspective is based 
upon, and whether or not it is accurate or useful. (Singer, 1990.) As Moscovici (1984) 
notes, we can only see what our “underlying conventions” (p.8) allow us to see, while 
those same conventions generally remain invisible to us. This is why it is necessary to 
shine a spotlight upon them, so that we can openly examine their accuracy and utility. 
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Moscovici (1984) asserts that all social representations, including those from a scientific 
perspective, are forced upon us, and contain within them the past knowledge of 
successive generations. Moreover, he suggests that “The more its origin is forgotten, 
and its conventional nature ignored, the more fossilized it becomes” (p. 12) and “I 
would even go so far as to say that, the less we think about them, and the less we are 
aware of them, then the greater their influence becomes.” (p. 13).  
The animal-human divide is a long-term, deeply held perspective based on beliefs 
imported from Judeo-Christian theology and philosophies beginning in Ancient Greece. 
Although it was surely the most rational and useful point of view at the time of its 
inception, it may not serve us as well now. We know much more about humans and 
other animals now, which challenges the scientific accuracy and social utility of such 
perspectives. This is one aspect that is missing from Costello and Hodson’s (2010) 
study, the underlying roots of the animal-human divide, where it has come from and 
how it relates to dehumanizing other humans. More theoretical insight into why and 
how this has occurred – as well as into why it is neither an accurate nor a useful belief at 
this point – would be helpful to substantiate the theory and better understand where the 
associated social representations came from. As Sakki and Pirttilä-Backman (2009) 
have articulated: “The categories and the everyday theories embedded in them are 
usually very difficult to change. Resistance can be explained by the historical roots and 
backgrounds of the categories and by the difficulty in changing the central core of the 
representation” (p. 151-152). Thus, understanding the origins and context for the social 
representation of the animal-human divide is necessary in order to contest or change it. 
2.6.1 Origins and propagation of the animal-human divide 
The animal-human divide has roots that go back into antiquity. It has been supported by 
the Bible and theologians for the past two millennia. Our conceptions of NH animals 
have roots in Judaism and ancient Greece, which came together in Christianity during 
the Roman Empire, through which they permeated Western thought. (Singer, 1990.) 
The Torah immediately marks the divide between humans and other animals in Genesis 
(passage 1:26-28). Humans were created in the image of God; other animals were not. 
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Even further, humans were given the role of “dominion” over other creatures, and told 
to subdue the earth.10 Westermarck (1939) clarifies the concept: “Man11 is the centre of 
creation, a being set apart from all other sentient creatures as God’s special favourite, 
for whose sake everything else was brought into existence” (pp. 386-387).  
In Ancient Greece, there were penalties for harming certain animals, and Pythagoras is 
one of the first recorded vegetarians in Western history, exhorting his followers to be 
respectful toward nonhuman animals (Westermarck, 1939). However, Plato and 
Aristotle were of the opposing perspective, and their philosophies are the ones that have 
since dominated Western discourse. Aristotle viewed all life as a hierarchy (see section 
2.5.2) and was a proponent of slavery, believing that “lesser men” are property in the 
same way as beasts, who were made “for the sake of men” (Mason, 2005, p. 34).12  
Judaism and the (enduring) philosophy of Ancient Greece each delineate an animal-
human divide, which comes into its fullest form in Christianity. However, this union 
includes the backdrop of the Roman Empire, whose moral inclusion was very limited, 
as evinced by the “games” where criminals, military captives, NH animals, and 
Christians (for a time), were put to death. The Christian doctrine of the sanctity of 
human life had two effects – it widened moral inclusion to comprise all humans, making 
life a lot kinder for criminals and captives, while at the same time broadening the 
division even further between humans and other animals, making life distinctly worse 
for the latter. The Roman games in Christian times were no longer permitted to include 
humans, but they remained as violent. This Christian shift also served to override the 
few Romans (e.g., Ovid, Seneca, Porphyry, and most notably Plutarch) who were more 
compassionate and inclusive in their thinking about NH animals. (Singer, 1990.) 
                                               
10 This becomes less clear when you look at the next two verses, and continue to the Garden of Eden 
where it appears reasonably certain that before the fall that all animals (humans and otherwise) lived in 
peace (Genesis 2-3). There is also debate about the true meaning of radah, the Hebrew word traditionally 
translated into “dominion,” but perhaps more accurately meaning “stewardship” (Singer, 1990). This lack 
of clarity, however, makes little difference because up until quite recently, almost no one discussed it. 
11 Biased language crops up several times in this historical analysis. This is the last note I will make of it, 
but I am aware of (and do not endorse) the sexist bias or the pejorative bias against NH animals. 
12 Aristotle’s quote originally from Politics, c. 384-322 BCE, p. 16. 
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The New Testament did not improve the situation, in fact there are several examples of 
contemptuous actions against nonhuman animals, including Jesus killing a herd of pigs 
(Luke 8:30-33), and Paul dismissing concerns for animals as foolish (1st Corinthians 
9:9-10a). This was used by Saint Augustine and other theologians to illustrate why 
human behaviour toward NH animals is unrelated to morals governing behaviour 
toward other humans. Saint Thomas Aquinas went even further, declaring NH animals 
to be entirely for humans’ use, and explicitly excluding them from the moral sphere.13 
(Singer, 1990.) Westermarck (1939) notes that not only NH animals, but also humans’ 
own animal nature was regarded with contempt. This has persisted since Christianity’s 
inception in all but certain sectarian groups (e.g., Quakers or Seventh Day Adventists); 
generally, it is seen as a “theological error to suppose that man owes any duty to an 
animal” (Westermarck, 1939, p. 389). 
The great divide had one last most influential proponent: Descartes. As Mason (2005) 
emphasizes, Descartes’ dualism placed “an absolute gap” (p. 37) between humans and 
nature. Dualism declared that there were only two basic things in the universe: matter 
and soul. Given that Christian doctrine stated that only humans had souls, this left 
nothing for other species’ aside from the conclusion that they were mindless, 
mechanistic automata. This ushered in a grim era for NH animals, because all feelings – 
including the ability to feel pain – were denied, and NH animals’ behaviours that 
seemed to suggest pain (e.g., squealing, crying) where dismissed as mere noises that 
would come from any machine being opened, like springs in a clock. Earlier inklings 
toward compassion were dismissed as people began to perform vivisections on live NH 
animals. The gulf was at its widest – between mindless matter and divinely ensouled 
humans. These vivisections, however, began to show how very physically similar these 
“machines” were to humans. (Singer, 1990.) 
The enlightenment marked a change, though small and gradual, in human perceptions 
about other animals. Several shifts began to occur. The vivisections disgusted some, and 
proved that NH animals were actually quite similar to humans, at least biologically. 
Some philosophers emphasized greater civility and benevolence, the circle of which 
                                               
13 Throughout Summa Theologica, 1274. 
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extended even (to an extent) to NH animals, with an exhortation to humans to more 
“gently” use them (e.g., Hume and Voltaire, see Patterson, 2002). The animal-human 
divide was still expansive regarding issues of intelligence, morality, and emotions, but 
there was movement toward recognizing similarities in biology, which most 
significantly included a burgeoning appreciation that NH animals could feel pain. In this 
vein, one of the most famous bridges across the divide was advocated – briefly, and in a 
footnote – by Jeremy Bentham, admonishing that: “…the question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”14 (Bentham, 1789, emphasis his).  
Darwin came soon after, and he had the greatest effect on closing the divide, although 
not as much as his findings warranted (Wynne, 2007). Darwin collected copious 
amounts of data that indicated that homo sapiens, like all other animals, evolved from 
common ancestors. He was however, hesitant for quite some time about revealing the 
extent to which he believed this, because he did not want it to “add to the prejudices 
against my views” (Darwin, 1871, p. 1). Nevertheless, he eventually published his full 
research, and straightforwardly detailed the psychological similarities between humans 
and other animals, which began an upheaval of humanity’s perceptions of the world, 
and humans’ place in it (Wynne, 2007). There was a great deal of resistance to his work 
and its implications in the beginning, which in some groups is still true today.  
However, once the scientific community embraced the theory of evolution and its 
myriad implications, previous justifications – at least in the field of science – for 
humans’ innate superiority and the animal-human divide lost their foundations. Wynne 
                                               
14 The full paragraph is significant, as it shows the parallels Bentham saw between NH animals and 
human slaves. The comparison between certain animals and human children also show that the animal-
human divide is not great in Bentham’s view. “The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not 
yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by 
the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. 
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have 
been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the 
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice 
of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the 
skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being 
to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, 
perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as 
well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose 
the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? 
but, Can they suffer? (Bentham, 1789, note 122, emphasis his.) 
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(2007) notes that before Darwin, the relationship between humans and other animals 
was rather simple: they were beasts and we were special. After Darwin, “this idea of a 
hard and fast line between humans and other species became untenable” (Wynne, 2007, 
p. 126). Humans were merely another species of animal who had happened to evolve 
differently. In theory, this should have eliminated the divide entirely: here was proof 
that humans and other animals were fundamentally similar, just at different places along 
the evolutionary continuum. However, the belief in human exceptionalism continued to 
be particularly resistant to change, even in the face of overwhelming evidence against it. 
De Waal (2006) points out that Huxley, Darwin’s greatest supporter, may have had a lot 
to do with this resistance. Although fervently advocating for and believing in evolution, 
he did so only up unto a very specific point, which was morality. He was the pioneer of 
veneer theory, which posits that morality is merely a thin overlay of goodness humans 
have chosen to possess, overtop of a nasty, brutish nature gained from evolution. How 
this might have occurred or why evolution’s explanatory power is deemed insufficient 
for morality is not explained. Thus, “Huxley’s curious dualism, which pits morality 
against nature and humanity against other animals” (de Waal, 2006, loc. 284) does not 
rest on evolution, or on empirical fact, but nonetheless persists to this day. 
Freud further legitimized this idea of violently overthrowing our biologically inherited 
id and forcing it to behave properly via the ego and superego. Everything was a struggle 
according to Freud, primarily morality’s battle against our base nature.15 (De Waal, 
2006.) The field of psychology caused further damage with the advent of behaviourism. 
During behaviourism’s heyday, any talk of inner life became unmentionable, especially 
for NH animals. It was back to discussing automata, something that science has not yet 
entirely recovered from. People eventually rebelled against human behaviour being 
entirely separated from inner processes, so the whole theory of behaviourism came to 
rest upon NH animals’ shoulders, and the “attribution of human-like experiences to 
animals was declared a cardinal sin.” (De Waal, 2006, loc. 1002). Skinner, Thorndike, 
and finally Watson most severely dispensed with the notion of NH animals having any 
                                               
15 Ironically, at the same time, Freud disparaged the “megalomania” of humankind that drove them to 
place a gulf between humans and other animals (Patterson, 2002). 
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psychological processes similar to humans, which is largely where mainstream 
psychology has remained up until recent decades (Wynne, 2007). 
2.6.2 Links between attitudes toward humans and NH animals 
Some changes have been made since then, and in many ways the divide is shrinking, as 
noted by research mentioned throughout section 2. Nevertheless, much of our thinking 
still rests upon these centuries of beliefs that have no empirical basis. The animal-
human divide has had a long history, grounded in religions and philosophies for which 
it undoubtedly made sense at the time. However, the theory that humans are 
qualitatively different from other animals is outdated and has been proven inaccurate. 
As Singer (1990) asserts: “The attitudes toward animals of previous generations are no 
longer convincing because they draw on presuppositions – religious, moral, 
metaphysical – that are now obsolete” (p. 185). 
Recent social transformations suggest that the parallels between prejudices toward 
humans and the bias toward NH animals have certain commonalities. As previously 
noted, those people advocating for animal welfare throughout history have quite often 
been the same people advocating for women’s suffrage, civil rights, and child 
protection. Many early (and current) feminist writers, for example, have compared the 
dominion over NH human animals with men’s domination of women (Nibert, 1994; see 
e.g., Adams, 1990). Gandhi was a vegetarian and his advocacy for nonviolence was not 
only about social protest but also applied to NH animals. He influenced Martin Luther 
King, Jr., who also showed implicit concern for NH animals, and his widow and son, 
and other famous civil rights activists such as Alice Walker have been unequivocal in 
their concern for animal welfare. (Singer, 1990.) More recently, numerous global 
movements explicitly pair human issues of poverty and exploitation with our 
relationship to nature and other animals, in particular many environmental groups 
(Mason, 2005). There are also numerous Holocaust-connected activists who advocate 
for animal welfare, most notably Isaac Bashevis Singer (Patterson, 2002)  
Singer (1990) emphasizes the intersectionality of it, in that, “the overlap between 
leaders of movements against the oppression of blacks and women, and leaders of 
movements against cruelty to animals, is extensive; so extensive as to provide an 
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unexpected form of confirmation of the parallel between racism, sexism, and 
speciesism”16 (p. 221). Although opposing cases can undeniably be found, some are 
more controversial than they may at first appear. For example, Hitler is very often 
presented as a case in point that having kind feelings toward NH animals does not relate 
to treating humans well. However, there is proof that he was never a vegetarian (Payne, 
1995) as well as dispute regarding his treatment of NH animals, which beyond his dogs, 
seems to have been quite callous (Patterson, 2002). The pervasiveness and attachment to 
the Hitler example, which is debatable at best, can be seen as an indication of the 
tenacity of the representation of the animal-human divide and people’s dedication to 
maintaining it. Generally however, it seems that empathy is empathy (as discussed in 
section 2.4), and where it exists, it is usually broadly applied. Very often, the 
mistreatment of NH animals is paired with mistreatment of human groups, and 
respectful treatment of NH animals with more egalitarian human social structures. 
This correlation has also been established empirically. Although those who support NH 
animal rights are often criticised for not attending to “more important human issues” 
(Nibert, 1994, p. 115), there is empirical evidence to suggest that concern for the 
welfare for NH animals and many human issues go hand in hand. Nibert’s (1994) 
survey found correlations between support for animal welfare and seven human issues; 
being for animal rights was related to advocating gun registration, ensuring access to 
safe abortions, homosexuals in the military, as well as opposition to violence, rape 
victim blaming, and white Americans pushing African Americans out of their 
neighbourhoods. It is notable that this was a general sample, where people were divided 
into groups depending on whether they agreed with the question, “Some people say that 
animals have rights that people should respect. Would you agree or disagree?" (Nibert, 
1994, p. 117). These results are even more striking since this is not an activist group, or 
necessarily people with strong beliefs about animal welfare; 74.5% of the sample agreed 
with that statement, likely indicating a wide spectrum of opinions on NH animals.      
                                               
16 Singer (1990) coined the term speciesism, and defines it as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of 
the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (p. 6). 
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Although little research has been done on the links between concern for NH animals and 
for human groups, there is a considerable volume of research on the other end of the 
spectrum, which shows that callousness toward animals is related to antisocial 
behaviours toward humans. At its most extreme, the torture of NH animals by adults, 
and particularly children, is a significant predictor of violent (including sadistic) crime 
toward other humans (see e.g., Dadds, Whiting, & Hawes, 2006; Kellert & Felthouse, 
1998; Stone, 2007). In fact, it is a key diagnostic criterion for conduct disorder, a 
necessary precondition for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy, 
and a key predictor of violence (Hare, Tart, & Harpur, 1991).  
There is both a theoretical and empirical continuity between violence against one 
sentient creature and violence against another that holds true more generally, beyond 
those with personality disorders. Bullying (in the “normal” population) and repeated 
abuse of NH animals has been found to be correlated (Henry & Sanders, 2007) Violence 
begets violence, through desensitization and learning. Anything from violent video 
games (Carnagey, Anderson, & Bushman, 2007) to films that portray sexual violence 
against women (Mullin & Linz, 1995) to general, habitual media violence (Krahe et al., 
2011) has an affective and physiological effect on people’s sensitivity to real-world 
violence. This same desensitization effect is found with witnessed or accomplished 
violence against NH animals (Fielding et al., 2011). Violence against animals 
precipitates or at least desensitizes people to violence against humans; the findings are 
quite robust. This gives explicit support to the notion that how people view and treat 
NH animals has a direct effect on how they view and treat other humans.  
2.6.3 Nonhuman animals in science: Anthropomorphism vs. anthropodenial 
Studying NH animals within social psychology is somewhat challenging, because there 
exists a “furry-ceiling” (Raupp, 2002, p. 353) in psychology and other social and natural 
sciences, making it difficult to research and publish on the subject. In general, sciences 
often interpret any positive examination of NH animals as anthropomorphism, which is 
seen a serious problem to be eradicated (Kennedy, 1992; see also Kwan et. al. 2008 and 
Morris, Fidler, & Costall, 2000 for empirical responses to this position). Unfortunately, 
that label is often applied whenever NH animals are discussed as anything beyond 
mindless automatons (de Waal, 2006; 2009).  
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The term anthropomorphism is used in different ways, but it generally involves “the 
attribution of human qualities to other animals, usually with the implication it is done 
without sound justification” (Shettleworth, 2010, p. 477). Eminent primatologist Franz 
de Waal (2006) has contrasted this to anthropodenial, “the a priori rejection of shared 
characteristics between humans and animals” (p. 65), and argues that science is deeply 
entrenched in anthropodenial. He contends that any statement beyond physical fact 
about NH animals is regularly dismissed as mere sentimentality, regardless of the 
physical, behavioural, or evolutionary similarities being considered. There is a curious 
tension in psychology, medicine, and many other sciences, whereby NH animals are 
studied because of their similarities to humans, while at the same time, acknowledging 
those similarities is implicitly or explicitly prohibited (de Waal, 2009).  
De Waal (2006) asserts that anthropodenial is as “dangerous” as anthropomorphising, 
and contends that anthropomorphism is not problematic and is in fact sensible, as long 
as scientists treat anthropomorphic theories as hypotheses. After all, we apply human 
insight to all other fields of science, and test our intuitions against observable facts. 
Using anthropomorphism in this way can be seen as a form of Occam’s razor, or the law 
of parsimony, which states that we should not come to a needlessly complex conclusion 
when a simpler one would suffice. Instead of cognitive parsimony, which is promoted 
by behaviourists (the simplest cognitive explanation should explain behaviour), de Waal 
advocates for evolutionary parsimony. This involves shared phylogeny, and posits, “If 
closely related species act the same, the underlying mental processes are probably the 
same, too. The alternative would be to assume the evolution of divergent processes that 
produce similar behavior, which seems a wildly uneconomic assumption for organisms 
with only a few million years of separate evolution.” (De Waal, 2006, loc. 939).  
The reality of animal-human continuity was established by Darwin, and evidence for it 
has only grown. It is not a matter of a new “value judgement invented by ‘liberal 
intellectuals’” (Allport, 1979/1954, p. 11) that are forced upon folkways that are 
disapproved of. As with any other bias, “Prejudgements become prejudices only if they 
are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge” (p. 9, italics his). If emotional 
resistance is being applied to studying NH animals openly and objectively, it can be 
nothing else but a prejudice. (Allport, 1979/1954.) 
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In psychology, most discourse on anthropomorphism has been theoretical rather than 
empirical; NH animals in general have been the subject of very few empirical studies 
outside of biological psychology (see e.g., Raupp, 2002). This is even truer in social 
psychology. Kwan and Fiske (2008) note that before mid-2007, not one journal article 
using the term anthropomorphism had been published in a social psychology journal, 
though they indicate there was some early psychology research that suggested that it is a 
facet of mental illness or a developmental stage that children (ought to) grow out of. 
Since then, most social psychological research concerning humans’ positive regard for 
NH animals has also characterized it as pathological, such as sad replacements by lonely 
people lacking human relationships (Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008) or 
frightened people trying to retain control over their world (Waytz et al., 2010).17  
However, there is a growing push in certain sciences (primarily the natural sciences, 
such as primatology and evolutionary biology; see de Waal, 2009) toward re-evaluating 
the culture of anthropodenial. There are also hints of it beginning in social and other 
psychologies, as mentioned in section 2.5.2 (see also Beatson & Halloran, 2007). Kwan 
et al. (2008) have even endorsed anthropomorphism as a form of social perception, and 
empirically determined that attributing personality to NH animals involves no greater 
projection of the self than attributing personality to other humans. If not yet popular, it 
is at least becoming acceptable to more openly study NH animals in the social sciences. 
2.6.4 The effects of culture 
It is vital to note that this study is limited to Western, individualistic cultures, as was 
Costello and Hodson’s (2010) study. Each culture has its own social representations and 
perceptions about different cultural groups and NH animals. As explained by Pivetti 
(2005), “’nature’ and ‘animals’ are culturally and historically specific and cannot be 
considered  objective categories within which to organize the world” (p. 36). This is 
important to specify, because every prejudice contains a historical dimension, often 
overlooked in prejudice research (Moscovici & Perez, 1997). Gaines and Reed (1995) 
contend that, if we agree that prejudice is neither an issue of genetics nor errors in 
categorization, then biases are not inevitable, but rather they are “the historical 
                                               
17 There have been several notable exceptions, addressed throughout section 2. 
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emergence of specific behaviors and their allied belief systems that equated physical 
and cultural differences with ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ within the human species" (p. 
101). As each culture defines its own standards for “goodness” and “badness,” 
prejudices too must be profoundly relative, based upon culture. 
Even talking broadly about Western, individualistic cultures is highly problematic. 
Although it can be seen as one group, it is a broad, superordinate group made up of 
various countries and subgroups that can and do vary widely on different points. 
Members of the same ingroup share social representations, but Western cultures are 
made up of numerous different ingroups. However, some hegemonic representations 
about NH animals may be broad enough to apply to the superordinate group of Western, 
individualistic cultures, sharing similar historical underpinnings. Hegemonic social 
representations are “consensually shared by all members of a society. Thus, they are 
uniform and coercive and constitute the collective reality of a given social 
phenomenon” (Sakki & Pirttilä-Backman, 2009, p. 154-155). Because Western cultures 
share the broad roots that created and maintained the animal-human divide, as 
illustrated in section 2.6.1, it is reasonable to suppose that there are at least some 
representations about NH animals and the divide that are generally shared. 
Western culture is dissimilar to other social traditions, most notably Aboriginal and 
other hunter-gatherer cultures. The representations of NH animals and of nature more 
generally are very different in these groups, where the natural world is respected as a 
continuum in which humans are but one part (Patterson, 2002). Different religious 
groups such as Hindus and Buddhists likewise believe that we are all part of the cycle of 
rebirth, and can be reincarnated as any living entity (see e.g., Mason, 2005). That said, 
for Hindus and Buddhists, all beings can be put on the hierarchy from demons to gods, 
and one’s karma influences what one is reincarnated as, so Haidt and Algoe (2004) 
suggest that humans may simply be prone to such hierarchical thinking even when 
trying to avoid it. Jains however, are much stricter in their equality, and in their rules 
not to harm any living being (see e.g., Westermarck, 1939), so hierarchical thinking is 
not necessarily inevitable. Many different cultures have more egalitarian relationships 
with NH animals than Western culture, not necessarily because of their religious 
doctrines per se, but rather because of a sense of common origin and compassion 
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(Westermarck, 1939). These cultural differences are important to note in order to set the 
boundaries on what I am examining, and to illustrate that our Western perspectives on 
humans and other animals are not inevitable or all pervasive. It also explains the 
relevance of our history in shaping these social representations, because each SR is, 
“directly linked and determined by historical, sociological, and ideological conditions. 
As such it is strongly marked by the collective memory of the group and the system of 
norms to which is refers.” (Abric, 1993, p. 75) 
A caveat: It is relevant to point out that this ignores the fact that most Western, 
individualistic cultures are at least somewhat pluralistic, and are home to almost all 
Aboriginal peoples, as well as numerous diverse religious and other groups that have 
differing social representations. Undoubtedly, not all of the hegemonic representations 
held by the majority are shared by these groups. Representations can also be 
emancipated, which are liberated from the hegemony and are unique to every subgroup. 
They can either coexist peacefully or become polemic representations when they come 
into conflict with divergent social representations held by other groups. (Moscovici, 
1988.) Thus, a multitude of varying social representations, many of which are directly 
opposite to one another, exist in Western society. 
It is also essential to note that, although Finland is a part of this Western, individualistic 
culture (e.g., Hofstede, 2001), it is unique in several ways that may have unexpected 
effects in this study. Finland has a relationship both with immigrants and with nature 
that is unique compared with other Western countries. Unlike other European countries, 
Finland did not have any substantial immigration until the 1990’s, and still has only a 
tiny minority population of immigrants (Haavisto, 2011). This means that experience 
with immigrants and representations about them are still rather new, and for the most 
part (aside from a small number of indigenous Sámi people and Romas who immigrated 
to Finland centuries ago) they have no weight of history behind them (Haavisto, 2011). 
Historical conflict with Sweden and Russia is a different matter; however, issues of 
race-relations are much newer in Finland than elsewhere in the Western world.  
Finns also have an unusually close relationship with nature, different from most other 
Western countries. Mythology about nature and the “forest Finn” is central to Finnish 
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identity (Haavisto, 2011; Peltonen, 2000). Representations of nature are vital to a sense 
of Finnishness, significantly more so than other key markers of Finnish identity, such as 
ice hockey and the Winter War (Finell, Olakivi, Liebkind, & Lipsanen, in press). Thus, 
there may be a greater sense of continuity felt between Finns and the natural world 
(including NH animals?) than normally exists in Western cultures. As I am not Finnish, 
and only have a second-hand understanding of the deep social representations shared by 
this society, it is somewhat difficult for me to predict how like or unlike they may be 
from other Western countries. It is nevertheless important to note that they may differ 
significantly from what one would expect from a Western, individualistic culture.  
Moscovici (1984) has stated that, “Representations, obviously, are not created by 
individuals in isolation. Once created, however, they lead a life of their own, circulate, 
merge, attract and repel each other, and give birth to new representations, while old 
ones die out. As a consequence, in order to understand and to explain a representation, it 
is necessary to start with that, or those, from which it was born.” (p. 12). I have 
attempted to understand and explain the representation of the animal-human divide and 
how it affects dehumanization and prejudice, by starting with those representations from 
which it was born. It is now time to return to the original question: Does the inclusion of 
NH animals in a person’s moral universe relate to the inclusion of other, diverse human 
groups? This leads us, finally, to Costello and Hodson’s (2010) study. 
2.7 Costello and Hodson’s Investigation 
Costello and Hodson (2010) conducted two studies on prejudice and dehumanization of 
immigrants. They are based on the premise that the belief in a marked animal-human 
divide is the root cause of dehumanization, which exacerbates outgroup prejudice; the 
counterpoint being that seeing continuity between NH animals and humans diminishes 
both dehumanization and prejudice.  
2.7.1 Study one: Animal-human continuity’s relationship with prejudice 
In their first study, Costello and Hodson (2010) examined whether greater perceived 
similarity between humans and NH animals correlated with less prejudice, and less 
dehumanization, of immigrants. Specifically, their use of dehumanization involved 
viewing outgroups as possessing less uniquely human personality traits and emotions 
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than ingroups. Measures included indices of uniquely human and non-uniquely human 
personality traits (based on Haslam et al., 2005), non-uniquely human and uniquely 
human emotions (conceptually similar to Leyens et al., 2001), animal-human similarity 
(Templer, Connelly, Bassman, & Hart, 2006), and immigrant prejudice (McConahay, 
Hardee, & Batts, 1981). Also included were measures of social dominance orientation 
(SDO) and universal orientation (UO). As noted, SDO is the degree that a person 
favours hierarchical divisions between social groups (Pratto et al., 1994).Conversely, 
UO is an intentional state of non-prejudice where a person chooses to attend to 
similarities as opposed to differences (Phillips, & Ziller, 1997), conceptually similar to 
universalism and an inclusive moral universe.  
Positive correlations were both hypothesized and found between UO, animal-human 
similarity, and immigrant humanization traits and emotions (i.e., attributing uniquely 
human traits and emotions to both immigrants and citizens). There was also a negative 
correlation between each of these factors and both SDO and prejudice, as well as a 
positive correlation between SDO and prejudice. Humanization mediated the 
relationship between prejudice and perceptions of animal-human similarity. 
2.7.2 Study two: Inducing animal-human continuity to affect prejudice 
Costello and Hodson’s (2010) second study strove to examine these correlations in 
further depth, and identify whether an experimental inducement of animal-human 
similarity could cause people to increase their humanization, and decrease their 
prejudice, toward immigrants. The second study comprised similar measures, but also 
included a recategorization index (measuring a common group identity between 
immigrants and citizens; based on Esses, Hodson, & Dovidio, 2003) as well as an 
empathy measure (Batson et al., 1997). Participants in the experimental study were 
divided into four groups, each of which was presented with a different editorial to read 
at the outset: animals are like humans, humans are like animals, humans are superior to 
animals, and animals are inferior to humans.  
The first two editorials emphasized the similarity between humans and other animals, 
whereas the second two exaggerated the animal-human divide. The distinction between 
animals are like humans versus humans are like animals was made to test their own 
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theory (minimizing the divide to foster less prejudice) against terror management theory 
(TMT; Goldenberg et al., 2001). TMT states that reminding humans that they are 
animals increases the salience of human mortality and consequently can cause anxiety 
and actually increase prejudice against outgroup members (Beatson & Halloran, 
2007).18 Thus, only the animals are like humans category was hypothesized to increase 
immigrant humanization, while the other three were theorized to decrease immigrant 
humanization. Their hypotheses were supported once again. The animals are like 
humans editorial made participants significantly less prejudiced, but it was not a direct 
effect. The result was mediated by humanization, recategorization, and empathy.  
2.7.3 My study: A replication and extension 
My approach is a replication of Costello and Hodson’s (2010) second study, with 
several variations. Their study is the first of its kind and although a similar study has 
been conducted recently by the authors (Bastian et al., in press) it has not been 
replicated by outside researchers, or in other contexts or countries.  
Like Costello and Hodson (2010), I examine whether the animals are like humans 
editorial reduces prejudice, via the mediating influences of dehumanization (traits and 
emotions), empathy, and recategorization. Dovidio et al. (2004) explain that: “Mediators 
are the psychological mechanisms through which outside forces produce change… they 
are the internal processes that translate external influences and interventions into 
reductions of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination” (p. 244). In this case, 
humanization, empathy, and recategorization are the internal processes through which 
the (external) editorial is expected to produce a reduction of prejudice. I am using the 
                                               
18 Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, and Hodson (in press) later expanded on this study and explicated that the 
large difference between these two groups has to do with framing, studies on which have shown that a 
feeling of similarity is enhanced when the referent is the self; but does not occur when the referent is 
another. With regards to this particular pair grouping, they note that when the referent is humans, “the 
subject of comparison (animals) is viewed as having few unique features compared to the referent of 
comparison (humans). Conversely, when animals are the referent of the human–animal comparison, 
humans are likely to be viewed as relatively dissimilar to animals. This is because humans are viewed as 
having many unique features when compared to animals” (p. 2). They found that this framing of animals 
are like humans raises the issue of moral inclusivity and increases mind perception about NH animals. 
Further, they note that, “when people become aware of the moral relevance of other species this process 
should inadvertently trigger greater concern for our own species” (p. 5).  
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same or similar instruments to measure each of these five main variables. I am also 
measuring animal-human continuity, and universalism and power-related orientations. 
Although there are some instrument substitutions that will be discussed in section 4.3, 
the prime difference in this study is that I am also looking at the content of participants’ 
representations of Finns, immigrants, animals, and humans, both through the trait and 
emotion scales, and with an added word association task. Furthermore, participants will 
be divided into one experimental group and a control group, because it is necessary to 
discover if intervention this works when compared to a regular control group.19  
I also believe this theory needs to be examined in a country with a different immigrant 
situation than Canada, which is where Costello and Hodson (2010) conducted their 
study. Canada is quite diverse, having had an open, non-discriminatory, and expansive 
immigration policy since the 1960’s. A key part of Canada’s national identity is 
multiculturalism, which is based on the acceptance of diversity and positive intergroup 
relationships, and feelings toward different ethnic and immigrant groups in Canada are 
quite positive. (Esses & Gardner, 1996.) It is also notable that most people in Canada 
are either first, second, or third generation Canadians, so immigrants are already a de 
facto part of almost all Canadians’ ingroups. Therefore, it may be easier to induce 
Canadians to humanize immigrants than it would be in many other countries.  
As noted in section 2.6.4, Finland is a much more homogenous nation, being a country 
of emigration rather than immigration up until recently (Haavisto, 2011). Only 3% of 
Finland's 5.3 million inhabitants are immigrants, composed mainly of Russians, 
Swedes, Estonians, and Somalis. Between 2000 and 2010 there has been an average of 
3345 applications for asylum each year. Only an average of 1.6% of applicants are 
granted asylum each year, although an additional 23.4% of asylum seekers (on average) 
are given residence permits per year. (Statistics Finland, 2012.) Although Finland lags 
well behind most other Western countries in terms of number of immigrants, there is 
nonetheless continuous debate about immigration. Foreigners have not been easily 
accepted into Finnish society, and there is insufficient top-down social support for open-
                                               
19 Their most recent study, conducted by Bastian et al. (in press) used a control group and still garnered 
significant results (study 3), which is encouraging. 
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minded attitudes toward immigrants, with Finnish media in particular contributing 
toward xenophobia (Liebkind & McAlister, 1999; see Haavisto, 2011 for more on the 
role of media). Perhaps also because Finns perceive themselves to be a specific ethnic 
group, the divisions between Finns and immigrants is much starker than any line one 
could draw between “Canadians” and “immigrants” (Liebkind, 2009).  
Recent increases in tension in Finland (and most other European countries) regarding 
foreigners, as illustrated by the unexpected rise of the starkly anti-immigrant 
Perussuomalaiset or “True” Finn party (Worth, 2011) makes it a very different situation 
than what is found in Canada. If this experimental condition can increase humanization 
not only in Canada, but also in a country with strained immigrant relations, it would be 
a significant finding. Theoretically, it should do so, because as Costello and Hodson 
(2010) note, even those highest in SDO and lowest in UO (i.e., the most prejudiced) 
showed reductions in prejudice after the animals are like humans manipulation.  
In fact, one of the most promising aspects of this particular prejudice reduction method 
is that it is indirect, and thus “circumvent[s] negative or defensive reactions that highly 
prejudiced people exhibit in response to more direct human outgroup prejudice 
interventions” (Costello & Hodson, 2010, p. 18). The implicit effect of this intervention 
gives it a certain kind of power, as discussed by Elcheroth, Doise, and Reicher (2011): 
“Sometimes acts can be even more influential when they are silent: discarding speech 
that could be explicitly challenged, they retain the unspoken and, hence, incontestable” 
(p. 14). Because the intervention does not directly target individuals’ social 
representations about immigrants – and in fact, does not reference prejudice, or 
alternately, tolerance – it can bypass the protective mechanisms of those individuals 
who are highly prejudiced and who would be motivated to disregard explicit 
suggestions to stop dehumanizing. Costello and Hodson (2010) theorize that because it 
speaks to an underlying categorization change that is never made explicit, it is equally 
effective on highly prejudiced individuals at minimizing their dehumanization.  
3 Research Questions  
The experimental objective of this study is to ascertain whether inducing animal-human 
similarity affects prejudice toward immigrants. Costello and Hodson (2010) found that 
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inducing animal-human similarity decreased prejudice toward immigrants, the effects of 
which were mediated by humanization (traits and emotions), empathy, and 
recategorization. This will be examined, along with the broader relationship between 
prejudice and moral universe. Additionally, the present study explores the social 
representations held by participants about Finns, immigrants, animals, and humans. The 
research questions and hypotheses are divided into those relating to the replication of 
Costello and Hodson’s (2010) study, and those about social representations. 
3.1 Replication Research Questions 
The main overarching research question is, 1: Does emphasizing animal-human 
similarity have an effect on prejudice towards immigrants? I also want to determine, 
2: What relationships do humanization traits, humanization emotions, empathy, 
and recategorization have with animal-human continuity and prejudice? 
Consequently, the principal hypotheses are: 
H1. Inducing animal-human continuity will have a negative effect on immigrant 
prejudice. 
H2. Inducing animal-human continuity will have a positive effect on: 
a. Humanization traits, 
b. Humanization emotions, 
c. Empathy, and 
d. Recategorization.  
H3. A negative effect on prejudice will result from an increase in:  
a. Humanization traits, 
b. Humanization emotions, 
c. Empathy, and 
d. Recategorization, 
H4. The relationship between animal-human similarity and prejudice will be 
mediated by:  
a. Humanization traits, 
b. Humanization emotions, 
c. Empathy, and 
d. Recategorization.  
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For clarity’s sake, hypotheses 1-4 are presented in Figure 4.  
Figure 4. Hypothesized Prejudice Reduction Model 
 
Figure 4. Hypothesized prejudice reduction model, in which emphasizing animal-human 
similarity should negatively affect prejudice (H1), and positively affect traits, emotions, 
recategorization, and empathy (H2). An increase in traits, emotions, recategorization, and 
empathy should decrease prejudice (H3). Traits, emotions, recategorization, and empathy should 
mediate the relationship between animal-human similarity and prejudice (H4). Based upon the 
findings of Costello and Hodson (2010). 
The relationships between these five main variables (prejudice, humanization emotions, 
humanization traits, empathy, and recategorization) and values will also be addressed, to 
determine their relationship to one’s moral universe. The associated research question 
is, 3: How are prejudice, humanization traits, humanization emotions, empathy, 
and recategorization related to moral universe? Accordingly, I hypothesize that: 
H5. An inclusive moral universe will be: 
a. Negatively related to prejudice,  
b. Positively related to humanization traits,  
c. Positively related to humanization emotions, 
d. Positively related to empathy, and 
e. Positively related to recategorization. 
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3.2 Social Representation Research Questions 
In this study, social representations will be examined in several ways, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Social representations are complex theories regarding 
common sense, and cannot be reduced to values, attitudes, or attributed traits or 
emotions. A social representation includes many components, including information, 
attitudes, figurative elements, values, and/or emotions. This makes studying SRs 
empirically rather complex, because different methodologies are needed to render the 
diverse aspects of an SR. (Sakki, 2010.) Thus, the humanization traits and humanization 
emotions addressed previously will also each be examined for their content, and word 
associations will be analyzed, meaning that three different angles will be taken in an 
effort to get at the social representations. 
3.2.1 Trait and emotion research questions 
In a way, I am examining two competing theories. H2 predicts that uniquely human 
traits and emotions will be attributed to both Finns and immigrants when animal-human 
continuity is induced, but only to Finns when it is not. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, 
this is based upon studies that have found that uniquely human traits and emotions are 
more likely to be attributed to the ingroup (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 
2005, 2008; Paladino et al., 2002), namely Finns, and that non-uniquely emotions may 
be more likely to be attributed to the outgroup (Leyens et al., 2000), namely immigrants. 
Inducing animal-human continuity should make participants view Finns and immigrants 
in much the same humanized way; otherwise, immigrants will be dehumanized.  
However, the specific cultural stereotypes (social representations) for each group do not 
fall into these same categories. Therefore, I also wish to examine the content of the 
humanization traits and emotions to see if, collapsed across groups (those induced to see 
animal-human continuity and those not), there are different social representations that 
are endorsed for Finns and immigrants that match established cultural stereotypes. In a 
way, I am putting limits on the previous theory, and taking a step back, in order to 
determine if there are conditions in which the theory regarding the attribution of 
uniquely human and non-uniquely human traits and emotions is overruled. That said, 
these two hypotheses might also coexist. Perhaps certain traits and emotions will be 
strongly attributed to either Finns or immigrants, but others will vary by experimental 
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condition. Alternately, maybe all traits and emotions will be attributed to one group or 
the other, but those traits and emotions that are uniquely human and that are attributed 
to immigrants will be more highly emphasized in the animal-human similarity group. 
To my knowledge, these two differing ways of looking at traits and emotions have not 
been combined before, so this is an open exploration. 
Based on past research on the Finnish identity, it seems that being silent, shy, slow, 
closed-off, direct, and with low self-esteem  (Sajavaara, & Lehtonen, 1997), as well as 
hard-drinking, violent, having sisu (guts), calmness, and being in touch with nature 
(Peltonen, 2000) are  related to a sense of Finnishness. Some of these traits are rather 
contradictory, and for immigrants it is even more difficult to say, since they are not a 
homogenous group. Although some studies have found that people have a generic 
picture of immigrants as “incompetent and untrustworthy” (Lee & Fiske, 2006, p. 751), 
that is, low on both competence and warmth, as per the Stereotype Content Model 
(Fiske, et al., 2002), once they are divided into groups a more nuanced image is formed, 
depending on the group being considered. Those of African descent are often still 
considered low in competence and low in warmth, whereas those from other European 
nations are seen as higher on competence, and their attributed warmth depends upon 
their country of origin (Fiske et al., 2002; Lee & Fiske, 2006). This also varies 
depending on the nationality of the evaluator.  
Thus, possible hypotheses about traits and emotions are potentially contradictory in 
nature, depending on whether one considers the uniquely and non-uniquely human trait 
and emotion literature, or established consensual stereotypes, as well as which 
stereotypes are chosen. Hence, the research question is, 4: Are certain humanization 
traits and emotions more highly associated either with Finns or with immigrants? 
Since hypotheses relating to uniquely and non-uniquely human traits are addressed in 
H2, these will be alternate (though not mutually exclusive) hypotheses, about the social 
representations of each group:  
H6. Finns will be associated with different traits and emotions than immigrants, 
including but not limited to those relating to being: silent, shy, slow, closed-off, 
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direct, with low self-esteem, hard-drinking, violent, having guts, calmness, and 
being in touch with nature. 
H7. Immigrants will be associated with different traits and emotions than Finns, 
including but not limited to: incompetence and untrustworthiness, as well as the 
inverse of any characteristic strongly related to Finnish identity. 
3.2.2 Word association research questions 
For the word association task (WAT), I also hope that the experimental group will 
exhibit less prejudice and dehumanization in their spontaneous responses, but I will not 
make any predictions, in order to give the data a chance to “speak for themselves.” In 
fact, that is why I am choosing to include the word association task, because I would 
like participants to be able to produce their own, spontaneous representations, free from 
the confines of questionnaires, which will also hopefully show a reduced social 
desirability bias. (Mäkiniemi, Pirttilä-Backman, & Pieri, 2011.)  
I have two research questions pertaining to the WAT data:  
5: What social representations do participants have of Finns, immigrants, animals, 
and humans?  
6: What effect, if any, does inducing animal-human continuity have on the terms 
(and the valence of those terms) that participants choose to describe immigrants 
and NH animals?  
4 Methodology 
As noted, I have conducted a modified replication of Costello and Hodson’s (2010) 
second study. I experimentally manipulated the animals are like humans factor using an 
experimental group and a control group, conducted via online questionnaires completed 
by Finnish students at Laurea Polytechnic and the University of Helsinki. Half of the 
participants read the animals are like humans editorial, the other read the control 
geology editorial (see Appendices 1 and 2), after which they filled in several 
questionnaires and completed a word association task. All of the measures were in 
Finnish. All questionnaires were translated and back-translated by experts whose 
mother tongue is Finnish. Information on the participants will now be examined, 
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followed by instruments, and a delineation of the analytical strategies, split into those 
used for the quantitative data and those used for the qualitative data. 
4.1 Participants 
Two-hundred and one Finnish students participated in the study. I wanted at least 50 
individuals per group, for a total of 100 participants, and chose first year students from 
Laurea Polytechnic in an attempt to be more representative of diverse study programs, 
with differing requirements and social levels, which would be closer to representing 
average Finns. In particular, I wished to avoid the typical social psychology students 
who are normally significantly different from the general population, particularly in 
areas such as prejudice, universalism, and moral inclusion, and who are mostly female 
(e.g., McFarland, 2010; Verkasalo, Daun, & Niit, 1994). 
Recruitment emails were initially sent out to 400 Laurea Polytechnic students on 
February 28th, 2012. Students were selected at random from all of Laurea’s institutes 
from almost all of its Finnish language programmes. Eleven email addresses failed, for 
a total of 389 potential participants. Only 37 responded, even after two follow up 
emails, for a response rate of 9.5%. Response rates have been found to be poorer using 
email recruitment, but this was even lower than anticipated (Cook, Heath, & Thompson, 
2000). More student email addresses were requested and received, and 400 more emails 
were sent on March 13th. Fifteen email addresses failed, for a total of 385 potential 
participants. Only 27 responded, for a response rate of 7.0%. To make up the difference 
I also decided to recruit students from the University of Helsinki, and emails were sent 
to 31 recommended mailing lists (see Appendix 6). It is impossible to know how many 
students are on the lists or consequently what the response rates were, but I received 131 
responses. Six students from other schools who were either on one of the mailing lists 
or who had previously studied at Laurea also responded. 
The 201 participants ranged in age from 19 to 65, M = 27.14. An unexpectedly low 
percentage of men participated, with 166 (82.6%) women and only 35 (17.4%) men. 
The vast majority spoke Finnish as their native tongue, 189 (94.0%), while eight (4.0%) 
spoke Swedish as their native tongue, and four (2.0%) noted another language (two 
Russian, and one each Estonian and Slovak). Sixty-four (31.8%) participants were from 
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Laurea Polytechnic, 131 (65.2%) from the University of Helsinki, and six (3.0%) listed 
other universities (two from Turku University, one each from Aalto University, Åbo 
Akademi, and Jyväskylä University, and one was left blank). Contrary to my intentions, 
very few were in their first year of studies at a post-secondary institution, with only 25 
(12.4%) listing this as their first year, 18 (9.0%) their second year, 33 (16.4%) their 
third, 36 (17.9%) their fourth, and the majority, 89 (44.3%) were in their fifth or higher 
year of university, making them on average, very highly educated. Finally, they were 
from a diverse range of programs. The programs were divided into eight categories, 
which differed by school: Arts and humanities (36.9%), social sciences (15.9%), 
education (11.3%), health care (10.8%), economics and business (9.2%), various 
polytechnic degrees (7.7%), science and technology (6.2%) and unspecified (2.1%). For 
a list of specific programs, see Appendix 6. 
Participants were not compensated, but were given the opportunity to put their email 
addresses into a draw to win movie tickets. Six movie tickets were conferred. Winning 
participants were chosen using a random number generator (Mads Haahr, 2012). 
It is important to note that this sample is not representative of the Finnish population, or 
even of Finnish university-level students. The sample is skewed in several ways, 
including by gender, by program, and by years of study. Self-selection bias was 
obviously a factor in this study (Cook, Heath, & Thompson, 2000) a problem which will 
be addressed in the discussion (section 6.2).  
4.2 Instruments 
Basic demographics were first collected (age, gender, school, year and programme of 
study, mother tongue), after which students read whichever of the two editorials they 
were randomly selected to get. Several questionnaires, a word association task, and 
some follow-up questions comprised the rest of the survey. The following 
questionnaires were used: 
? A combination of two Finnish prejudice scales used in place of the Modern 
Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) with modified 
questions from that scale, as well as from Liebkind and McAlister (1999), and 
Pettigrew and Meertens (1995);  
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? Recategorization questions (Costello & Hodson, 2010; based on Esses, Hodson, 
& Dovidio, 2003);  
? A shortened version of the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003) 
measuring uniquely and non-uniquely human personality traits;  
? An inventory based upon Demoulin et al. (2004) and Paladino et al. (2002) 
measuring uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions; 
? Batson and colleagues’ (1997) empathy scale;  
? The Animal-Human Continuity scale (Templer, et al., 2006);  
? Schwartz et al.’s (in press) revised value survey (PVQ-R).  
These scales were each necessary for the (quasi) replication of Costello and Hodson’s 
(2010) study. The MRS was substituted because it has proven inappropriate in the 
Finnish context, whereas the questionnaires have been more applicable (see e.g., Finell 
et al., in press; Liebkind & McAlister, 1999). For the same reason, I chose to use 
Schwartz et al.’s (in press) redesigned value survey to measure moral universe, instead 
of universal orientation (UO) and social dominance orientation (SDO), due to the 
latter’s inappropriateness in the Finnish context (see e.g., Hirvelä, 2011). I used only 
one of Costello and Hodson’s (2010) two traits scales for the sake of keeping the survey 
at a reasonable length, and chose this one because it had better convergent and 
discriminant validity as well as test–retest reliability (Gosling et al., 2003). I also used a 
few different terms for the emotion scale than Costello and Hodson did, to better reflect 
those emotions most consistently used across studies (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et 
al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002).  
Prejudice, recategorization, and humanization-traits are each measured on a scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), where a higher score indicates greater 
prejudice, recategorization, or humanization traits. Humanization emotions are 
measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and empathy is 
measured on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), again, higher scores indicate 
greater humanization emotions and empathy. For the values survey, response options 
varied on a 6-point scale from not at all like me to very much like me. Each of the 
questionnaires can be seen in Appendices 3 and 4. 
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Prejudice scale. The substitution of the MRS, the scale measuring the dependent 
variable, was not undertaken lightly. However, it was highly recommended to change 
the scale for several reasons, the chief one being that it is no longer particularly modern; 
as well, there are questions of its applicability outside the United States, and in 
particular, researchers in Finland have found it to be an unreliable measure in the 
Finnish context. Two other scales have been used more regularly in Finland, one (which 
I will term P-scale 1) containing appropriate questions from the MRS (McConahay et 
al., 1981) and questions from Pettigrew and Meertens (1995); the other (termed P-scale 
2) using one of the same questions from Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) as well as 
questions from Liebkind and McAlister (1999). Questions 1, 3, 4, and 6 were from the 
former; questions 1, 7, and 8 from the latter (see Appendices 3 and 4). Because each 
questionnaire was so short, and had some crossover, they were combined to make a 
composite scale. Additionally, the recategorization questions and the one reverse-scored 
(non-prejudiced) question from the MRS were folded into the scale, to avoid response 
sets or excessive social desirability bias and to provide a more balanced measure (Clark 
& Watson, 1995). This new scale was piloted before use, see Appendix 5. 
Moral universe scale. Schwartz et al.’s (in press) redesigned value survey was used as 
a proxy for UO and SDO, using universalism and power subscales, respectively, which 
give a rough estimate of how inclusive a person’s moral universe is. Helkama (2009) 
notes that universalism values predict “acceptance of immigrants and prosocial 
behaviour more strongly in countries with a larger moral inclusiveness” (p. 141), and 
since Finland scores reasonably high on moral inclusion (3.25 out of 4), it should be 
applicable (Schwartz, 2007). Additionally, Feather and Mckee (2008) found that power 
has a direct relationship with prejudice, related to SDO, and that prejudice has an 
inverse relationship with universalism, so it should function as proxies for these scales. 
The revised value scale may also be particularly relevant, due to the finer breakdown of 
universalism and power into subscales. Universalism is now comprised of concern, 
nature, and tolerance, while on the opposite side, power is divided into dominance and 
resources; see Figure 5. Theoretically, each of the universalism scales should have some 
relationship with the main variables, although how specifically is unknown, because it is 
a brand-new measure. Power dominance has the strongest conceptual relationship with 
social dominance orientation, however, because it is a new measure and because neither 
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power nor dominance is generally a culturally endorsed value for Finns (e.g., Hofstede, 
2001) it seems necessary to leave the possibility open for either subscale to be affected. 
Figure 5. Schwartz et. al.’s (in press) Revised Motivational Continuum 
 
Figure 5. Reprinted  from  Schwartz  et  al.  (in  press),  with  the  caption  “Figure 1. Proposed 
circular motivational continuum of 19 values with sources that underlie their order.” 
Pilot studies. I conducted several pilot studies covering different facets of this research. 
They include both English and Finnish pilots done with the assistance of my colleagues, 
as well as a measure-check pilot using random participants in order to test the geology 
editorial, my method for random selection, and the composite prejudice scale. See 
Appendix 5 for details on each of the studies.  
Word associations. As mentioned, I also included a word association task (WAT) after 
the questionnaires (but before the PVQ-R). I wanted to give participants the opportunity 
to articulate their own spontaneous social representations, free from the confines of 
questionnaires. I hoped to gain a clearer idea of whom the participants were thinking 
about when they thought of immigrants and what other terms came to mind, as well as 
the valence they gave to such representations. This also necessitated the comparison 
category of Finn, to see what kind of differences individuals delineated between the 
two. I also wished to see what terms were most common when participants thought of 
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NH animals, as it is relevant to the experimental manipulation, and I hoped it would 
help illustrate the theoretical underpinnings. The comparison category of human was 
then also necessary. Thus, the terms I used for the WAT were Immigrant, Animal, 
Human, and Finn.  
Follow-up questions and debrief. Finally, several follow up questions were asked after 
participants completed all of the above tasks. For each of the groups, a multiple-choice 
editorial check question was asked to make sure that participants had read and 
understood the editorial.20 Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions or 
leave comments and had the choice to give their email address for the movie ticket 
draw, and to indicate whether they wanted to receive a follow up debrief. Because of the 
awkward nature of the e-lomake program, I could not include a proper debrief on the 
questionnaire, because participants could go back and change their responses right up 
until the survey was finished and exited. Nevertheless, I felt it was ethically necessary to 
give participants the opportunity to get a fuller debriefing on what they experienced and 
on the aims of the study, so I sent a follow up email to the participants who wished one. 
4.3 Analytical Strategies 
All quantitative data was analyzed with PASW Statistics 18. Effect sizes (including 
Cohen’s d) were calculated using an online program, Effect Size Calculators (Becker, 
1999). Qualitative data was analyzed by hand using Microsoft Excel 2010, though 
statistical tests on the word association data was also performed with PASW. The main 
quantitative methods consisted of bivariate analyses, one sample, independent sample, 
and paired sample t-tests, as well as simple linear and step-wise multiple regressions.   
As noted, 201 participants completed the survey. One participant was removed because 
of a saving error within e-lomake, whereby most of her data was lost. A second was 
removed because she commented that she answered randomly. Finally, four were 
eliminated because their mother tongue was neither Finnish nor Swedish, so they were 
either immigrants or of immigrant descent. Consequently, 195 cases were analyzed. 
                                               
20 Animal question: How close is human DNA to chimpanzee DNA? Geology question: What are the three 
layers of the earth? 
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There was no missing data for any questions, because the online survey was set up so 
that they were required to answer each question before they could move on. The only 
exception was the WAT data, which was not mandatory, but was nonetheless almost 
always completed. There were 585 fields (3 words each per 195 participants), and for 
Finn 573 were filled in, for Immigrant 572, for Animal 566, and for Human 563.  
4.3.1 Quantitative data 
Scale reliability. Initially, composite scores were made for each of the scales, including 
for the two separate prejudice scales that had been combined. The reliability of each 
scale was checked; their Cronbach’s alphas can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Alphas for all relevant scales and subscales 
Scale ?   Scale ? 
Prejudice .73   Universalism .86 
   P-scale 1 .77      Tolerance .69 
   P-scale 2 .68      Nature .88 
Humanization traits .86      Concern .79 
Humanization emotions .97   Power .84 
Empathy .89      Dominance .80 
Recategorization .75      Resources .79 
Animal-human continuity .66     
 
The internal consistency of humanization emotions, humanization traits,21 and empathy 
was excellent; recategorization and prejudice were both acceptable.22 Likewise, the 
universalism and power scales and subscales were all reliable, aside from tolerance, 
which was a bit too low. Animal-human continuity was less reliable, which was not 
unexpected. I find this scale to be problematic and searched (without success) for a 
replacement before conducting this study. Multiple issues with it were raised during my 
pilot studies, and I have concerns with the wording of many of the questions. The 
translators who converted it into Finnish also mentioned that it was awkward to 
translate into Finnish, an issue that was not raised with other scales. Multiple 
participants also raised concerns about the scale in the comments section. Therefore, the 
results from this scale were treated with some caution. 
                                               
21 Hereafter, humanization emotions and traits will simply be referred to as emotions and traits. 
22 As in the pilot (see Appendix 5), P-scale 2 was not as reliable as it should be, but since the composite 
scale was not that much less reliable than P-scale 1, the composite scale was used for all analyses. 
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Nonparametric data. Data was then explored using descriptive statistics and bivariate 
analyses. To measure correlations between the dependent variable (prejudice) and the 
categorical demographic variables (gender, school, years of study, program of study, 
mother tongue), prejudice was transformed into a categorical variable. Scores between 
1-1.9 were given the rank 1, scores between 2-2.9 the rank 2, and so on (see Appendix 
6). Program of study also had to be transformed from open-ended responses into a 
categorical variable. After translation, they were separated into faculties wherever 
possible. For example, study programs in the faculty of social sciences were all grouped 
together, as well as the faculty of arts, and the faculty of science. Then all education 
study programs were grouped together, and all programs relating to health care. 
Economics, business, and law were combined because there was multiple crossover 
between these programs (e.g., economics and business administration, business law). 
Finally, due to the small number of them, all polytechnic degrees that did not apply to 
any other category were combined into one category. Those participants who did not 
specify their program (e.g., master’s program) were put in an unspecified category. All 
listed programs and their categories can be seen in Appendix 6, as can the specific 
scoring of each of the categorical variables. Correlations between prejudice, gender, 
school, years of study, program of study, and mother tongue were then measured with a 
bivariate analysis using Spearman’s rho.  
Parametric data. Continuous variables (age, emotions, traits, recategorization, 
empathy, values) were examined with a bivariate analysis using Pearson’s correlations. 
Analysing continuous variables with parametric tests also requires that several basic 
assumptions be met, namely normal distribution, homogeneity of variance, and 
independence of observations. Of all of the relevant variables (prejudice, traits, 
emotions, empathy, recategorization, animal-human continuity, universalism subscales, 
power subscales) only empathy, animal-human continuity, and each of the universalism 
subscales fell within the parameters of normal distribution. Emotions’ kurtosis was 
borderline, due to the high number of participants who had a score of 5. Traits was both 
positively skewed and pointy, recategorization’s kurtosis was also borderline, and both 
power resources and power dominance were positively skewed.  
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Most problematically, prejudice was both  positively skewed and had a sharp peak. 
Since none was extremely non-normal, and due to the large sample size, it was 
determined that results would not be severely affected by the violation of this 
assumption, as per the Monte Carlo simulations done by Glass, Peckham, and Sanders 
(1972). This was partly determined because the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was met for all relevant variables (aside from humanization emotions, which just barely 
failed, receiving 0.48 on Levene’s test of equal variances), as was independence of 
observations (as noted by the Durbin-Watson test done with the multiple regression, 
discussed later). However, it does mean that interpretations need to be made with a bit 
of caution, particularly in terms of its generalizability. 
As noted, correlations were examined, as were means and standard deviations, to get an 
understanding of the data, both for the total group, as well as by experimental condition. 
As noted, I used an experimental framework with two conditions, the animals are like 
humans (experimental) condition and geology (control) condition. Specifically, I 
examined how the animals are like humans editorial (as compared to the control 
geology editorial) affected prejudice toward immigrants, as well as humanization (traits 
and emotions),23 empathy, and recategorization (as per Costello & Hodson’s study, 
2010). Independent sample t-tests were conducted between groups on every variable to 
see which were significantly different. Since P-scale 2 had a much lower alpha than P-
scale 1, independent samples t-tests were also conducted using each subscale, but no 
differences were found between those t-tests and the composite scale t-test, so the 
composite scale was assumed to be adequately reliable, and used for all analyses. 
The manipulation checks were also tested, comparing animal-human continuity scores 
by experimental group with an independent sample t-test. Answers to the editorial 
questions were also examined, and independent sample t-tests were rerun without the 
few participants who got the question wrong, to check for differences (there were none). 
Hypothesis testing. To test H1, H2, H3, and H4, whether traits, emotions, empathy, and 
recategorization mediate between the independent variable (editorial) and the dependent 
                                               
23 Humanization traits and humanization emotions are each divided into uniquely (UH) and non-uniquely 
human (NUH). All hypotheses concern UH scores for immigrants. 
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variable (prejudice), several linear regression analyses were run, as per Baron and 
Kenny (1986). See Figure 5 for the model.  
Figure 5. Baron and Kenny’s (1986) Mediational Model 
 
Figure 5. Reprinted from Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1176), with the caption “Figure 3. Mediational 
model.” 
To test for mediation, several steps need to be followed. Step 1 is to run a regression on 
the editorial and prejudice (c in figure; H1). Step 2 is to run separate regression analyses 
on the editorial and each of the potential mediators (a in figure; H2). Step 3 is to run a 
regression on each of the potential mediators and prejudice (b in figure; H3). Finally, it 
is necessary to establish whether the effect is a partial or complete mediation (affecting 
H4). (Kenny, 2012.) Although this is the standard model for mediation testing, there has 
been some debate in the past several decades over whether every one of these steps is 
necessary (Kenny, 2012; Zhao, 2010). Kenny (2012) notes that the majority of analysts 
now agree that step 1 is not necessary to show mediation. Consequently, even if step 1 
is not significant, steps 2 and (if significant) step 3 can be carried out. The relationship 
between the main variables and control variables, as well as the model fit was 
determined with a step-wise multiple regression analysis.  
During the step-wise multiple regression analysis, diagnostics were performed to test if 
the assumptions of linear regression were met. Emotions, traits, empathy, and 
recategorization each had a roughly linear relationship with prejudice, although traits 
was a bit more curved than it ought to have been. The residuals (distribution of the error 
term) were inspected using a histogram and a scatterplot to determine normal 
distribution and homoscedasticity, respectively. The residuals were quite normally 
distributed, although they were somewhat heteroscedastic. As mentioned, the Durbin-
Watson value was examined to check for autocorrelation, and observations were 
determined to be independent. A scatterplot of the residuals and leverage indicated that 
there were no outliers in the risky category. Multicollinearity was assessed by 
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examining VIF scores, which indicated that none of the variables was highly correlated 
with one another. Thus, the assumptions of linear regression were generally met. 
To test H5, Pearsons’ correlations between prejudice, emotions, traits, empathy, 
recategorization, and values were tested using bivariate analysis. This was done after 
preparing the PVQ-R data, which must be centred, to control for differential use of the 
scale. A personal mean for each participant was calculated, using all 57 questions. The 
items of the subscale were summed together, and then divided by the mean multiplied 
by the number of items (always three, in the revised version). (See e.g., Myyry, 2003.) 
To test H6 and H7, paired sample t-tests were conducted to see which traits and 
emotions apply to which group. Pairing the previously mentioned theoretical traits and 
emotions with the scales means that Finns are expected to be acharacterized as 
dependable/self-disciplined, reserved/quiet, calm/emotionally stable, and 
(paradoxically) critical/quarrelsome. Further, immigrants should be attributed as being 
disorganized/careless, extroverted/enthusiastic, and open to new experiences/complex 
(extroverted and open because Finns are thought to be distinctly not extroverted or 
open, so immigrants should come out higher in comparison). As with all t-tests that 
were run, effect sizes and Cohen’s d were also calculated. 
4.3.2 Qualitative data 
Participants were asked to supply three associations for each term, and give each word a 
valence, either positive (+), negative (-), or neutral (0). A total of 2274 words and 
phrases were submitted (as noted, Finn = 573, Immigrant = 572, Animal = 566, and 
Human = 563). The terms were translated using an online translator, after which they 
were checked and revised by a native Finnish speaker. They were then discussed 
together, after which some small reformulations and clarifications were made. The data 
for each term was processed for the sake of clarity, grouping all semantically similar 
words that differed only by way of grammar (e.g., singular/plural, adjectives/adverbs). 
Words that were different but semantically comparable were likewise put into groups 
(e.g., noisy and loud). (Sarrica & Contarello, 2004.) Finally, due to the sheer volume of 
data, words that were not semantically equivalent but expressed the same spirit of 
meaning were grouped together (e.g., dominant with conquering). Categories were 
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created as long as there were at least three of the same or conceptually similar words; 
any less and they were included in the miscellaneous category. Borderline or ambiguous 
terms were also included in the miscellaneous category. These categories and the 
contents therein were then checked by another researcher for whom Finnish is their 
native tongue, in both Finnish and English, to determine if my interpretation of the 
English word did not miss nuances present in the Finnish, as well as to negotiate the 
interpretations until agreement was reached. 
Although qualitative data is not generally used with experiments, it has recently been 
done, for example, by Maykel Verkuyten (2005) with considerable success. In order to 
triangulate the WAT data with the questionnaire data, it was necessary to quantify it, in 
order to see if there were genuine differences by condition. This was done by assigning 
every individual an overall valence for each of the four terms (Finn, Immigrant, Animal, 
and Human) by adding up the valences participants had given to their words. Thus, the 
possible scores ranged from -3 (three negative words) to 3 (three positive words). Terms 
given a neutral valence or not given a valence were scored 0. (Rozin, Kurzer, & Cohen, 
2002.) Independent sample t-tests were performed on the mean of each term, compared 
by experimental condition. Participants were then collapsed across groups and a one 
sample t-test was performed to see if there was a statistically significant difference 
between the valence means in each group.   
Finally, to get a better sense of the empathy and alternately, the reproach directed at 
each of the four groups, all terms given a negative valence were recategorized into 
terms that were reproachful, empathetic, or ambiguous, and differences between the 
groups were examined.24 
5 Results 
5.1 Replication Results 
Demographics. Pearson’s correlations between the main five variables (prejudice, 
humanization emotions, humanization traits, recategorization, and empathy) appear in 
                                               
24 The word association data spans 21 pages, which is why it was not included as an appendix. However, 
it is available upon request. 
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Table 2. The five main variables are all significantly correlated (in the predicted 
direction), with the exception of recategorization with emotions.  
Table 2. Correlations between prejudice, emotions, traits, empathy, and 
recategorization 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1. Prejudice –    
2. Emotions (UHI) -.28*** –   
3. Traits (UHI) -.34*** .21** –  
4. Empathy -.44*** .14* .31*** – 
5. Recategorization -.34*** .09 .37*** .38*** 
Note. UHI = uniquely human, for immigrants. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (1-tailed). 
Correlations were also run with the demographic variables, to check if any needed to be 
controlled for. The only parametric demographic variable, age, was not significantly 
correlated with any of the main variables. Spearman’s rho correlations are in Table 3.   
Table 3. Correlations between prejudice (categorical), gender, school, years of 
study, program of study, and mother tongue 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Prejudice –     
2. Gender .17* –    
3. School -.34*** -.04 –   
4. Years of study -.03 .11 -.05 –  
5. Program of study -.32*** -.04 .49*** -.14 – 
6. Mother tongue .01 .04 -.03 .06 .00 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (2-tailed). 
Gender, school, and program of study were all significantly correlated with prejudice. 
For gender, men (n = 34) scored higher than women (n = 161), M = 3.06 versus M = 
2.63. An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if men were 
significantly more prejudiced than women, which proved to be the case, t(193) = -2.73, 
p = .007, ES = .19, d = -.39. For school, Laurea Polytechnic students (n = 62) scored 
higher on prejudice than University of Helsinki students (n = 127), M = 3.12 versus M = 
2.50. An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if the Laurea students 
were significantly more prejudiced than the University of Helsinki students, which 
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proved true, t(187) = 4.98, p < .001, ES = .34, d = .73. The effect size for school was 
quite high, almost twice the effect of gender. For program of study, students in health 
care proved to be the most highly prejudiced, while the least prejudiced were students of 
social sciences, as anticipated. Program of study is examined in detail in Appendix 7.  
Means, standard deviations, and t-scores for prejudice, emotions, traits, empathy, and 
recategorization25 are listed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Prejudice, emotions, traits, empathy, and recategorization means, 
standard deviations, and t-scores 
 All  Animal Editorial  Geology Editorial   
(N  = 195) (n = 99) (n = 96) t 
Measure M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)   
Prejudice 2.71 .84  2.66 .83  2.76 .86  -.84 
Emotions (UHI) 3.88 .77  4.04 .75  3.72 .77  2.91* 
Traits (UHI) 4.30 .69  4.29 .69  4.31 .70  -.17 
Empathy 3.78 1.08  3.84 1.17  3.73 .97  .69 
Recategorization 4.55 1.49  4.44 1.42  4.66 1.57  -1.01 
Note. UHI = uniquely human, for immigrants. Df for all t-tests was 193 (equal variances), 
except empathy, df = 188 (0.48 on Levene’s test of equal variances). 
*p < .01 
 
A preliminary examination of prejudice, emotions, traits, empathy, and recategorization 
by condition was conducted using an independent samples t-test. There were no 
significant differences between the animal and geology conditions for prejudice, traits, 
empathy, or recategorization. Emotions had the only significant difference across 
conditions, with a medium effect size, p = .004, ES = .21, d = .42. 26  
Hypothesis 1. Although the independent sample t-test indicated that the animal editorial 
did not affect prejudice, a simple linear regression was conducted to follow the rules of 
mediation analysis. The regression analysis was non-significant. Consequently, H1 was 
not supported. As noted in section 4.3, the assumptions of linear regression for all 
relevant variables were tested and generally met. 
                                               
25 See Appendix 7 for an additional analysis on recategorization. 
26 Since there is no consensus about whether effect sizes should be reported for non-significant results 
(see e.g., Leach & Henson, 2007), I have chosen not to report them, for the sake of simplicity. 
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Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis was that the animal editorial would have a 
positive effect on emotions, traits, empathy, and recategorization. Again, a simple linear 
regression was conducted for each variable individually (so that H4 could be tested, as 
t-tests are not usable for mediation analysis). The regression analyses for traits, 
empathy, and recategorization were non-significant. Emotions was the only variable that 
was significant, B = .32, SE(B) = .11, ? = .21, t = 2.90, p = .004. R2 was 4.2% and 
adjusted R2 3.7%; the editorial did not have a large effect on emotions’ variance. 
Consequently, H2 (a), (c), and (d) were not supported, but H2 (b) was confirmed. The 
animal editorial also had an unexpected effect on uniquely human emotions for Finns, 
and non-uniquely human emotions for both groups. See Appendix 7 for details. 
Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis concerned whether traits, emotions, 
recategorization, and empathy had an effect on prejudice. A simple linear regression 
conducted on each variable determined that they were all significant, p < .001. 
Therefore, to examine their cumulative effect on prejudice, a step-wise multiple 
regression was conducted. Since gender, school, and program were all significantly 
related to prejudice, they were controlled for in the model, see Table 5. 
Table 5. Step-wise multiple regression model predicting prejudice 
 B SE(B) ? t R2 
Step 1     .11 
   Gender .28 .13 .12* 2.08  
   School .00 .04 .01 .09  
   Study Program -.10 .03 -.22*** -3.59  
Step 2     .24 
   Emotions (UHI) -.21 .07 -.19** -3.05  
   Traits (UHI) -.16 .08 -.13 -1.93  
Step 3     .29 
   Recategorization -.08 .04 -.148* -2.14  
Step 4     .36 
   Empathy -.23 .05 -.30*** -4.576  
Note. UHI = uniquely human, for immigrants.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Step 1 of the hierarchical regression included the control variables, namely gender, 
school, and study program. For the control variables alone; the model was significant, 
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though it only accounted for 9.5% of the variance (adjusted R2),27 F(3, 191) = 7.82, p < 
.001. Adding humanization emotions and traits in the second step brought the adjusted 
R2 up to 22.1% of the variance, F(2, 189) = 16.39, p < .001. The third step incorporated 
recategorization, which increased the adjusted R2 to 26.2% of the variance, F(1, 188) = 
11.56, p = .001. Including empathy in the fourth and final step increased the adjusted 
R2’s variance to 33.3%, F(1, 187) = 20.94, p < .001. Altogether, the model predicted a 
third of the variance in prejudice, with the largest effect being seen for humanization 
(traits and emotions) and the smallest for recategorization. However, recategorization 
accounted for a 5% change in variance, which is nonetheless meaningful. H3 (a), (b), 
(c), and (d) were confirmed.  
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis involved mediation. Only emotions were 
significantly affected by the animal editorial, and they also significantly affected 
prejudice, as seen in Table 5 (the simple linear regression conducted on emotions alone 
resulted in B = -.30, SE(B) = .08, ? = -.28, t = -3.98, p < .001, R2 = 7.6%, and adjusted 
R2 = 7.1%,). Thus, although the original strictures of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
mediational method were not followed because there was no direct effect of the editorial 
on prejudice, according to newer conceptions of mediation (e.g., Kenny, 2012; Zhao, 
2010), emotions did mediate between animal-human similarity and prejudice, because 
humanization emotions was affected by the editorial, and it, in turn, affected prejudice. 
Therefore, although H4 (a), (c), and (d) were not supported, (b) was confirmed. 
Hypothesis 5. The fifth hypothesis considered the relationships between the main 
variables and the individual’s moral universe, which was determined using the three 
universalism and two power values from the PVQ-R. These values and their 
correlations with the main variables can be seen in Table 6.  
 
 
                                               
27 I have included the adjusted R2 as a more conservative estimate of the effect size to mitigate the 
increased sampling error due to so many variables, as per Leach and Henson (2007). 
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Table 6: Correlations between universalism and power subscales, and prejudice, 
emotions, traits, empathy, and recategorization 
 Universalism  Power 
 Concern Nature Tolerance  Dominance Resources 
Prejudice -.63*** -.34*** .-47***  .14* .34*** 
Emotions (UHI) .13* .09 .03  .13* -.08 
Traits (UHI) .25*** .14* .27***  -.14* -.18** 
Empathy .38*** .32*** .28***  -.039 -.14* 
Recategorization .33*** .25*** .39***  -.038 -.21** 
Note. UHI = uniquely human, for immigrants. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (1-tailed). 
H5 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) were all confirmed, because at least one each of the 
universalism subscales and one each of the power subscales correlated with all five of 
the variables. All three of the universalism scales have a significant negative 
relationship with prejudice, and a significant positive relationship with traits, empathy, 
and recategorization. Universalism concern is weakly correlated with emotions, but 
overall, humanization emotions do not have a strong relationship with universalism. 
Prejudice has the strongest relationship to the universalism subscales, being highly 
negatively correlated with both universalism concern and tolerance. Power has weaker 
but nonetheless significant relationships with the five variables. For prejudice and traits, 
both power subscales are correlated (the strongest being power resources and prejudice). 
Emotions correlate just to power dominance, and empathy and recategorization just to 
power resources. The correlations of all 19 values with the main variables can be seen in 
Appendix 7. No values differed significantly by condition. Overall, the results of the 
PVQ-R were very neat; exhibiting the characteristic sinusoid curve, and indicating that 
the revised scale functions in the same way as the original. The correlations between all 
values can also be seen in Appendix 7.  
Manipulation check. The animal-human continuity scale failed as a manipulation 
check, as scores were not significantly different between the two editorial conditions. 
The second manipulation check (the multiple-choice question) was examined, to make 
sure that participants did read and understand the editorial. For the geology condition, 
only one person got the answer wrong, whereas for the animal condition, seven people 
did not answer the question correctly. An additional independent sample t-test was run 
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after filtering out the participants who failed the manipulation check, but prejudice 
remained non-significant across conditions. Overall, most people read and understood 
the editorial. Although the animal-human continuity scale was unsuccessful as a 
manipulation check, it did negatively correlate to prejudice, -.13, p = .03 (one-tailed).28 
5.2 Social Representation Results  
5.2.1 Trait and emotion results 
The representations that participants have about the traits and emotions of Finns and 
immigrants can be seen in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.  
Table 7. Means, standard deviations, and significance (paired sample t-test) of 
traits, by Finns and immigrants 
 M (SD) t ES d 
 Finn  Immigrant    
Conscientiousness (UH)       
Dependable/self-disciplined    5.31 (1.09)  4.50 (1.25) 8.99*** .33 .69 
Disorganized/careless 3.54 (1.27)  4.31 (1.28) -8.22*** -.29 -.60 
Openness (UH)       
Open to new exp.,/complex 4.26 (1.25)  4.90 (1.13) -7.27*** -.26 -.54 
Conventional/uncreative 4.33 (1.16)  3.89 (1.01) 6.62** .20 .40 
Neuroticism (NUH)       
Anxious/easily upset 4.70 (1.23)  4.49 (1.14) 2.52* .09 .18 
Calm/emotionally stable 4.70 (1.17)  4.12 (1.18) 6.44*** .24 .49 
Agreeableness (NUH)       
Critical/quarrelsome 4.67 (1.18)  4.17 (1.26) 5.66*** .20 .41 
Sympathetic/warm 4.76 (1.14)  4.96 (1.12) -2.66** -.09 -.18 
Extroversion (NUH)       
Extroverted, enthusiastic 3.92 (1.32)  5.05 (1.12) -10.78*** -.42 -.92 
Reserved, quiet 5.28 (1.03)  4.04 (1.25) 11.50*** .48 1.08 
Note. UH = uniquely human; NUH = non-uniquely human. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Hypotheses 6 and 7. Paired sample t-tests were conducted with each of the attributed 
traits and emotions collapsed across groups, comparing the means for Finns and 
                                               
28 It is notable however that animal-human continuity was significantly positively correlated with 
universalism-tolerance .13, p = .032, -concern, .15, p = .016 and -nature, .20, p = .003. 
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immigrants. For traits, all ten t-tests were significant, meaning that each trait was 
typically attributed to either Finns or immigrants. Thus, H6 was confirmed; Finns were 
considered to be dependable/self-disciplined, reserved/quiet, calm/emotionally stable, 
and critical/quarrelsome, as well as conventional/uncreative and anxious/easily upset. 
H7 was also supported, as immigrants were considered disorganized/careless, open to 
new experiences/complex, and extroverted/enthusiastic, as well as sympathetic and 
warm. The effect sizes were largest for extroversion traits, indicating that they are 
strongly stereotypical, particularly reservation/quietness for Finns. Effect sizes for 
conscientiousness and openness were medium, and those for neuroticism and 
agreeableness were more variable. 
Table 8. Means, standard deviations, and significance (paired sample t-test) of 
emotions, by Finns and immigrants 
 M (SD)  t ES d 
 Finn  Immigrant     
UH Positive        
Serenity 3.80 (.98)  3.51 (1.12)  4.52** .14 .28 
Compassion 4.03 (.93)  3.99 (.95)  .63 - - 
Hope 4.01 (.95)  4.21 (.75)  -3.71** -.12 -.23 
UH Negative        
Guilt 3.61 (1.19)  3.72 (1.05)  -1.72 - - 
Shame 3.96 (1.00)  4.05 (.94)  -1.45 - - 
Remorse 3.91 (.95)  3.82 (.99)  1.81 - - 
NUH Positive        
Excitement 3.81 (1.08)  4.28 (.70)  -7.66** -.25 -.52 
Attraction 3.84 (.96)  3.85 (.95)  -.25 - - 
Pleasure 4.14 (.85)  4.07 (.91)  1.83 - - 
NUH Negative        
Fear 4.01 (.98)  4.32 (.68)  -6.00** -.18 -.37 
Anger 4.03 (.87)  3.86 (1.02)  3.09* .09 .18 
Pain 3.85 (1.11)  4.14 (.90)  -5.83** -.14 -.29 
Note. UH = uniquely human; NUH = non-uniquely human. 
*p < .01, **p < .001 
 
For emotions, only half of the t-tests were significant. Finns were characterized by 
serenity and anger; immigrants were characterized by hope, excitement, fear, and pain. 
Neither group was considered to be particularly marked by compassion, guilt, shame, 
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remorse, attraction, or pleasure. The effect sizes for emotions were generally weaker, 
the strongest being the attribution of excitement to immigrants. 
5.2.2 Word association results 
The word association task contained the words Finn, Immigrant, Animal, and Human. 
Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 list the categories for each term, as well as the itemization of 
positive, negative, neutral, and missing valences given to the terms, and their 
breakdown across experimental condition. 
The top ten most frequently cited descriptors for Finn were: silent and reserved, sullen 
and withdrawn, honest and straightforward, industrious (hard-working and skilled), 
symbols of Finland (e.g., sauna, flag, Santa, hockey, Moomins), reliable and 
conscientious, words describing the people and country (e.g., kansa, patriotic, welfare 
state), sisu (guts and perseverance), calm and stable, and finally, cold, northern, and 
dark. Silent and reserved was the most frequently cited descriptor listed out of all of the 
terms. The words associated with Finn correspond to the traits and emotions attributed 
to them in the questionnaire data, as seen in Table 9. 
Table 9. Traits and emotions by word association categories, for Finn 
Attributed traits and emotions Related WAT categories 
Reserved/quiet Silent and reserved 
Some similarity to sullen and withdrawn 
Dependable/self-disciplined Reliable and conscientious 
Industrious (hard-working and skilled) 
Some similarity to sisu (guts and perseverance) 
Calm/stable 
Serenity 
Calm and stable 
 
Critical/quarrelsome Harsh 
Selfish and rude 
Conventional/uncreative Conservative and conforming 
Some similarity to stupid and dull 
Some similarity to narrow-minded and racist 
Anxious/easily upset Some similarity to sullen and withdrawn 
Mentioned in miscellaneous difficulties  
Anger Mentioned in selfish and rude 
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Table 10. Word associations for Finn, total and by condition 
Category Frequencies 
 All + - 0 x A G A+ A- A0 Ax G+ G- G0 Gx 
1. Silent and reserved 96 7 30 42 17 52 44 4 12 29 7 3 18 13 10 
2. Sullen and withdrawn 40 0 24 12 4 19 21 0 12 6 1 0 12 6 3 
3. Honest and straightforward 35 27 0 0 8 16 19 12 0 0 4 15 0 0 4 
4. Industrious (hard-working and skilled) 35 26 2 2 5 16 19 12 1 1 2 14 1 1 3 
5. Symbols of Finland (e.g., sauna, flag) 32 13 2 13 4 13 19 8 0 4 1 5 2 9 3 
6. Reliable and conscientious 30 29 0 0 1 18 12 17 0 0 1 12 0 0 0 
7. People and country (e.g., kansa, patriotic) 26 10 2 8 6 11 15 4 1 4 2 6 1 4 4 
8. Sisu (guts and perseverance) 22 16 0 3 3 9 13 7 0 2 0 9 0 1 3 
9. Calm and stable 21 14 0 3 4 9 12 5 0 2 2 9 0 1 2 
10. Cold, northern, and dark 21 5 4 8 4 12 9 3 3 4 2 2 1 4 2 
11. Selfish and rude 18 0 13 4 1 10 8 0 7 3 0 0 6 1 1 
12. Common (e.g., peasants, basic) 15 1 7 3 4 4 11 1 2 0 1 0 5 3 3 
13. Physical attributes (e.g., blond, fat) 14 1 4 6 3 5 9 1 1 3 0 0 3 3 3 
14. Closeness with nature, nature words 14 7 1 2 4 5 9 3 0 0 2 4 1 2 2 
15. Narrow-minded and racist 13 0 11 0 2 7 6 0 7 0 0 0 4 0 2 
16. Conservative, unified, and conforming 13 4 4 3 2 6 7 3 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 
17. Compassionate and friendly 13 11 0 0 2 13 0 11 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
18. Drunkenness, liquor 11 0 7 1 3 7 4 0 6 1 0 0 1 0 3 
19. Equality and fairness 11 9 0 0 2 10 1 8 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
20. Educated 10 7 0 1 2 5 5 4 0 1 0 3 0 0 2 
21. Dull, stupid, and slow 9 0 6 3 0 8 1 0 5 3 0 0 1 0 0 
22. International and tolerant 9 6 0 3 0 6 3 4 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 
23. Polite and modest 9 1 1 6 1 5 4 1 0 3 1 0 1 3 0 
24. Various people (e.g., woman, president) 7 3 0 3 1 3 4 2 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 
25. Misc. difficulties (e.g., lost roots, single) 7 0 7 0 0 2 5 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 
26. Finns each different and individual 6 1 0 3 2 4 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 
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27. Happy and lucky 5 4 0 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 
28. Language 4 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
29. Awkward and odd 4 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
30. Lazy and inefficient 4 0 2 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 
31. Severe 3 0 3 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
32. Perussuomalaiset ("True" Finns) 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
33. Sense of humour 3 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
34. Misc. (idiosyncratic or uninterpretable) 10 5 1 1 3 4 6 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Total  # 573 212 136 133 92 291 282 120 65 72 34 92 71 61 58 
Total  % 100% 37.0% 23.7% 23.2% 16.1% 50.8% 49.2% 41.2% 22.3% 24.7% 11.7% 32.6% 25.2% 21.6% 20.6% 
 % of total (573) % of A (291) % of G (282) 
Note. + positive valence, - negative valence, 0 neutral valence, x no valence given, A animal editorial group, G geology editorial group. 
 
Table 11. Word associations for Immigrant, total and by condition 
Category Frequencies 
 All + - 0 x A G A+ A- A0 Ax G+ G- G0 Gx 
1. Heterogeneous and different 58 19 0 29 10 28 30 10 0 12 6 9 0 17 4 
2. Multicultural and international 31 16 0 11 4 19 12 11 0 7 1 5 0 4 3 
3. Loud 29 0 17 9 3 15 14 0 7 8 0 0 10 1 3 
4. Dark skinned 28 5 1 16 6 12 16 2 0 8 2 3 1 8 4 
5. Rude and temperamental 23 0 15 7 1 12 11 0 8 3 1 0 7 4 0 
6. Social and extroverted 23 14 0 2 7 11 12 5 0 1 5 9 0 1 2 
7. Bold, brave, and strong 22 18 1 0 3 13 9 10 1 0 2 8 0 0 1 
8. Happy, positive, and hopeful 22 14 0 2 6 10 12 8 0 2 0 6 0 0 6 
9. Misc. stresses (e.g., uncertainty, lost) 22 1 11 7 3 12 10 1 5 4 2 0 6 3 1 
10. Lazy and unemployed 21 1 15 1 4 14 7 1 10 1 2 0 5 0 2 
11. Discrimination and racism 20 0 13 1 6 9 11 0 5 1 3 0 8 0 3 
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12. Misc. positive traits (e.g., friendly, nice) 20 17 0 0 3 15 5 13 0 0 2 4 0 0 1 
13. Adaptable and open 19 13 0 2 4 10 9 7 0 1 2 6 0 1 2 
14. Hard-working and enterprising 18 15 0 1 2 13 5 10 0 1 2 5 0 0 0 
15. Not adaptable,  reclusive 18 0 12 3 3 7 11 0 4 2 1 0 8 1 2 
16. Language (e.g., deficits, learning) 16 2 3 8 3 9 7 1 1 5 2 1 2 3 1 
17. Family and community-centred 15 10 0 5 0 10 5 7 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 
18. People (normal and equal) 14 6 0 6 2 7 7 6 0 1 0 0 0 5 2 
19. Foreigner (moved from afar) 13 2 0 10 1 4 9 1 0 3 0 1 0 7 1 
20. Types of immigrants (country, ethnicity) 12 3 3 3 3 3 9 0 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 
21. Traumatized, victims 11 2 4 2 3 6 5 0 4 2 0 2 0 0 3 
22. New, change 10 3 0 6 1 3 7 0 0 3 0 3 0 3 1 
23. Workers 10 4 2 3 1 3 7 1 1 1 0 3 1 2 1 
24. Relating to women (e.g., veil, misogyny) 9 0 3 6 0 4 5 0 1 3 0 0 2 3 0 
25. Religion (mainly Islam) 9 0 2 5 2 4 5 0 2 1 1 0 0 4 1 
26. Interesting and welcome 8 6 0 0 2 6 2 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 
27. Crime-related (e.g., rape, stealing) 7 0 6 0 1 4 3 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 1 
28. Refugees 7 0 0 4 3 1 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 2 
29. Poor and homeless 7 0 3 2 2 4 3 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 
30. Strange 7 0 0 6 1 5 2 0 0 4 1 0 0 2 0 
31. Clothing (e.g., colourful clothes, skirt) 6 0 0 3 3 2 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 
32. Fear(ful) 6 0 4 0 2 3 3 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 
33. Places (e.g., east Helsinki, train station) 5 1 0 2 2 2 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
34. Good food 4 3 0 0 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
35. Smell-related (e.g., fragrant, food smell) 3 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
36. Misc. (idiosyncratic or uninterpretable) 19 4 0 9 6 6 13 3 0 3 0 1 0 6 6 
Total  # 572 179 116 172 105 291 281 104 58 86 43 75 58 86 62 
Total  % 100% 31.3% 20.3% 30.1% 18.4% 50.9% 49.1% 35.7% 19.9% 29.6% 14.8% 26.7% 20.6% 30.6% 22.1% 
 % of total (572) % of A (291) % of G (281) 
Note. + positive valence, - negative valence, 0 neutral valence, x no valence given, A animal editorial group, G geology editorial group. 
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 Table 12. Word associations for Animal, total and by condition 
Category Frequencies 
 All + - 0 x A G A+ A- A0 Ax G+ G- G0 Gx 
1. Cute and beautiful 47 39 0 0 8 24 23 19 0 0 5 20 0 0 3 
2. Fur and hair 37 12 2 15 8 18 19 4 0 10 4 8 2 5 4 
3. Friend, companion, family member 35 30 0 2 3 21 14 18 0 1 2 12 0 1 1 
4. Pet 30 19 1 4 6 11 19 8 1 1 1 11 0 3 5 
5. Warm and soft (pleasant for humans) 28 21 0 2 5 18 10 13 0 2 3 8 0 0 2 
6. Faithful and reliable 27 22 0 3 2 17 10 12 0 3 2 10 0 0 0 
7. Nature 24 16 0 5 3 12 12 9 0 1 2 7 0 4 1 
8. Wild, free, and natural 24 11 0 6 7 10 14 4 0 5 1 7 0 1 6 
9. Beloved and wonderful 23 16 0 1 6 16 7 12 0 0 4 4 0 1 2 
10. Happy and sociable 21 18 0 0 3 8 13 8 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 
11. Part of the natural order and diversity 20 8 0 7 5 8 12 3 0 3 2 5 0 4 3 
12. Species' and types (e.g., horse, mammal) 19 11 1 3 4 7 12 6 0 0 1 5 1 3 3 
13. Instinctual 19 4 0 12 3 12 7 2 0 8 2 2 0 4 1 
14. Mistreated 18 0 16 0 2 10 8 0 10 0 0 0 6 0 2 
15. Dogs 18 10 0 4 4 9 9 5 0 1 3 5 0 3 1 
16. Unpleasant (e.g., smelly, annoying) 17 0 11 3 3 7 10 0 4 1 2 0 7 2 1 
17. Sympathetic and supportive to humans 16 13 0 0 3 7 9 5 0 0 2 8 0 0 1 
18. Innocent and simple 16 9 1 2 4 8 8 4 1 2 1 5 0 0 3 
19. Physical traits (e.g., small, fast) 15 3 0 9 3 8 7 2 0 6 0 1 0 3 3 
20. Intrinsic value and importance 13 12 0 0 1 8 5 8 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 
21. Intelligent and wise 12 8 0 1 3 8 4 6 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 
22. Genuine and sincere 11 8 0 0 3 7 4 6 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 
23. Inferior beast 10 0 6 2 2 6 4 0 3 2 1 0 3 0 1 
24. Cats 10 5 0 2 3 3 7 1 0 1 1 4 0 1 2 
25. As food 9 4 0 2 3 3 6 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 3 
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26. Animal rights and ethics 7 2 0 1 4 3 4 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 
27. Dangerous and cruel 7 0 5 1 1 4 3 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 
28. Functional and useful (for humans) 6 3 0 2 1 4 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 
29. To train and tame 5 0 1 3 1 3 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 
30. Sentient and feeling 4 3 0 1 0 4 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
31. Alive 3 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
32. Misc. (idiosyncratic or uninterpretable) 15 4 0 7 4 3 12 1 0 2 0 3 0 5 4 
Total  # 566 313 44 100 109 289 277 165 21 58 45 148 23 42 64 
Total  % 100% 55.3% 7.8% 17.7% 19.3% 51.1% 48.9% 57.1% 7.3% 20.1% 15.6% 53.4% 8.3% 15.2% 23.1% 
 % of total (566) % of A (289) % of G (277) 
Note. + positive valence, - negative valence, 0 neutral valence, x no valence given, A animal editorial group, G geology editorial group. 
Table 13. Word associations for Human, total and by condition 
Category Frequencies 
 All + - 0 x A G A+ A- A0 Ax G+ G- G0 Gx 
1. Intelligent and wise 81 64 0 4 13 41 40 35 0 2 4 29 0 2 9 
2. Selfish and greedy 65 3 50 3 9 40 25 3 31 2 4 0 19 1 5 
3. Cruel and destructive 43 0 33 1 9 23 20 0 18 1 4 0 15 0 5 
4. Science, art, technology, culture 31 20 0 5 6 16 15 9 0 3 4 11 0 2 2 
5. Thoughtless and fallible 30 1 17 2 10 15 15 1 10 1 3 0 7 1 7 
6. Emotional and caring 29 22 0 4 3 14 15 12 0 1 1 10 0 3 2 
7. Categorical terms (e.g., homo sapiens, I) 27 8 0 13 6 10 17 4 0 5 1 4 0 8 5 
8. Social and communal 23 11 0 7 5 8 15 5 0 0 3 6 0 7 2 
9. Complex and adaptable 22 6 1 6 9 10 12 3 0 3 4 3 1 3 5 
10. An animal 20 6 0 9 5 10 10 3 0 6 1 3 0 3 4 
11. Dominant and conquering 16 2 7 5 2 8 8 1 4 2 1 1 3 3 1 
12. Body words (e.g., hairless, two legs) 16 2 0 12 2 6 10 0 0 5 1 2 0 7 1 
13. Hard working and goal-oriented 16 10 0 6 0 12 4 8 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 
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14. Nature and evolution 13 6 0 5 2 6 7 4 0 2 0 2 0 3 2 
15. Moral qualities (e.g., equality, respect) 13 11 0 1 1 5 8 4 0 0 1 7 0 1 0 
16. Curious and thoughtful 12 7 0 4 1 7 5 5 0 2 0 2 0 2 1 
17. Love 11 8 0 0 3 9 2 6 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 
18. Angry and unhappy 9 0 7 0 2 7 2 0 6 0 1 0 1 0 1 
19. Diverse and individual 9 4 0 3 2 4 5 2 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 
20. Active and restless 8 3 1 4 0 4 4 2 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 
21. Alive 7 2 0 1 4 2 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 2 
22. Wonderful and special 7 5 0 0 2 3 4 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
23. Family and children 6 3 0 0 3 2 4 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 
24. Religion and spirituality 6 3 0 1 2 4 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
25. Language and communication 6 1 0 3 2 3 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 
26. (Too) many, overpopulation 5 0 4 0 1 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 
27. Responsibility 5 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
28. Happy and hopeful 4 3 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
29. Misc. (idiosyncratic or uninterpretable) 23 3 3 7 10 11 12 1 1 5 4 2 2 2 6 
Total  # 563 216 124 107 116 287 276 118 73 50 46 98 51 57 70 
Total  % 100% 38.4% 22.0% 19.0% 20.6% 51.0% 49.0% 41.1% 25.4% 17.4% 16.0% 35.5% 18.4% 20.7% 25.4% 
 % of total (563) % of A (287) % of G (276) 
Note. + positive valence, - negative valence, 0 neutral valence, x no valence given, A animal editorial group, G geology editorial group. 
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Reserved/quiet, as well as calm/stable (and serenity) matched up exactly with word 
association categories, and both dependable/self-disciplined as well as conventional/ 
uncreative aligned with several categories. Critical/quarrelsome, anxious/easily upset, 
and anger were less commonly cited, but nonetheless did occur. Anxious/easily upset 
was the most difficult to match up, possibly because it is opposite to calm/stable, so 
there are some polemic social representations being invoked in this case. Finns were 
also characterized as compassionate and friendly in the word association data, but not 
significantly so in the questionnaire data. 
The social representations from the traits and emotions as well as from the word 
association data matches up well with the consensual stereotypes about Finns. As noted, 
the most typical representations of Finns involve being quiet, honest, taciturn, slow-
witted, straightforward, calm, and diligent (Sajavaara & Lehotonen, 1997; Varjonen, 
Arnold, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2009). They are also characterized as being heavy drinkers 
and embodying the quality of sisu (Haavisto, 2011). Key symbols include sauna, nature, 
ice hockey, and the Winter War (Finell et al., in press). Of these stereotypic 
representations, the only one that was never mentioned was the Winter War. 
For Immigrant, the top ten most frequently cited descriptors were: heterogeneous and 
different, multicultural and international, loud, dark skinned, rude and temperamental, 
social and extroverted, brave and strong, happy and positive, miscellaneous stressors 
(e.g., uncertainty, lost, bureaucracy, unlucky), and lazy and unemployed. The number 
one descriptor for immigrants, heterogeneous, was echoed in numerous comments given 
at the end of the survey. Dozens of people mentioned that they found the questionnaires 
difficult to answer because “immigrants are not a homogenous group.” Many were quite 
upset that they had been classed together; the reasons for their dismay spanned from 
egalitarian (explaining that immigrants are each individuals and should not be 
essentialized) to quite prejudiced (stating that it was “absurd” to compare a productive 
Norwegian businessman with a Somali refugee). The trait and emotion data that 
matched up with the word associations can be seen in Table 14.  
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Table 14. Traits and emotions by word association categories, for Immigrant 
Attributed traits and emotions Related WAT categories 
Open to new experiences/complex Adaptable and open 
Some similarity to bold, brave, and strong 
Disorganized/careless Lazy and unemployed 
Extroverted/enthusiastic Social and extroverted  
Some similarity to loud  
Sympathetic/warm Some similarity to happy and positive 
Some similarity to social and extroverted 
Mentioned in miscellaneous positive traits 
Hope  Happy, positive, and hopeful 
Excitement Some similarity to interesting and welcome 
Fear Fear 
Pain Mentioned in miscellaneous stresses 
Some similarity to traumatized, victims 
 
Immigrant categories did not match up quite as neatly, although open to new 
experiences/complex, as well as hope and fear has comparable categories in the WAT 
data. Disorganized/careless, sympathetic/warm, and pain were all mentioned in various 
categories, but were not as frequent or consistent. Some of the traits attributed to 
immigrants may be in comparison to Finns; for example, sympathetic/warm is the 
opposite of sullen and withdrawn, which was frequently cited for Finns. So perhaps the 
social representation of immigrants is not strongly about sympathy/warmth, but rather, 
in comparison with Finns they are considered sympathetic/ warm. Finally, excitement 
was a difficult category to compare to the WAT data, because it was never explicitly 
listed. However, it appeared implicitly, in the tenor of words describing immigrants, and 
in comparison to Finns, that their lives were more exciting than Finns’ lives are. 
Since immigrants are such a heterogeneous group, the words used to describe them were 
much more variable than was the case for the other terms. There was no central 
representation of Immigrant; in fact, most of the representations were polemic, in that 
they directly conflicted with each other. For example, brave and strong versus fear, lazy 
and unemployed versus hardworking and enterprising, and adaptable and open versus 
not adaptable and reclusive. Of course, this occurred for the other terms as well, but 
there were generally frequently cited hegemonic representations, and then much less 
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frequently cited polemic representations (e.g., for Finn, industrious was mentioned 35 
times, whereas lazy and inefficient was mentioned four times). So there are obviously 
many different social representations of immigrants, depending on what immigrant 
group is being thought about, as well as how the individual feels about immigrants in 
general, which made it a much more variable category than any of the others. 
The top ten most frequently cited descriptors of Animal were: cute and beautiful, fur 
and hair, friend and family member, pet, warm and soft (pleasant for humans), faithful 
and reliable, nature, wild and free, beloved and wonderful, and happy and sociable. 
There were many more categorical descriptors for this group (e.g., dog, cat, mammal), 
as well as physical traits listed (e.g., hairy, warm, paws). Further, almost all of the main 
categories were about how NH animals relate to humans, or more specifically, how they 
are enjoyed by humans, as opposed to what they are like on their own terms. This is 
quite different from the other three categories. The representations in general were 
simple and there was more agreement between them, with fewer idiosyncratic words. 
It is notable that, of the few negative words applied to the Animal group, almost all 
were the same or similar to negative words applied to the Immigrant group. Further, 
almost none of these words were applied to the Finn or Human groups. Aside from 
inferior beast, each of the predominantly negative categories associated with the Animal 
group had a direct correlate in the Immigrant group. Mistreated, unpleasant, and 
dangerous and cruel for the Animal group are conceptually similar to discrimination 
and racism, rude and temperamental, and crime-related, respectively, in the Immigrant 
group. The categories even contain many identical words, both sympathetic (e.g., 
exploitation, helpless, fearful) and recriminating (e.g., aggressive, loud, difficult), as 
well as numerous conceptually similar words (e.g., discriminated/mistreated, victim’s 
position/abused, foreign smell/smelly, unpredictable/capricious). The Human group had 
one similar category, namely cruel and destructive, but otherwise the bulk of these 
negative words were only shared by the Animal and Immigrant groups. 
Finally, for Human the top ten most frequently cited descriptors were: intelligent and 
wise, selfish and greedy, cruel and destructive, science and culture, thoughtless and 
fallible, emotional and caring, categorical terms (e.g., homo sapiens, man, woman, I, 
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we), social and communal, complex and adaptable, and an animal (e.g., primate). 
Overall, participants were quite critical of humans. Humans were most highly 
characterized by intelligence and progress on the one hand, and selfishness and cruelty 
on the other. There was also more consistency and agreement in the human category 
than there was in either of the other two categories encompassing humans. Much like 
the Animal group, words about humans were characterized more simply, more 
categorically, and with less nuances and idiosyncratic associations. 
The valence given to the words is also notable. There was a marked difference between 
the number of positive and negative terms given to each of the words. Overall, Animal 
was given, by far, the highest number of positive terms (55.3%) and the lowest number 
of negative terms (7.8%) of any group. Finn and Human were given a relatively high 
number of positives (37.0% and 38.4%, respectively) and an intermediate number of 
negatives (23.7% and 22.0%). Immigrant was middling; not as many positively (31.3%) 
nor as many negatively (20.3%) scored words were attributed to them. There were also 
marked differences across conditions. The participants in the animal condition came up 
with more positively and less negatively attributed words for every term except Human; 
they were more negative than the geology group in that case. 
To triangulate the WAT data with the questionnaire data, each individual was assigned 
an overall valence for each of the four terms, from -3 to 3, as noted in section 4.3.2. 
Independent sample t-tests were performed on the means of each word, by experimental 
condition. The Immigrant group was significantly different across conditions, t(189) = 
2.09, p = .038, ES = .15, d = .30. None of the other terms was significant across 
conditions, although Immigrant is the most important one. The effect size was not large, 
but any effect is notable, especially since most of the expected effects were not found 
with the questionnaire data. It therefore appears that the editorial had some effect on 
perceptions of immigrants that was not captured by the questionnaire data.  
Because the valences given to each of the four terms seemed so different from one 
another, participants were then collapsed across groups to see if there was a statistically 
significant difference between the valence means for each term. The results of the one 
sample t-test can be seen in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Mean valences and t-scores for word association terms (Finn, Immigrant, 
Animal, and Human) 
 t df Mean Difference ES d 
Finn 4.22* 190 .40 .29 .61 
Immigrant 3.75* 190 .33 .26 .54 
Animal  13.91* 189 1.42 .71 2.02 
Human 4.35* 189 .49 .30 .63 
*p <.001 (2-tailed) 
The valence mean of each term was significantly different from all of the other terms. In 
particular, the Animal group was markedly different from the other three groups, with a 
very large effect size (as illustrated earlier, by the very high percentage of positive and 
extremely low percentage of negative words). However, each of group was valuated 
differently, and Finn, Immigrant, and Human all had mid to large effect sizes as well. 
One point that must be addressed is that the category of terms given a negative valence 
is problematic when viewed as a monolith. Because I was interested in the positive, 
empathizing, and humanizing words given to different groups, some differentiation in 
words assigned a negative valence was necessary. To use two terms from the Animal 
group as an example, the word annoying and the word abused were both given a 
negative valence. Annoying has the appropriate connotation one would expect from a 
term with a negative valence, in that it is a negative term, used to reproach or derogate. 
The term abused, however, has the opposite meaning, in that it expresses empathy with 
the referent, which shows a positive rather than a negative feeling toward the group. To 
clarify this category, all terms given a negative valence were recategorized into terms 
that were reproachful, empathetic, or ambiguous. The split between empathetic, 
reproachful, and ambiguous terms, by word and by condition, can be seen in Table 16. 
Table 16. Negative word associations, broken into empathetic, reproachful, and 
ambiguous, total and by condition 
Term Total Empathetic Reproachful Ambiguous 
 # % of all # % # % # % 
Finn         
   Total 136 23.7% 14  10.3% 80  58.8% 42  30.9% 
   Editorial A 65 22.3% 8 12.3% 37 56.9% 20 30.8% 
   Editorial G 71 25.2% 6 8.5% 43 60.6% 22 31.0% 
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Immigrant         
   Total 116 20.3% 33  28.4% 64  55.2% 19  16.4% 
   Editorial A 58 19.9% 18 31.0% 32 55.2% 8 13.8% 
   Editorial G 58 20.6% 15 25.9% 32 55.2% 11 19.0% 
Animal         
   Total 44 7.8% 15  34.1% 22  50.0% 7  15.9% 
   Editorial A 21 7.3% 10 47.6% 9 42.9% 2 9.5% 
   Editorial G 23 8.3% 5 21.7% 13 56.5% 5 21.7% 
Human         
   Total 124 22.0% 1 0.8% 114  91.9% 9 7.2% 
   Editorial A 73 25.4% 1 1.4% 69 94.5% 3 4.1% 
   Editorial G 51 18.4% 0 0% 45 88.2% 6 11.8% 
Note. # and % refer to the number and percentage of word association terms given a negative 
valence (total), and for each of the three categories. 
The different ways in which the ingroups and outgroups are viewed can be better 
grasped with this breakdown. The ingroups, Finn and Human, get more reproach and 
less sympathy (or almost all reproach and no sympathy, in the case of Human). The 
outgroups, both Immigrant and Animal, are still the target of much reproach, but they 
also have much more sympathy directed toward them. The representations of the 
arguably more dominant and powerful two groups are much more critical than of the 
two weaker groups, who seem to be pitied (as well as being criticized), as per 
Moscovici and Pérez’ (2007) research on minorities being perceived as victims. 
Overall, the words and valuation given to each of the groups, Finn, Immigrant, Animal, 
and Human were markedly different from one another, with few but significant 
similarities. The social representations invoked, and their associated valences, helped to 
clarify the relationships between the groups, most notably some of the parallels between 
the Immigrant and Animal group. It also provided confirmation that the experimental 
condition had some effect.  
6 Discussion 
The discussion will be divided into several parts, for the sake of clarity. First, there will 
be a general discussion, including addressing each research question in turn. Second, the 
many methodological issues that arose in this study will be addressed. Third, the 
strengths and contributions of this study will be delimited. Fourth, suggestions for 
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future research will be put forth. Finally, some final thoughts regarding this complicated 
and broad study will be shared.  
6.1 General Discussion 
One of the main objectives of this study (and the first research question) was to examine 
whether emphasizing animal-human similarity could have an effect on prejudice 
towards immigrants. The answer to this question is not straightforward. Regarding the 
questionnaire data, the answer is largely no; emphasizing animal-human similarity did 
not have an effect on prejudice toward immigrants, at least not a direct effect. However, 
analyses of the WAT data painted a different picture, suggesting both quantitatively and 
qualitatively that the animal editorial did have an effect on the positive and negative 
social representations of immigrants offered by participants. As well, there was a 
relationship between animal-human similarity and prejudice mediated by humanization 
emotions (as per Kenny, 2012; Zhao, 2010). Thus, tentatively, it seems reasonable to 
say that the intervention had an effect, but not quite the expected effect. 
The second research question, determining whether emphasizing animal-human 
similarity has an effect on humanization (traits and emotions), empathy, and 
recategorization, and/or whether these variables affect prejudice, is clearer. Animal-
human similarity only had an effect on emotions, so it was the only variable that had a 
mediating effect between the experimental condition and prejudice. Beyond the 
experimental condition, the correlations and regression analyses provide robust 
confirmation that these variables each help to explain the variance of prejudice. This is 
perhaps less true of the humanization traits, which became non-significant in the 
regression model after including all of the other variables. However, traits are more 
complex, because they also deal with stereotype content.  
That the intervention affected all emotions (uniquely and non-uniquely human) for both 
Finns and immigrants, as well as the Immigrant WAT data, suggests that the editorial 
may have had some sort of implicit emotional effect. Previous studies have found that 
non-uniquely human emotions are sometimes more highly associated with the outgroup 
(Leyens et al., 2000), so that finding was not exceptional. However, that the editorial 
also affected the uniquely and non-uniquely human emotion scores for Finns may 
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indicate that the intervention for some reason raised the intensity of emotions and their 
attribution in general. This was also likely affected by the noted methodological 
problem with that scale, of it having a sharp peak at the high end. Perhaps the fact that it 
was the only 5-point scale in a group of 7-point scales is what engendered the ceiling 
effect. Nevertheless, there was a distinct difference between the animal and geology 
groups, illustrating a link between emphasizing animal-human similarity and generally 
attributing more emotions to humans. 
Research question three, addressing whether the main variables relate to a person’s 
moral universe, was answered vigorously in the affirmative. It is notable that each of the 
universalism subscales was significantly correlated with prejudice, traits, empathy, and 
recategorization. Emotions were a bit weaker, but nonetheless significant. It is also 
theoretically relevant that the universalism nature subscale had a significant, reasonably 
high correlation with prejudice, empathy, and recategorization (and a weak relationship 
with traits). This supports the underlying theory that what one thinks about the natural 
world (including, presumably, NH animals) relates to how one sees other human 
groups. This was further emphasized by the fact that the animal-human continuity scale, 
problematic though it is, not only correlated with universalism nature, but also with 
tolerance and concern, albeit more weakly. It would be useful to compare the 
universalism subscales with a better animal-human continuity scale. 
It was unexpected that the main variables were more highly (negatively) correlated with 
power resources, since power dominance has a closer theoretical relationship with social 
dominance orientation. However, since power is a deficit value (meaning that it is more 
salient and valuated when people are without it; Schwartz, 2011), it makes some sense 
that it is related to resources. If a person feels like there is not enough to go around, and 
they are lacking or in danger of losing material benefits, then they may see immigrants 
as coming and taking their resources (reflected in the WAT data with terms for the 
Immigrant group such as social security and greed). The stronger relationships with 
power resources may also be due to the very reason I did not measure SDO – given the 
strongly egalitarian social norms in Finnish society, Finns do not generally endorse 
positions that approve of dominance (see e.g., Hirvelä, 2011; Hofstede, 2001). Thus, 
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power resources may get at the underlying power issue better in this context, by 
bypassing the social script to disavow hierarchical relationships. 
Research question four addressed whether certain humanization traits and emotions 
were more readily associated with Finns or with immigrants, which was found to be the 
case. The fact that each of the listed traits was significantly associated with one group or 
the other may be largely responsible for why the effect of uniquely human traits 
disappeared in the regression analysis. It may also explain why the results for 
humanization emotions were very different from humanization traits. Emotions are 
perhaps considered so innately human (as emphasized by the frequency with which 
people listed emotional for the Human group on the WAT; it was the sixth most 
frequently endorsed category), whereas specific traits are much more variable, and more 
tied to their particular content and the context. In this case, between the competing 
hypotheses of uniquely human attribution versus stereotypic social representations, it 
appears that the representations won out in people’s minds.  
This was not the case for emotions; even those that were attributed to one group or the 
other had generally weaker effect sizes than traits did. The significant emotions were 
also often those that matched up with a particular trait, for example, serenity with calm/ 
emotionally stable. It is notable that each of the statistically significant traits and 
emotions also came up in the WAT data, whereas those emotions that were not 
significant for either group did not. The only exception was compassion, which was 
mentioned several times in describing Finns. However, conceptually similar terms came 
up when describing immigrants as well (e.g., empathic, helpful), which may account for 
this feeling not being more highly attributed to either group in the questionnaire data. 
The questionnaires also undoubtedly had a priming effect, putting those terms in the 
forefront of people’s minds, which would have made them more likely to include them 
on the WAT. This does not change the fact that these had to be representations that 
resonated for each group for them to be endorsed. 
Research question five was broadly aimed at discovering the SRs that participants have 
of Finn, Immigrant, Animal, and Human. What is evident from the WAT data is that the 
representations that people have of each group are markedly different from one another. 
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There was very little crossover of words used between groups, which is notable given 
how many objective similarities actually exist between these groups. This of course 
makes sense, as having each of them listed together implicitly primes participants to 
view them vis-à-vis each other, and to differentiate between them more strongly than 
they may do under other circumstances, such as if each participant were only given one 
word, and those responses were compared to each other. I tried to mediate this 
comparison issue as much as possible by putting large spaces between the terms on the 
online questionnaire (as opposed to having them one next to the other), but this did not 
erase the problem. Therefore, it is difficult to say how much of their dissimilarity is due 
to them genuinely being seen as completely separate categories, or whether that is more 
so in comparison to one another. The one large exception to this disparateness was the 
parallels between the negative words attributed to the Animal and Immigrant groups, 
which adds further corroboration to the underlying theory that how we think of 
nonhumans is intertwined with how we think of humans. 
There was a cohesiveness to each of the groups that speaks to some strongly shared 
representations. In particular, for Finn, Animal, and Human, there were certain terms 
that were invoked by a large percentage of participants. For example, just under half of 
all participants used words such as silent, withdrawn, reserved, and quiet to describe 
Finns. This was also paralleled by the fact that the trait reserved/ quiet had the highest 
effect size of any of the traits or emotions. In the case of immigrants, silent and quiet 
were never used, and withdrawn, reserved, and shy only came up four times all together. 
Instead, loud and noisy were highly attributed to immigrants, which was also paralleled 
in the high effect size for their trait extroverted/enthusiastic. The Immigrant group in 
general was the most complex, which can be illustrated by their most frequently 
attributed category being heterogeneous and different. Immigrants in Finland come 
from many different backgrounds and are not easily grouped with one another. This was 
further demonstrated by the fact that so many participants commented (protested) at the 
end of the survey that immigrants are not a homogenous category and cannot be treated 
as such. There were also many more directly opposing words in the Immigrant group 
than in the other groups, as mentioned. This indicates that there is a larger number of 
social representations about immigrants, and that they differ meaningfully from one 
another, and sometimes directly oppose each other. For the other three terms there are 
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general, hegemonic representations expressed, with some emancipated and polemic 
representations around the edges. For immigrants it is much more mixed. 
Research question six queried whether the experimental condition would affect the 
WAT data regarding immigrants and NH animals. Statistically, this was proven to be so 
for the Immigrant group. However, there was also a qualitative dimension, which 
indicated differences between the experimental groups for those two groups. For 
example, the tenor of the negative terms was much more sympathetic in the animal-
human similarity condition (for Immigrant, 31.0% of the negative terms were 
sympathetic in the animal group, versus 25.9% for the geology group; for Animal, it 
was a remarkable 47.6% versus 21.7%). There were also positive categories that were 
invoked in the animal-human similarity group that were not ever mentioned in the 
geology group, such as sentient and feeling for Animal. For Immigrant, words in the 
categories general positive traits and hardworking and enterprising were conveyed 
three times as frequently in the animal group as in the geology group. Interestingly, this 
also seemed to extend to the Finn and Human groups. Words in the category 
hardworking and goal-oriented for Human, and compassionate and friendly for Finn 
were only ever mentioned by participants in the animal group. Although I can make no 
sweeping claims from the qualitative analysis of this data, there does seem to be a more 
positive and empathetic tenor to the terms chosen by the animal group, across the board. 
There also seems to be a higher level of abstraction and deeper thinking in that group, 
with many fewer categorical descriptions listed by the animal group, across all four 
terms. Perhaps the animal-human editorial partly stimulated further thought on the topic 
of what it means to be human and not, eliciting more complex representations.  
6.2 Methodological Issues 
There are a number of reasons why the intervention may not have worked as it ought to 
have, including that the theory may simply be wrong. Although it is possible that the 
underlying theory about the animal-human divide is flawed, the correlations and 
regressions, as well as the WAT results suggest that the theory itself is sound. Further, 
there are multiple methodological issues that doubtless influenced the results. 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     93 
   
One problem that undoubtedly afflicted this study was the non-representativeness of the 
sample. The participants were too highly educated, too many were from the social 
sciences and humanities, and there were too many women. Only 13 participants out of 
195 had a prejudice score above 4 (the midline of the scale). That means that only 13 
individuals even slightly agreed with a single prejudiced statement, which seems rather 
unlikely to reflect the general population. Because it was such a markedly unprejudiced 
group of participants, floor effects could be seen on the prejudice scores. There was, 
therefore, very little room for the scores to decrease in the experimental group.  
Representativeness is even more of an issue with web-based questionnaires, and a low 
response rate often indicates a biased sample who self-selects based on the variables 
involved (Cook, Heath, & Thompson, 2000). The fact that I do not have a Finnish name 
may have been additionally problematic, and part of the reason that my response rate 
was so low – people may have been reticent to fill out a survey on immigrants for 
someone who was obviously an immigrant. This may have created an even stronger 
self-selection bias than what would normally exist in such a situation (with people who 
are more agreeable and benevolent generally being the ones to choose to fill in surveys 
in the first place, see e.g., Lönnqvist et al., 2007). In this case, perhaps only people who 
were highly non-prejudiced (and a few who were unabashedly prejudiced and did not 
care who knew it) chose to fill in the questionnaire, in which case, as mentioned, it 
created a floor effect where participants already had such low prejudice that the 
intervention could not cause them to drop any lower. This could have also been 
influenced by demand characteristics, that even those who were perhaps relatively more 
prejudiced (but not overtly so) answered in a less prejudicial manner so as not to offend 
the immigrant researcher, or to avoid making the Finnish people look like a prejudiced 
group. Although social and other psychologies usually rely on non-representative 
student samples, the exaggerated self-selection bias in this case has caused the external 
validity of these results to be even poorer than what is normally accepted in the field. 
Reliability is also compromised when using web-based questionnaires, because the 
participant’s environment is not controlled. Thus, participants may get distracted or 
have someone watching them, all of which may affect their responses, but be unknown 
to the researcher. Although it is convenient (and was unavoidable in this case because I 
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cannot speak adequate Finnish, and had to have all my materials and correspondence 
translated), web-based methods are not best suited for this type of study. 
Another issue in this study is that not all of the parametric assumptions were met. Most 
problematic was the non-normal distribution of prejudice, traits, emotions, and 
recategorization. Emotions also failed tests of homogeneity of variance (though barely). 
Another issue was that, of the regressed variables, only empathy had a neatly linear 
relationship with prejudice. Both emotions and recategorization were slightly warped, 
and traits curved more than I would have liked. The residuals were also somewhat 
heteroscedastic. Although the assumptions required by parametric tests are never met 
perfectly, and most of these were relatively minor violations, they are still relevant, 
particularly the non-normal distribution, which was the most serious issue.  
At a more conceptual level, it is also likely that the prejudice scale was too direct, 
reflecting unduly blatant prejudice. The politically correct answers were obvious; in 
fact, one participant stated: “Interesting study where I found myself trying to cheat once 
for a while, in other words, when I think about it, I was trying to answer in a politically 
correct way. However, I try to be honest.” In 1999, in reference to the blatant nature of 
the prejudice scales typically used in Finland, (including P-scale 2, which I used) 
Liebkind and McAlister noted that: “Blatant prejudice is common in Finland and norms 
against it may not be sufficiently internalised for the distinct phenomenon of subtle 
prejudice to become widespread. However, attitude measures and manipulations in 
future studies in Finland might attempt to distinguish between these two forms of 
prejudice” (p. 777). Perhaps in the intervening 13 years, the norms against prejudice 
have become internalized, at least in highly educated female social scientists. Although 
the composite prejudice scale was reasonably reliable, the lower reliability of the blatant 
subscale was potentially problematic. 
Pertinently, although prejudice scores were very low across the board, empathy scores 
were not high; in fact, they were just below the midpoint. So although participants did 
not endorse prejudice toward immigrants, neither did they feel compassionate, warm, or 
sympathetic toward them. This was different from Costello and Hodson’s (2010) 
sample, who were just under the midpoint for prejudice but almost a point above the 
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midpoint for empathy. Likewise, there were some highly prejudiced words listed in the 
WAT data for Immigrant, many of the most negative of which (such as rape, abusers, 
criminal, stealing) did not come from those participants who scored above 4 on the 
prejudice scale. That means that several of the people who indicated no prejudice 
toward immigrants on the questionnaire nonetheless expressed representations of 
immigrants of a highly prejudiced nature. It is therefore difficult to discern how 
prejudiced this sample actually is, though there is reason to believe that their prejudice 
ratings on the questionnaire were not entirely honest. This suggests an issue with 
content validity, in that prejudice scores may not simply reflect participants’ prejudice 
toward immigrants, but also (or instead) reflect their perceptions of how prejudiced they 
think they should be. Hirvelä (2011) recently had a similar finding with a Finnish 
sample; considerable prejudice was observable in answers to qualitative questions, 
which did not match up with the quantitative multiculturalism results. Using a subtle or 
implicit prejudice measure in present-day Finland may likely be a better choice. 
Additionally, although both were acceptable, neither the prejudice scale nor the 
recategorization scale were as reliable as I would have preferred, perhaps partly due to 
their being combined in the questionnaire. Although they were analyzed separately, 
mixing the recategorization questions in with the prejudice questions may have affected 
participants in an unforeseen manner. Questions asking if categorical delineations are 
useful and whether people are simply people in the midst of blatantly prejudicial 
questions may have increased the salience of social desirability and cued participants to 
respond in a less prejudiced manner to the questions on the prejudice scale.  
I also believe that the intervention may not have worked properly because the 
independent variable was simply too weak. When I received the animal editorial from 
Costello and Hodson (2010), I was surprised by it. It did not seem strong enough to 
have the impact that they found. The information contained in it is not novel or 
particularly engaging (see Appendices 1 and 2). However, North Americans do strongly 
emphasize the hierarchical divide between humans and other animals, so perhaps this 
editorial was appropriate in Canada, but may have been less so here. It seems possible 
that in Finland, with the cultural value of closeness to nature and the highly educated 
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population (emphasized in my sample), that the information contained in the editorial 
was far too basic and commonly known to have a strong effect.  
That the animal-human continuity manipulation check failed further indicates that the 
editorial was ineffectual (although it also underlines the problems with that scale). 
Almost all participants correctly answered the multiple choice question about the 
editorial (indicating that they did, in fact, read and understand it). The editorial simply 
had no effect on the manipulation check; people in the experimental condition did not 
see any greater animal-continuity than those in the control group. Therefore, the 
problem may have been an issue of construct validity; the independent variable (animal 
editorial) did not adequately represent the construct of animal-human similarity, or at 
least not strongly enough to affect participants in the way it was theorized to. That said, 
the poor reliability of the animal-human continuity scale was also an issue. Another 
scale should be devised to better capture animal-human continuity. 
As briefly noted, that I am not a Finn and know only basic Finnish was a problem that 
cropped up in many ways during the study. I initially chose to do my research in Finnish 
instead of English because it seemed likely that there would be significant differences 
between Finns who could speak (and were willing to answer a survey) in English and 
those who could or would not. Although this is undoubtedly true, my non-Finnish name 
on the recruitment emails may have filtered out many of those people anyway. 
Therefore, I may have gained very little from the choice, and added several 
consequences, including the fact that it is never ideal to conduct research on translated 
material, especially qualitative data. Language issues aside, it was also a cultural issue, 
in that my knowledge of Finnish self-representations and mythology is limited, which 
made it quite difficult to understand many of the words associated with Finn. It took 
extensive dialogue with the Finnish researcher aiding me with the WAT data for me to 
grasp the significance of many of the words, even after reading extensively about 
Finnish identity. Although this issue has been partially mediated by working closely 
with a Finnish social psychologist on all of the WAT data, for someone to conduct 
research without the necessary cultural or language competency raises some concerns. 
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Finally, another issue that was more cultural than methodological relates to the 
appropriateness of applying this theory in the Finnish context. In the same way that 
current social representations of NH animals are based on representations forged 
centuries ago, conflating outgroup humans (particularly racial minorities) with NH 
animals is also ancient, and based in colonialism and European white men seeing these 
“races” for the first time and assuming they were more animal than human (Leyens et 
al., 2000). These are ancient, long since naturalized social representations in the 
Western world. However, Finland has no history of colonialism, and up until recent 
decades, almost no experience with immigrants or racial minorities. So perhaps these 
dehumanizing representations are simply not as relevant here, or at least not as deeply 
held. Between that, the egalitarian social structure, and Finns’ sense of closeness with 
nature, perhaps this theory does not apply in this culture, or only weakly.  
To my knowledge, no other studies have been done comparing animal-human continuity 
or similarity in Finland. However, the mean for animal-human continuity in this sample 
of Finnish participants was 4.40, which is much higher than in Costello and Hodson’s 
(2010) sample (3.64 in the similarity conditions and 2.84 in the dissimilarity 
conditions). Thus, it is possible that Finns already have a relatively strong sense of 
animal-human continuity and weaker social representations about dehumanizing 
outgroups, which made the intervention somewhat moot. Even if the theory of the 
animal-human divide underlying dehumanization (which in turn underlies prejudice) is 
true, that does not mean that it is true for all prejudice in all cases. Perhaps prejudice in 
Finland is more related to fear and anxiety and lack of experience with people from 
other cultures, as contact theory suggests.  
Part of the purpose of this study was to determine if it had cross-cultural validity. 
Cultural differences that could affect the application of this theory were addresses in 
section 2.6.4, but nonetheless, an assumption was made that, as a Western, 
individualistic country, the same hegemonic representations would apply in Finland as 
they did in Canada. However, this does not appear to be the case. The Finns’ 
representations of nature and their relationship with it, and differing historical 
relationships with immigrant groups make them unique among Western, individualistic 
cultures. This has undoubtedly had an unforeseen effect on the results, which may speak 
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more to Finnish culture and the theory’s limited cross-cultural validity rather than to 
flaws with the theory itself. 
6.3 Strengths and Contributions 
One element of this study that is both a weakness and a strength is its complexity. The 
large number of variables and different dimensions that this topic was examined from 
make for a very complicated study, which was doubtless too elaborate to be addressed 
suitably in a master’s thesis. However, viewing it from so many angles hopefully has 
allowed for a broader picture to emerge about the relationship between representations 
of NH animals and the treatment of outgroups. Since the intervention did not work as it 
was expected to on the dependent variable or on most of the intended mediators, if it 
had merely been a (failed) replication, it would have looked like the underlying theory 
was faulty. However, between the word association data and the examination of NH 
animals historically, culturally, and within science, it seems more reasonable to 
conclude that it is more likely that the underlying theory is sound, and rather that the 
methodology was flawed. So that is the principle contribution that this study has made 
to the field, to show that how we view NH animals is linked with how we view human 
outgroups, specifically immigrants. Other studies have shown this, but as it is a very 
new topic, any corroboration is useful. 
In the same vein, I think that the explication of the roots of the animal-human divide 
and how that has translated into how science studies NH animals, has been a 
contribution to this very small field exploring the animal-human divide underlying 
dehumanization. In Costello and Hodson’s (2010) study as well as in other studies 
where the topic is broached (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2011), there is very little elaboration 
on why or how dehumanizing outgroups could be based on how NH animals are 
perceived. It may seem self-evident to these researchers, or it may simply be a matter of 
not having the space to adequately deal with the subject. However, I think that it is 
necessary to clarify the history that underlies this theory, because it is not self-evident to 
many people, and should not be assumed or taken for granted. I think that the theory is 
much more understandable when historically explicated. 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     99 
   
One final strength and contribution that this study makes is methodological. Very few 
experimental studies have been conducted using qualitative data, the recent and notable 
exception being Verkuyten’s (2005) study. In it, he notes that qualitative (in his case, 
discursive) and experimental methods are generally seen as antithetical, but that they 
need not be, and in fact they can be combined to great effect. Obviously, word 
associations are different from discursive analysis, but nonetheless, it is unusual to 
examine the impact of an experimental intervention qualitatively. It was quite fruitful in 
this case and I think it has great potential, especially with sensitive topics such as 
prejudice, where explicit scales may not always get honest answers, and where word 
associations or other qualitative methods may be able to get beyond politically correct 
social scripts. Although some quantification of the qualitative data was necessary in 
order to be convincing, I think that both quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
qualitative data can add a considerable amount of richness to an experimental study, and 
perhaps help to bridge the divide between positivism and constructionism.    
6.4 Future Research 
One piece of future research that ought to be (and is currently being) conducted is a 
systems analysis of the social representations held by highly prejudiced and non-
prejudiced individuals, of both immigrants and NH animals. It is theorized that social 
representations are made up of two systems, a stable, fixed core, and peripheral 
elements that are more flexible and subject to context (Abric, 1993). Determining the 
core and peripheral elements of the social representations of Immigrant and Animal for 
prejudiced people versus unprejudiced people would be highly useful for exploring the 
links between the animal-human divide and prejudice. I am in the process of such an 
analysis, for those participants scoring highest on the prejudice measure (above 4) and 
those scoring the lowest. Due to time and space constraints, it was not possible to 
include in this manuscript. However, I intend to complete this analysis, as well as 
conduct analyses of the social representational fields (using SPAD 5.0 software) in a 
forthcoming paper. However, future research should also determine the social 
representations of more highly prejudiced people than I had in this sample. 
As noted in section 6.2, there were several difficulties with the prejudice scale that may 
have affected results. Future research should use a subtle prejudice scale, or better yet, 
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an implicit association test (see e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Alternately or 
concurrently, it would be useful to try the intervention with a more highly prejudiced (or 
more openly prejudiced) group to see whether the animal-human similarity intervention 
would work in that case. Specifically choosing a sample with espoused anti-immigrant 
biases (e.g., Perussuomalaiset or “True” Finn party members) would be useful, to 
determine whether Costello and Hodson’s (2010) discovery that the intervention works 
equally well on those who are prejudiced as those who are not applies in other contexts, 
and with highly prejudiced populations. This is especially important because those who 
are highly prejudiced are resistant to most prejudice reduction methods, so conclusively 
finding one that is effective for that group would be highly beneficial. 
I also think that the cognitive nature of the editorial was problematic, and that future 
research at least ought to include an emotional component. A purely cognitive 
intervention seems impractical since prejudice, dehumanization, and empathy are 
inherently emotional rather than logical. An address to reason is perhaps not the best 
method to employ for these issues, because they are not based in reason (Allport, 
1979/1954). Confronting them on an emotional level may be more fruitful, because we 
must feel that we are in a continuum with all life, not just logically see that it is so. 
Perhaps a short film would be a better tool to explore this theory, due to films’ unique 
capacity to have a visceral effect, “which may elude consciousness but which carry an 
emotional and affective charge capable of engendering deep responses” (Ivakhiv, 2008, 
p. 13). A stronger intervention that has an emotional component would potentially be a 
better assessment of the underlying theory. 
Finally, it would be useful to test this intervention with action tendencies (see e.g., 
Bastian et al., 2011) or better still, test its effects on observed behaviour. I had initially 
intended to do a behavioural follow up conceptually similar to Rokeach (1971), where 
participants, two weeks after their participation, would be recruited by a pro-immigrant 
group to see if they wished to join or volunteer, and compare this across conditions. 
Unfortunately, there were ethical pitfalls that made such a follow up unmanageable in 
this case, but it would be a useful pursuit for future research, because it would illustrate 
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whether the intervention affects behaviour and if its effects persists over time.29 Since 
attitudes about prejudice and prejudiced behaviours are often not that highly correlated, 
prejudice research that includes behavioural measures are especially valuable 
(McConnell & Leibold, 2001).  
6.5 Final Thoughts 
In this study, I have attempted to answer the following question: if you include 
nonhuman animals within your moral universe, are you more likely to include other 
outgroups in your moral universe? Answering this question has involved a historical 
and cultural analysis, an experiment, results from quantitative measures, and social 
representations drawn from word associations. I have tried to build the case that our 
social representations of NH animals affect our perceptions of other humans. Because 
our perspectives of NH animals are not considered a “hot” topic, in this endeavour I 
have flouted one of the basic methodological principles of social representations theory, 
which is that, to examine a social representation, it must be emerging and problematic 
(Moscovici, 1984). I find this premise to be flawed, as have other researchers, to 
varying degrees (Hirvelä, 2011; Wagner, Valencia, & Elejabarrieta, 1996). Its most 
notable problem is that it ignores one of its own key tenets, which is that after a new 
social representation is anchored and objectified, it is naturalized, and becomes a part of 
everyday life. That does not mean that it ceases at that very moment to be a social 
representation. Thus, one would think that studying naturalized social representations 
would be equally important to studying emerging ones, especially since Moscovici 
(1984) himself emphasizes that the more naturalized an SR becomes, the greater its 
influence upon people.  
This was part of the reason that I discussed the historical underpinnings of the animal-
human divide at length in section 2.6.1, to illustrate the initial, emerging representation 
and how it was naturalized. Although it can readily be argued that immigrants are a 
“hot” enough topic in our current cultural climate to study with SRT, this historical 
perspective applies equally to the initial, emerging representations of various ethnic and 
                                               
29 Although, this should perhaps be combined with a stronger intervention, as noted previously, to have 
any chance of persisting over time. 
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cultural groups, as noted in section 6.2. For example, when white Europeans first 
encountered Aboriginal peoples in North America, they found them to be problematic 
and unfamiliar, so they needed to anchor this new and troubling group to something 
known and understandable. Since Aboriginals were viewed as uncivilized and brutish 
(Mason, 2005), they were anchored to NH animals instead of to humans. This is 
unquestionably a social representation, just one that has been naturalized for many 
centuries. Therefore, the study of such a representation seems relevant, especially since 
social representations theory “maintains that social psychological phenomena and 
processes can only be properly understood if they are seen as being embedded in 
historical, cultural and macro social conditions” (Wagner et al., 1999, pp. 95-96). 
I think that there is sufficient evidence, through this study and those that came 
previously, that beliefs about NH animals directly relate to our beliefs about and 
treatment of human outgroups. I also think that there is enough corroboration to suggest 
that including NH animals in our moral universe would not only benefit them, but 
would also benefit humans. Prejudice causes some of the most devastating problems in 
the world, which makes it imperative for us to try to cut it off at the source. This makes 
it vital that we acknowledge that, “the way we see other humans is inextricably 
intertwined with the way we see nonhumans” (Kwan & Fiske, 2008, p. 125). We then 
need to create effective interventions to help to change the social representations of 
nonhumans accordingly. 
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Appendix 1: Editorials (English) 
Animals 
The boundary between animals and humans is not as great as most people 
think. Scientific evidence suggests that the distinction between animals and 
humans is artificial, for in reality other animals are very similar to humans. 
Because humans evolved from animals, all animals are genetically and 
behaviourally similar to humans. Indeed, genetic research continues to 
discover evidence suggesting that animals share a significant proportion of 
their DNA with humans. For example, the DNA of chimpanzees is 98.4% 
identical to the DNA of humans. 
 
Due to the high percentage of genes that animals share with humans, the 
nervous systems of most animals are based on the same physiological 
principles as the human nervous system. As a result, animals are motivated to 
avoid pain and to seek pleasure, just like humans. In fact, animals demonstrate 
the same physiological responses to pain as humans do, including increased 
heart and breathing rates. Furthermore, like humans, animals possess a 
centralized brain containing the limbic system, which is responsible for 
emotional experiences. Evidence from various areas of research including 
physiology, endocrinology, and psychology support the position that animals 
are also very similar to humans on an emotional level and thus experience 
complex emotions in a manner similar to humans. 
 
Research suggests that what appears to be basic biological programming 
and/or simple learning by other animals is actually the result of sophisticated 
cognitive abilities. In fact, like humans, other animals possess the capacity to 
make choices, create their own destinies, and understand abstract concepts 
including cause and effect relationships.  
Animals obviously share the same needs and motivations as humans. Like 
humans, animals are motivated to find security, shelter, and food, to avoid 
predators/enemies, and to protect their home fronts. Animals also engage in  
 
 
social behaviours analogous to those of humans. For example, like humans, 
animals are motivated to seek out and maintain social relationships, engage in 
creative behaviours to attract mates, and to protect and raise their offspring. 
 
Geology 
 
The earth can be described as a ball of rock. It is made up of the core, the 
mantle, and the crust. The core has metallic properties and is likely composed 
largely of iron. It has a very high density. The mantle is a thick layer of ‘heavy 
rock’ between the core and the crust. The mantle material begins at various 
depths in different parts of the world. The crust is the outer shell, and is a sort 
of envelope surrounding the mantle. It is made up of a tremendous variety of 
different rocks, covered in soil and other loose deposits. There are two main 
types of rock groups that occur in the crust: light rocks (e.g., granite, 
sandstones, and shales), and dark and heavy (basic) rocks (e.g., basalt). 
 
Rocks in the crust regularly change composition due to a variety of factors. 
They are both mechanically broken down and they chemically decay, both of 
which are known as weathering. For example, human inscriptions on rock will 
rarely survive rain, frost, and wind for more than a few centuries. Rocks move, 
fold, and erode, which over time results in changes to land and topography. 
Another way in which rocks can change is by metamorphism, which is a 
process of recrystallization. 
 
Interesting developments have occurred in the past century within the field of 
tectonics. The discovery and understanding of plate tectonics and sea-floor 
spreading has provided an explanation for continental drift. Further 
developments also continue to occur in our understanding and use of various 
different types of rocks and minerals, including their use in new technologies. 
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Appendix 2: Editorials (Finnish) 
Eläimet 
Eläinten ja ihmisten raja ei ole niin jyrkkä kuin useimmat ihmiset ajattelevat. 
Tieteellinen todistusaineisto viittaa siihen, että eläinten ja ihmisten 
erottaminen on keinotekoista, sillä todellisuudessa muut eläimet ovat hyvin 
samanlaisia kuin ihmiset. Koska ihmiset kehittyivät eläimistä, kaikki eläimet 
ovat perimältään ja käyttäytymiseltään samanlaisia kuin ihmiset. 
Perinnöllisyystutkimus löytääkin jatkuvasti uutta todistusaineistoa joka viittaa 
siihen, että eläinten ja ihmisten DNA:sta merkittävän suuri osuus on yhteistä. 
Esimerkiksi simpanssien DNA:sta 98.4 % on identtistä ihmisten DNA:n 
kanssa. 
 
Johtuen eläinten ja ihmisten yhteisten geenien suuresta prosenttiosuudesta 
useimpien eläinten hermostot perustuvat samoihin fysiologisiin periaatteisiin 
kuin ihmisen hermosto. Sen tuloksena eläimet pyrkivät välttämään kipua ja 
etsimään mielihyvää, aivan kuin ihmiset. Itse asiassa eläimillä on todettu 
samat fysiologiset reaktiot kipuun kuin ihmisillä, muun muassa kiihtynyt 
pulssi ja hengitys. Lisäksi eläimillä, kuten ihmisilläkin, on keskushermosto ja 
siinä limbinen järjestelmä, joka vastaa tunnekokemuksista. Eri 
tutkimusalueilta kuten fysiologiasta, endokrinologiasta ja psykologiasta saatu 
todistusaineisto tukee kantaa, jonka mukaan eläimet on hyvin samanlaisia kuin 
ihmiset myös tunteiden tasolla ja kokevat siis mutkikkaita tunteita ihmisten 
kaltaisesti. 
 
Tutkimus viittaa siihen, että muiden eläinten biologisilta perustoiminnoilta 
ja/tai yksinkertaiselta oppimiselta näyttävät ilmiöt johtuvat itse asiassa 
monimutkaisista kognitiivisista kyvyistä. Itse asiassa muilla eläimillä on, 
kuten ihmisilläkin, kyky tehdä valintoja, luoda omat kohtalonsa ja ymmärtää 
abstrakteja käsitteitä kuten syy-seuraussuhteita. 
 
Eläimillä on selvästi samat tarpeet ja motivaatiot kuin ihmisillä. Ihmisten 
tavoin eläimet pyrkivät saamaan turvallisuutta, löytämään suojaa, ruokaa,  
 
välttämään saalistajia/vihollisia ja puolustamaan kotirintamiaan. Eläinten 
sosiaaliset käyttäytymismuodot ovat rinnasteisia ihmisen sosiaaliseen 
käyttäytymiseen. Esimerkiksi eläimet, kuten ihmisetkin, pyrkivät etsiytymään 
sosiaalisiin suhteisiin ja ylläpitämään niitä, käyttäytymään luovilla tavoilla 
vetääkseen kumppaneita puoleensa sekä suojelemaan ja kasvattamaan 
jälkeläisiään. 
 
Geologia 
 
Maata voi kuvata kivipalloksi. Sen osat ovat sydän, vaippa ja kuori. Sydän on 
metallia ja koostuu todennäköisesti etupäässä raudasta. Se on hyvin tiheä. 
Vaippa on paksu kalliokerrostuma sydämen ja kuoren välissä. Vaippa alkaa eri 
syvyydestä maailman eri osissa. Kuori on eräänlainen vaippaa ympäröivä 
peite. Se koostuu suuresta määrästä eri kivilajeja, joita peittää maaperä 
erilaisine irtokerrostumineen. Maankuoressa esiintyy pääasiassa kahta 
kivilajia: kevyttä ja vaaleaa (esimerkiksi graniitti, hiekkakivi, savikivi) ja 
raskasta ja tummaa peruskalliota (esim. basalttia). 
 
Maankuoren kiven koostumus muuttuu monien tekijöiden vaikutuksesta. Se 
murenee mekaanisesti ja kuluu kemiallisesti, mitä yhdessä kutsutaan 
rapautumiseksi. Esimerkiksi ihmisen kallioon piirtämät kirjoitukset kestävät 
sadetta, pakkasta ja tuulta harvoin kauempaa kuin muutaman vuosisadan. 
Kalliot liikkuvat, poimuttuvat ja kuluvat, mikä ajan mittaan johtaa maaperän ja 
pinnanmuodostuksen muutoksiin. Toinen tapa, jolla kalliot muuttuvat, on 
metamorfoosi, uudelleenkiteytymisprosessi. 
 
Mielenkiintoisia edistysaskeleita on otettu viime vuosisadalla tektoniikan 
alueella. Mannerlaattojen löytäminen ja niiden liikkeiden ymmärtäminen on 
tarjonnut selityksen mannerten siirtymille. Ymmärrämme myös yhä paremmin 
erilaisia kiviä ja mineraaleja ja osaamme käyttää niitä uusien teknologioiden 
kehittämiseen.  
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Appendix 3: Measures (English) 
1. Prejudice and Recategorization (Foreigners in Finland) 
Society has many different perspectives about foreigners. Please rate how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following beliefs, on a scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Slightly  
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
1. If foreigners tried harder, they could be as well off as Finns are.  
2. I don’t think of people in terms of being immigrants or non-
immigrants, only as people who are part of one group (i.e., Finnish 
residents). [recategorization] 
3. Discrimination against foreigners living in Finland is no longer a 
problem here.  
4. Foreigners in Finland have become too demanding in trying to get the 
same rights as Finns have.  
5. It is easy to understand the anger of immigrants in Finland. 
6. Foreigners who have come over to Finland in the past have overcome 
prejudice and been successful; those foreigners who now move to 
Finland should do the same without any extra benefits.  
7. Immigrants can only blame themselves if they are scorned.  
8. People have the right to keep immigrants away from their 
neighbourhood.  
9. The distinction between immigrants and non-immigrants is artificial; 
we are all part of a shared group (humans/people). [recategorization] 
 
 
 
2. Emotion Attribution 
Listed below are a number of emotions. Please indicate using the scale 
provided, how much you think the following groups, in general, experience the 
listed emotions. For example, check 5 if you strongly agree that the group 
experiences the emotion, or check 1 if you strongly disagree that the group 
experiences the emotion. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
  Finn Immigrant 
1. Fear   
2. Guilt   
3. Serenity   
4. Excitement   
5. Anger   
6. Pain   
7. Compassion   
8. Hope   
9. Attraction   
10. Remorse   
11. Shame   
12. Pleasure   
 
3. Trait Attribution 
 
Listed below are a number of personality traits. Please indicate using the 
scale provided, how much you think these traits apply to the following groups. 
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For example, check 7 if you strongly agree that the trait applies to the group, 
or check 1 if you strongly disagree that the trait applies to the group. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Some-
what 
disagree 
Slightly  
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Slightly  
agree 
Some-
what 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 Finn Immigrant 
1. Extroverted, enthusiastic   
2. Critical, quarrelsome   
3. Dependable, self-disciplined   
4. Anxious, easily upset   
5. Open to new experiences, complex   
6. Reserved, quiet   
7. Sympathetic, warm   
8. Disorganized, careless   
9. Calm, emotionally stable   
10. Conventional, uncreative   
 
4. Empathy (Feelings Toward Immigrants) 
Please answer honestly on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) how 
well the following adjectives describe your feelings toward immigrants. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all 
     Very 
much 
 
1. I feel sympathetic toward immigrants.  
2. I feel compassionate toward immigrants.  
3. I feel soft-hearted toward immigrants.  
4. I feel warm toward immigrants.  
5. I feel tender toward immigrants.  
6. I feel moved by immigrants. 
 
5. Animal-Human Continuity 
Please answer each of the following questions on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
disagree 
Moder-
ately 
disagree 
Slightly  
disagree 
Unsure Slightly  
agree 
Moder-
ately 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
  
1.   Humans have a soul but animals do not.  
2.   Humans can think but animals cannot.  
3.   People have a life after death but animals do not.  
4.   People are animals.  
5.   Animals are afraid of death.  
6.   People evolved from lower animals.  
7.   People are superior to animals.  
8.   Animals can fall in love.  
9.   People have a spiritual nature but animals do not.  
10. The needs of people should always come before the needs of animals.  
11. It's okay to use animals to carry out tasks for humans.  
12. It's crazy to think of an animal as a member of your family. 
 
6. PVQ-R (Values)  
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think 
about how much each person is or is not like you. Choose the answer from the 
list of how much the person in the description is like you. 
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Not at all 
like me 
Not like 
me 
A little like 
me 
Somewhat 
like me 
Like me Very much 
like me 
 
1. Thinking creatively is important to her.  
2. It is important to him that his country protect itself against all threats. 
3. Having a good time is important to her.  
4. It is important to him to avoid upsetting other people.  
5. Protecting the weak and vulnerable people in society is important to her.  
6. Having people do what he says is important to him.  
7. It is important to her never to be boastful or self-important.  
8. Caring for nature is very important to him.  
9. It is important to her that no one should ever shame her.  
10. Always looking for different kinds of things to do is important to him.  
11. Taking care of people she is close to is important to her.  
12. Having the feeling of power that money can bring is important to him. 
13. It is very important to her to avoid disease and protect her health.  
14. Being tolerant toward all kinds of people and groups is important to him.  
15. Never to violate rules or regulations is important to her.  
16. It is important to him to make his own decisions about his life.  
17. Having ambitions in life is important to her.  
18. It is important to him to maintain traditional values or beliefs.  
19. It is important to her that people she knows have full confidence in her.  
20. Being wealthy is important to him.  
21. It is important to her to take part in actions to defend nature.  
22. Never to be annoying to anyone is important to him.  
23. It is important to her to have original ideas and form her own opinions.  
24. Protecting his public image is important to him.  
25. It is very important to her to help the people dear to her.  
26. His personal security is extremely important to him.  
27.  It is very important to her to be a dependable and trustworthy friend.  
28. Taking risks that make life exciting is important to him.  
29. It is important to her to have the power to make people do what she wants.  
30. Doing everything independently is important to him.  
31. It is important to her to follow rules even when no one is watching.  
32. Being very successful is important to him.  
33. Following her family’s customs or the customs of a religion is important to 
her.  
34. It is important to him to listen to and understand people who are different 
from him.  
35. Having a strong state that can defend its citizens is very important to her.  
36. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him.  
37. It is important to her that every person in the world have equal 
opportunities in life.  
38. It is important to him to be humble.  
39. It is important to her to learn about things and understand them well.  
40. He strongly values the traditional practices of his culture.  
41. It is important to her to be the one who tells others what to do.  
42. Obeying all the laws is important to him.  
43. It is important to her to have all sorts of new experiences.  
44. It is important to him to own expensive things that show his wealth.  
45. Protecting the natural environment from destruction or pollution is 
important to her.  
46. It is important to him to take advantage of every opportunity to have fun.  
47. Concerning herself with every need of her dear ones is important to her. 
48. It is important to him to have people admire what he achieves.  
49. It is important to her never to be humiliated.  
50. Stability and order in the wider society are important to him.  
51. It is important to her always to be tactful and avoid irritating people.  
52. It is important to him that everyone be treated justly, even people he 
doesn’t know.  
53. That her own neighbourhood should be safe is very important to her.  
54. It is important to him never to seek public attention or praise.  
55. It is important to her that those she spends time with can rely on her 
completely.  
56. Freedom to choose what he does is important to him.  
57. It is important to her to accept people even when she disagrees with them. 
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Appendix 4: Measures (Finnish) 
1. Ennakkoluulo ja Uudelleenluokittelu (Ulkomaalaiset Suomessa) 
Yhteiskunnassamme on monia erilaisia käsityksiä ulkomaalaisista. Arvioi 
asteikkoa 1 (täysin eri mieltä) - 7 (täysin samaa mieltä) käyttäen, missä 
määrin olet samaa tai eri mieltä seuraavien käsitysten kanssa. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Täysin 
eri 
mieltä 
Aika 
lailla eri 
mieltä 
Hieman 
eri 
mieltä 
Ei samaa 
eikä eri 
mieltä 
Hieman 
samaa 
mieltä 
Aika lailla 
samaa 
mieltä 
Täysin 
samaa 
mieltä 
 
1. Jos maahanmuuttajat vain yrittäisivät kovemmin, he voisivat pärjätä 
yhtä hyvin kuin suomalaisetkin. [uudelleenluokittelu] 
2. En jaottele ihmisiä maahamuuttajiin ja ei-maahanmuuttajiin, vaan 
näen heidän kuuluvan samaan ryhmään (Suomen asukkaat). 
3. Maahanmuuttajien syrjintä ei ole enää ongelma Suomessa. 
4. Ulkomaalaiset Suomessa ovat tulleet liian vaativiksi yrittäessään 
saada samat oikeudet, jotka suomalaisilla on.  
5. On helppo ymmärtää maahanmuuttajien suuttumus Suomessa. 
6. Ulkomaalaiset jotka ovat tulleet Suomeen aiempina vuosina ovat 
voittaneet ennakkoluulot ja menestyneet; nyt Suomeen muuttavien 
ulkomaalaisten pitäisi tehdä samoin ilman mitään lisäetuuksia. 
7. Maahanmuuttajat saavat syyttää vain itseään, jos heitä haukutaan. 
8. Ihmisillä on oikeus pitää maahanmuuttajat poissa naapuristaan. 
9. Maahanmuuttajien ja ei-maahanmuuttajien erottelu on keinotekoista; 
olemme kaikki samaa yhteistä ryhmää (ihmiset). [uudelleenluokittelu] 
 
2. Tunteiden Kokeminen 
Alla on joukko tunteita. Kerro annettua asteikkoa käyttäen, missä määrin 
uskot seuraavien ryhmien yleensä kokevan lueteltuja tunteita. Klikkaa esim. 5 
jos olet täysin samaa mieltä siitä, että ryhmä kokee tunnetta ja klikkaa 1, jos 
olet täysin eri mieltä siitä, että ryhmä kokee tunnetta. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Täysin eri 
mieltä 
Eri mieltä Ei samaa eikä 
eri mieltä 
Samaa mieltä Täysin samaa 
mieltä 
 
  Suomalaiset Maahanmuuttajat 
1.Pelko   
2. Syyllisyys   
3. Tyyneys   
4. Jännitys   
5. Viha   
6. Kipu   
7. Myötätunto   
8. Toivo   
9. Vetovoima   
10. Tunnonvaivat   
11 Häpeä   
12. Mielihyvä   
 
3. Piirteet 
Alla on persoonallisuuspiirteitä. Kerro annettua asteikkoa käyttäen, missä 
määrin katsot näiden piirteiden sopivan seuraaviin ryhmiin. Klikkaa esim. 7 
jos olet täysin samaa mieltä siitä, että piirre sopii ryhmään ja klikkaa 1, jos 
olet täysin eri mieltä siitä, että piirre sopii ryhmään. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Täysin 
eri 
mieltä 
Aika 
lailla eri 
mieltä 
Hieman 
eri 
mieltä 
Ei samaa 
eikä eri 
mieltä 
Hieman 
samaa 
mieltä 
Aika lailla 
samaa 
mieltä 
Täysin 
samaa 
mieltä 
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 Suomalaiset Maahanmuuttajat 
1. Ulospäin suuntautunut, innostunut   
2. Kriittinen, riidanhaluinen   
3. Luotettava, kurinalainen   
4. Ahdistunut, helposti hermostuva   
5. Avoin uusille kokemuksille, mutkikas   
6. Varautunut, hiljainen   
7. Myötätuntoinen, lämmin   
8. Huolimaton,järjestyksestä piittaamaton   
9. Rauhallinen, tunteiltaan vakaa   
10. Sovinnainen, epäluova   
 
4. Empatia (Tunteet Maahanmuuttajia Kohtaan) 
Kuinka hyvin seuraavat adjektiivit kuvaavat maahanmuuttajiin kohdistuvia 
tunteitasi? Vastaa käyttäen asteikkoa 1 (ei ollenkaan) – 7 (hyvin paljon). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ei ollenkaan      Hyvin paljon 
 
1. Tunnen myötätuntoa maahanmuuttajia kohtaan. 
2. Tunnen sääliä maahanmuuttajia kohtaan. 
3. Sydämeni heltyy kun ajattelen maahanmuuttajia. 
4. Tunnen lämpimiä tunteita maahanmuuttajia kohtaan. 
5. Tunnen hellyyttä maahanmuuttajia kohtaan. 
6. Maahanmuuttajat liikuttavat minua. 
 
5. Eläimen ja Ihmisen Jatkuvuus 
Vastaa seuraaviin kysymyksiin asteikolla 1 (täysin eri mieltä) - 7 (täysin 
samaa mieltä ). 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Täysin 
eri 
mieltä 
Kohtalaisen  
eri mieltä 
Hieman 
eri 
mieltä 
Epävarma Hieman 
samaa 
mieltä 
Kohtalaisen  
samaa 
mieltä 
Täysin 
samaa 
mieltä 
 
1. Ihmisillä on sielu mutta eläimillä ei. 
2. Ihmiset osaavat ajatella, eläimet eivät. 
3. Ihmisillä on kuolemanjälkeinen elämä mutta eläimillä ei. 
4. Ihmiset ovat eläimiä. 
5. Eläimet pelkäävät kuolemaa. 
6. Ihmiset ovat kehittyneet alemmista eläimistä. 
7. Ihmiset ovat eläinten yläpuolella/parempia kuin eläimet. 
8. Eläimet voivat rakastua. 
9. Ihmisillä on hengellinen tai henkinen luonne mutta eläimillä ei. 
10. Ihmisten tarpeet on aina pantava eläinten tarpeiden edelle. 
11. Eläimiä voi hyvin käyttää tekemään töitä ihmisten hyväksi. 
12. On hullua ajatella eläin perheen jäseneksi. 
 
6. PVQ-R (Arvot)  
Seuraavassa kuvataan lyhyesti erilaisia ihmisiä. Lue jokainen kohta ja mieti, 
missä määrin kuvaus sopii tai ei sovi Sinuun itseesi. Valitse sitten, 
rastittamalla sopiva ruutu, kunkin kuvauksen kohdalla vaihtoehto joka sopii 
parhaiten itseesi. 
 
Ei 
lainkaan 
samanlain
en kuin 
minä 
Ei juuri 
lainkaan 
samanlain
en kuin 
minä 
Vain 
hieman 
samanlain
en kuin 
minä 
Jonkin 
verran 
samanlain
en kuin 
minä 
Melko 
samanlain
en kuin 
minä 
Erittäin 
paljon 
samanlain
en kuin 
minä 
 
1. Hänelle on tärkeää ajatella luovasti. 
2. Hänelle on tärkeää, että hänen maansa puolustaa itseään kaikkia uhkia 
vastaan.  
3. Hänelle on tärkeää pitää hauskaa. 
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4. Hänelle on tärkeää välttää järkyttämästä muita ihmisiä.  
5. Yhteiskunnan heikkojen ja haavoittuvien jäsenten suojeleminen on hänelle 
tärkeää. 
6. Hänelle on tärkeää, että ihmiset tekevät mitä hän sanoo. 
7. Hänelle on tärkeää, ettei hän koskaan kerskaile eikä ole tärkeilevä. 
8. Luonnosta huolehtiminen on hänelle hyvin tärkeää. 
9. Hänelle on tärkeää, että kukaan ei koskaan häpäisisi häntä. 
10. Hänelle on tärkeää jatkuvasti etsiä erilaisia asioita, joita tehdä. 
11. Hänelle on tärkeää pitää huolta itselleen läheisistä ihmisistä. 
12. Rahan mukanaan tuoma vallan tunne on hänelle tärkeä.  
13. Hänelle on hyvin tärkeää välttää sairauksia ja suojella terveyttään. 
14. Hänelle on tärkeää olla suvaitsevainen kaikenlaisia ihmisiä ja ihmisryhmiä 
kohtaan. 
15. Hänelle on tärkeää, ettei hän koskaan riko sääntöjä tai määräyksiä. 
16. Hänelle on tärkeää päättää itse omasta elämästään. 
17. Hänelle on tärkeää, että hänellä on elämässään kunnianhimoisia päämääriä. 
18. Perinteisten arvojen tai uskomusten vaaliminen on hänelle tärkeää. 
19. Hänelle on tärkeää, että hänen tuntemansa ihmiset luottavat häneen täysin. 
20. Hänelle on tärkeää olla varakas. 
21. Luonnonsuojelutoimintaan osallistuminen on hänelle tärkeää. 
22. Hänelle on tärkeää olla koskaan ärsyttämättä ketään. 
23. Hänelle on tärkeää, että hänellä on omia ideoita ja itsenäisesti 
muodostettuja mielipiteitä.  
24. Oman maineen varjeleminen on hänelle tärkeää.  
25. Hänelle on hyvin tärkeää auttaa itselleen läheisiä ihmisiä.   
26. Oma henkilökohtainen turvallisuus on hänelle äärimmäisen tärkeää. 
27. Hänelle on hyvin tärkeää olla luotetava ja vakaa ystävä. 
28. Hänelle on tärkeää ottaa riskejä jotka tekevät elämästä jännittävää. 
29. Hänelle on tärkeää, että hänellä on valtaa saada muut tekemään mitä hän 
tahtoo. 
30. Hänelle on tärkeää tehdä kaikki itsenäisesti. 
31. Hänelle on tärkeää noudattaa sääntöjä myös silloin kun kukaan ei ole 
näkemässä. 
32. Hänelle on tärkeää olla todella menestyvä. 
33. Hänelle on tärkeää noudattaa sukunsa tai uskonnon tapoja. 
34. Hänelle on tärkeää kuunnella ja ymmärtää ihmisiä, jotka ovat erilaisia kuin 
hän itse. 
35. Hänelle on hyvin tärkeää, että valtio on kyllin vahva puolustaakseen 
kansalaisiaan. 
36. Iloinen elämä ja sen nautinnot ovat hänelle tärkeitä. 
37. Hänelle on tärkeää, että kaikilla maailman ihmisillä on samat 
mahdollisuudet elämässä. 
38. Hänelle on tärkeää olla nöyrä. 
39. Hänelle on tärkeää oppia asioita ja ymmärtää ne hyvin. 
40. Hän pitää oman kulttuurinsa perinteisiä tapoja suuressa arvossa. 
41. Hänelle on tärkeää olla se joka kertoo muille mitä tehdä. 
42. Kaikkien lakien noudattaminen on hänelle tärkeää. 
43. Hänelle on tärkeää saada kaikenlaisia uusia kokemuksia. 
44. Hänelle on tärkeää omistaa kalliita tavaroita jotka osoittavat hänen 
varallisuutensa.  
45. Hänelle on tärkeää suojella luontoa ja ympäristöä tuhoutumiselta tai 
saastumiselta. 
46. Hänelle on tärkeää käyttää hyväkseen jokainen mahdollisuus huvitteluun. 
47. Hänelle on tärkeää huolehtia läheistensä kaikkien tarpeiden täyttämisestä. 
48. Hänelle on tärkeää, että ihmiset ihailevat hänen saavutuksiaan. 
49. Hänelle on tärkeää, ettei häntä koskaan nöyryytetä.  
50. Koko yhteiskunnan vakaus ja järjestys ovat hänelle tärkeitä.  
51. Hänelle on tärkeää olla aina tahdikas ja välttää suututtamasta muita. 
52. Hänelle on tärkeää, että kaikkia, myös niitä joita hän ei tunne, kohdellaan 
oikeudenmukaisesti 
53. Hänen oman lähiympäristönsä turvallisuus on hänelle hyvin tärkeää. 
54. Hänelle on tärkeää, ettei hän koskaan hae julkista huomiota tai kiitosta. 
55. Hänelle on tärkeää, että henkilöt joiden kanssa hän viettää aikaa voivat 
turvautua häneen täysin. 
56. Vapaus itse valita tekemisensä on hänelle tärkeää. 
57. Hänelle on tärkeää hyväksyä ihmiset, vaikka olisi eri mieltä heidän 
kanssaan. 
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Appendix 5: Pilot Studies 
English Pilot Study 
I conducted an initial pilot in English with seven of my colleagues. The purpose of this pilot 
was to determine the best sequence of my multiple measures, as well as to head off any 
technical difficulties. The university’s online questionnaire system (e-lomake) posed 
multiple problems, which required repeated testing and modification. The English pilot was 
also conducted to gauge the general length of time the survey took, in order to help make a 
final decision on how many of the measures to use. It was also practically necessary to 
create mirrored English and Finnish questionnaires and SPSS databases, so that I could run 
my analyses in English to reduce the possibility for potential errors. 
Measure-Check Pilot Study 
An additional pilot was conducted in order to verify several components of my survey. I 
sent out a short survey that simply covered demographics and the prejudice scale, with 
participants randomly divided into two groups, one reading the geology editorial and the 
other reading nothing, prior to completing the prejudice scale. It was sent to four University 
of Helsinki mailing lists (see Appendix 6), and was conducted in English primarily for my 
own convenience, and because language was not a relevant factor in the measures I was 
checking. A total of 41 participants (27 women, 14 men, Mage = 27.37, SD = 6.28) 
completed the survey. Their identified mother tongues were 19.5% English, 14.6% Finnish, 
and 65.9% other, listed as Spanish (14.6%), Russian (12.2%), Estonian and German (each 
4.9%), and with a single respondent each (2.4%): Chinese, Czech, French, Greek, 
Portuguese, Romanian, Tagalog, Telugu, Turkish, and Ukrainian. 
First, due to the technical limitations of the e-lomake program, it was impossible within the 
given framework to select participants randomly for each group. Thus, I had to devise a way 
to separate participants into the two groups using another method. Through consultation I 
decided that the most reasonable available option was to have participants answer what day 
of the month they were born, and then split those born on odd days into one group and those 
on even days into the other. Theoretically, these groups should be random; there should be 
no difference whatsoever between the prejudice levels of people born on different days of 
the month. The odd group, with seven (six in a leap year) additional days each year should 
be slightly larger than the even group, but not enough to disrupt the results. However, this 
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needed to be tested. Unexpectedly, it turned out that the smaller group was the odd group, 
with 17 (41.5%) participants, while the even group had 24 (58.5%). This was deemed close 
enough, and likely an anomaly, so it was kept as the dividing process. 
Second, because Costello and Hodson’s study (2010) did not use a control group, they had 
no control editorial written, so I needed to write one. After considerable deliberation and 
with a focus upon using a similarly science-based editorial topic that should theoretically 
have no effect on participants’ prejudice levels, I decided upon and wrote the geology 
editorial. However, as it was an untested intervention, it was necessary to make sure that it 
did not have an unanticipated effect. The difference between the two groups’ mean 
prejudice scores was not significant; for the geology editorial it was M = 2.67, SD = 0.91, 
and for no editorial, M = 2.71, SD = 0.76. Therefore, it appeared safe to conclude that the 
geology editorial (and the division of participants by even and odd birth dates) did not have 
an effect on prejudice scores. 
Finally, due to concerns with the prejudice scale Costello and Hodson (2012) used in their 
study, a new composite scale was drafted (as noted in section 4.2). This included the 
recategorization questions being folded into the prejudice questionnaire, although their 
results were analyzed separately. Cronbach’s alpha for the composite prejudice scale (minus 
the recategorization questions) was ? = .73, which is acceptable. Cronbach’s alphas for the 
separate Finnish scales were ? = .72 for P-scale 1 and ? = .59 for P-scale 2. Thus, although 
the reliability of the composite scale is adequate, there is potentially a problem with P-scale 
2, in that the two questions devised by Liebkind and McAlister (1999) measure a more 
blatant form of prejudice (acknowledged by the researchers) than the question by Pettigrew 
and Meertens (1995), or by P-scale 1. Because the overall alpha was acceptable, all 
questions were kept, with the knowledge that P-scale 2 could be dropped if it proved 
problematic during the experiment. 
Finnish Pilot Study 
The Finnish pilot test was the final test I conducted, immediately before recruiting 
participants. It was completed with the assistance of five of my colleagues. This was done 
as a last language and formatting check, as well as to discover how long the final version 
took, in order to provide that information to participants. 
 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     130 
   
Appendix 6: Supplementary Information
University of Helsinki mailing lists 
 
Measure-check pilot (English mailing lists): 
  kannu-news@helsinki.fi 
  degree-students@helsinki.fi 
  esn-helsinki@helsinki.fi 
  fs-chat@helsinki.fi 
 
Survey (Finnish mailing lists): 
elo-lista@helsinki.fi  
didacta-post@helsinki.fi  
ebe-lista@helsinki.fi  
foni-lista@helsinki.fi  
hao-lista@helsinki.fi  
konnarit@helsinki.fi  
limes-lista@helsinki.fi  
yhis-opisk@helsinki.fi  
ktto-lista@helsinki.fi  
stigma-lista@helsinki.fi  
voo-l@helsinki.fi  
media-lista@helsinki.fi  
kontakti-ry@helsinki.fi  
putkinotko-lista@helsinki.fi  
katharsis-lista@helsinki.fi  
eidos-ry@helsinki.fi  
aistimus-lista@helsinki.fi  
synkooppi-list@helsinki.fi  
repliikki-lista@helsinki.fi  
ural-lista@helsinki.fi  
mana-ry@helsinki.fi  
mythos-list@helsinki.fi  
saga-list@helsinki.fi  
setenta-ry@helsinki.fi  
umlaut-ry@helsinki.fi  
as-pekti@helsinki.fi  
dilemma-lista@helsinki.fi  
karavaani-lista@helsinki.fi  
keho-lista@helsinki.fi  
kronos-info@helsinki.fi  
rupla-ry@helsinki.fi 
 
 
Programs of study listed by students 
 
Arts and Humanities: 
Master of Arts (x7) 
Bachelor of Arts (x6) 
Communication (x6) 
Asian Studies (x5) 
Finnish Language (x5) 
Musicology (x5) 
History (x4) 
General Linguistics (x3) 
Language Technology (x3) 
Logopedics (x3) 
Art History (x2) 
Comparative Literature (x2)  
Comparative Religion (x2) 
Development Studies (x2) 
General History (x2) 
Humanistic (x2) 
Social and Moral Philosophy (x2) 
Arabic and Islamic Research 
Arts Research 
Bachelor's Degree in Philosophy 
Doctor of Philosophy 
English Philology 
Finnish Literature 
French Philology 
Political History  
Scandinavian Languages 
Theatre Research 
Translation of German 
Social Sciences: 
Sociology (x9) 
Social Services (x7) 
Social Policy (x4) 
Bachelor of Social Sciences (x3) 
Education: 
General and Adult Education (x6) 
Kindergarten Teacher Education (x4) 
Education (x4) 
Bachelor of Early Childhood Education (x2) 
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Social Sciences (x3) 
Social work (x2) 
Behavioral Studies 
Master of Social Sciences 
Psychology 
 
Early Childhood Education Master's Degree (x2) 
Doctoral Education, Germanic Philology 
Education and Social Policy 
Master of Education 
Mother Tongue Teacher 
Polytechnic Degrees: 
Bachelor of Hospitality Management (x5) 
Facility Services and Management (x4) 
Security Management (x2) 
Tourism (x2) 
Aesthetics 
Beauty Care Studies 
Management 
 
Economics, Business, Law: 
Economics and Business Administration (x9) 
Business Administration (x4) 
Faculty of Law (x2) 
Business Law 
Economics 
Environmental Economics 
Science and Technology: 
M.Sc. (x5) 
Computer Science (x4) 
Data Communications 
Digital Culture 
Geography 
 
Health Care: 
Nursing (x14) 
Health Care (x6) 
Physiotherapy 
 
Unspecified: 
Master's Program (x2) 
Postgraduate 
Tiko 
 
 
 
Categorical Variables 
Gender: 1 = female, 2 = male  
School: 1 = Laurea, 2 = University of Helsinki, 3 = Aalto University, 4 = Other 
Years of study: 1 = first, 2 = second, 3 = third, 4 = fourth, 5 = fifth or more 
Mother tongue: 1 = Finnish, 2 = Swedish (all others were removed from analysis) 
Program of study: 1 = miscellaneous polytechnic. 2 = science and technology, 3 = 
economics and business, 4 = health care, 5 = education, 6 = arts and humanities, 7 = 
social sciences, 8 = unspecified 
Prejudice (categorical): 1 = 1.0-1.9, 2 = 2.0-2.9, 3 = 3.0-3.9, 4 = 4.0-4.9, 5 = 5.0-5.9. 6 = 
6.0-7.0 
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Appendix 7: Supplementary Analyses 
Recategorization Questions 
Both of Costello and Hodson’s (2010) recategorization questions used the superordinate 
group Canadian citizens. However, I was not convinced that type of recategorization would 
work the same way in the Finnish context. Because Canada is a pluralist society, where dual 
identities exist easily and harmoniously, recategorization is different than in societies where 
this is not so (Dovidio et al., 2007).Thus, I used different superordinate groups for each of 
the questions, namely Finnish residents for one, and humans (in general) for the second (see 
Appendices 3 and 4 for the precise questions). I expected that the question recategorizing 
immigrants into the human group would be more highly endorsed than the one 
recategorizing immigrants into the Finnish residents group. This theory was tested using a 
one sample t-test, collapsed across conditions. The question recategorizing immigrants into 
the human group (M = 5.11) was rated higher than the question recategorizing them as 
Finnish residents (M = 3.98). A one sample t-test (collapsed across conditions) was 
conducted between each of the means, finding a significant difference between them, t(194) 
= 32.90, p < .001, ES = .92, d = 4.72. This issue was not relevant to my hypotheses, but was 
important to check for the sake of comparability between Canadian and Finnish samples.  
Programs of Study 
To get a better understanding of how programs of study functioned with prejudice, they 
were examined in more detail. As noted, I had not intended to recruit social sciences or 
humanities students, because they have been found to be higher in universalism and 
consequently lower in prejudice (Myyry & Helkama, 2001; Feather & Mckee, 2008), which 
appears to hold true in this sample as well. Differences in prejudice means across condition 
and by program group can be seen in Table 17.  
Table 17. Prejudice means by program of study, total and across condition 
 Total  Animal  Geology 
 n M (SD)   n M (SD)   n M (SD) 
Social Sciences 31 2.25 (.49)  13 2.35 (.61)  18 2.18 (.39) 
Arts & Humanities 72 2.54 (.79)  36 2.51 (.97)  36 2.56 (.56) 
Education 22 2.51 (.49)  16 2.43 (.44)  6 2.71 (.61) 
Health Care 21 3.25 (.78)  10 3.37 (.70)  11 3.14 (.86) 
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Science & Technology 12 2.84 (1.02)  5 2.54 (.66)  7 3.06 (1.23) 
Economics & Business 18 2.99 (1.09)  9 3.00 (.93)  9 2.98 (1.29) 
Misc. polytechnic 15 3.22 (.69)  8 2.95 (.72)  7 3.53 (.53) 
Unspecified 4 3.89 (1.16)  2 3.14 (.20)  2 4.64 (1.31) 
 
Overall, aside from the unspecified group, health care had the highest prejudice levels, 
closely followed by miscellaneous polytechnic, then economics and business, science and 
technology, arts and humanities, education, and finally, social sciences came in at a full 
point beneath health care. Because the program of study moderated the effects of prejudice, 
a t-test was conducted to see if removing social sciences and arts and humanities students 
would show effects by condition, but it was non-significant, possibly resulting from the 
unusually high health care scores. A t-test just using the demographic that was aimed for 
and initially expected (polytechnic, economics and business, and science and technology 
students) was likewise non-significant; the groups being tested were very small.  
Editorial effects on emotions 
Beyond the hypothesis and significant results stating that the animal editorial would 
have an effect on uniquely human emotions for immigrants, it unexpectedly had an 
effect on each of the other emotion variables. The animal editorial was significantly 
higher on uniquely human emotions for Finns t(193) = 2.75, p = .006, ES = .19, d = .40, 
as well as non-uniquely human emotions for Finns t(193) = 3.29, p = .001, ES = .23, d = 
.47, and immigrants t(193) = 3.17, p = .002, ES = .22, d = .46. They have similar effect 
sizes (including uniquely human emotions for immigrants) indicating that the editorial 
had a similar effect on each of the emotion scales, which was not predicted. 
Testing Values 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, there were several interesting correlations 
between values and the main variables, which can be seen in Table 18. Additionally, the 
correlations between all values can be seen in Table 19. 
 
 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     134 
   
Table 18. Correlations between all values, main variables, and animal-human 
continuity 
 Prejudice Emotions 
(UHI) 
Traits 
(UHI) 
Empathy Recat. AHC 
SDT -.18** .02 -.07 .01 .13* .12* 
SDA -.14* .01 .02 -.08 .06 .09 
ST .05 -.02 .08 -.01 .20** .03 
HE .00 -.05 -.02 .01 .09 -.09 
AC .04 .21** -.14* .03 -.04 -.07 
POD .14* .13* -.14* -.04 -.04 -.02 
POR .34*** -.08 -.18** -.14* -.21** -.08 
FA .07 .05 -.17** -.08 -.23*** .02 
SEP .13* -.09 .05 -.22*** -.15* -.17** 
SES .37*** -.14* -.08 -.18** -.39*** -.03 
TR .35*** -.07 -.12* -.08 -.26*** -.04 
COR .16* -.03 -.03 -.11 -.11 -.07 
COI .03 -.04 -.00 -.11 -.10 -.10 
HU .04 -.05 -.01 -.00 .07 .03 
BED -.11 -.08 .08 -.07 .07 -.10 
BEC -.11 -.09 .25*** .09 .11 -.03 
UNC -.63*** .13* .25*** .38*** .33*** .15* 
UNN -.34*** .09 .14* .32*** .25*** .20** 
UNT -.47*** .03 .27*** .28*** .39*** .13* 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (1-tailed)
NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND PREJUDICE     135 
   
Table 19. Correlations between all values, with means and standard deviations 
 SDT SDA ST HE AC POD POR FA SEP SES TR COR COI HU BED BEC UNC UNN UNT 
SDT –                   
SDA .47*** –                  
ST .21*** .20** –                 
HE -.15* -.05 .38*** –                
AC -.01 .11 .07 -.08 –               
POD -.11 -.03 .14* .02 .47*** –              
POR -.28*** -.17** .03 .06 .46*** .47*** –             
FA -.24*** -.07 -.30*** -.01 .13* .05 .16* –            
SEP -.04 .12 -.29*** -.19** -.05 -.15* -.05 -.03 –           
SES -.19** -.18** -.21** -.29*** -.15* -.02 .09 .01 .26*** –          
TR -.33*** -.43*** -.19** -.19** -.08 -.04 .10 .01 -.07 .46*** –         
COR -.38*** -.27*** -.48*** -.30*** -.13* -.13* .05 -.01 .17** .18** .24*** –        
COI -.24*** -.29*** -.34*** -.08 -.20** -.21** -.05 .12* -.04 -.08 .01 .29*** –       
HU -.19* -.20** -.05 .07 -.41*** -.32*** -.28*** .01 -.16* -.08 .00 .09 .34*** –      
BED -.12* -.04 -.06 .04 -.27*** -.20** -.18** -.11 .00 -.21** -.14* .11 .11 .04 –     
BEC -.10 -.14* -.16* -.10 -.35*** -.34*** -.37*** -.25*** .15* .03 -.01 .09 .08 .08 .33*** –    
UNC .35*** .13* .00 .02 -.27*** -.31*** -.46*** -.19** -.16* -.26*** -.30*** -.30*** -.18** -.03 .04 .12 –   
UNN .25*** .11 .05 -.15* -.18** -.20** -.47*** -.24*** -.06 -.27*** -.25*** -.22*** -.19** -.01 .00 .16* .43*** –  
UNT .40*** .16* .11 .042 -.30*** -.37*** -.47*** -.29*** -.19** -.30*** -.28*** -.30*** -.19** .07 .10 .17** .71*** .35*** – 
M 1.22 1.18 .97 1.04 .91 .67 .55 .98 1.14 .93 .72 .88 .92 .93 1.24 1.22 1.25 1.03 1.22 
SD .18 .16 .23 .22 .22 .22 .22 .23 .18 .21 .27 .26 .23 .19 .14 .15 .20 .26 .19 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (1-tailed) 
